215. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva0
Tosec 137. Following is first sitrep on coup d’etat in Republic of Korea subsequent to information contained Seoul’s 1524 previously [Page 453] passed Secretary in Geneva.1 Subsequent sitreps will be transmitted as need arises and also rptd info Ottawa for President during his visit there.
Military coup d’etat began in Seoul pre-dawn May 16, carried out by few ROK Army airborne units and elements first ROK Marine Brigade under leadership Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui, Deputy CG Second ROK Army. These military units swiftly took over ROK military headquarters, principal communications and governmental centers. Indications also that coup has affected some other urban centers. Coup group made its first broadcast over Seoul radio 5 AM May 16 in name of Military Revolutionary Committee “which is revolutionary govt” stating Chairman is Lt Gen Chang To-yong, Chief of Staff ROK Army, and Deputy Chairman Maj Gen Pak. So far seven decrees known to have been issued ordering martial law throughout ROK, night curfew, full censorship, restricted use of airports and seaports, ban on travel out of Korea by Koreans, ban on public meetings, dissolution of National Assembly and local councils, arrest of all Cabinet Ministers and Vice Ministers, freezing of all banking activities, and protection of lives and property of foreign troops and diplomatic personnel. Coup group also broadcast six-point program calling for continuation anti-Communist policy, support for US and UN, “economic revolution,” preparations for unification of country and turning over govt to “new and honest” politicians.
With less than 4000 ROK military personnel estimated to comprise coup units controlling Seoul, bulk of regular ROK armed forces have apparently made no attempt either assist or interfere with coup operations. First ROK Army CG, Lt Gen Yi Han-lim, and Second ROK army CG (formerly ROK Army Chief of Staff) Lt Gen Choe Kyong-nok reportedly not in sympathy with coup leaders. Position of present Chief of Staff Gen Chang To-yong seems equivocal. He has reportedly declined call on other ROK Army units to put down coup, presumably on ground this would cause considerable bloodshed. On other hand Gen Chang has apparently not cast his lot with coup group. Latter’s use of Gen Chang’s name as coup leader appears unauthorized and incorrect.
On morning May 16 Gen Magruder, as CINCUNC, issued statement calling on all military personnel his command to support ROK Govt headed by PriMin Chang Myon and expressing CINCUNC’s expectation that chiefs ROK forces “will use their authority and influence to see that control is immediately turned back to lawful governmental authorities” and that order restored in armed forces. Charge Green issued statement concurring in above position and saying US supports constitutional government of ROK. Texts of both statements carried over US [Page 454] Armed Forces Korea radio network, but reportedly carried by only one domestic Korean newspaper as result censorship. Dept has issued brief official statement and has given press brief factual resume of events and political backgrounders indicating, however, Dept not yet in position make any assessments of future prospects. Dept has also told press there are no indications that American lives or property are in imminent danger.
Charge Green and Gen Magruder mid-day May 16 had three-hour meeting with ROK President Yun Po-sun.2 Gen Magruder told President he believed Chief of Staff Chang loyal to ROKG and that Chang had urged insurgent leader Pak insure order, safeguard public officials and submit rebel group’s complaints to duly constituted govt. Magruder also emphasized any usurpation of govt authority by insurgent group at gunpoint would be disastrous for future of Korea. Green stressed constructive achievements present govt and that any change in govt by force would jeopardize survival of hard-won ROK democratic institutions, takeover by military clique in defiance of law would harm ROK’s international prestige. Green recognized that many officers involved in coup might be motivated by patriotism, however misdirected.
President Yun in taking partial issue with Magruder and Green said popular dissatisfaction and disillusionment with Chang administration widespread, corruption extensive and extended to high places in govt, ROK needed strong govt and Chang Myon had proven incapable of providing such leadership. Yun believed solution would have to come through establishment supra-partisan national cabinet including leaders from both within and without National Assembly. He did not specify whether he envisaged his solution as taking place inside or outside existing Constitutional framework.
PriMin Chang’s whereabouts uncertain, but he believed to be in hiding since coup began.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5-1661. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Manhard; cleared by Bacon and William B. Coolidge, Chief of the East Asia Division of INR; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to Ottawa, Bangkok for Vice President Johnson, Athens, Taipei, Tokyo, and Paris TOPOL. Rusk was in Geneva for the opening sessions of the Geneva Conference on Laos.↩
- Telegram 1524, May 16, received in the Department of State on May 15 at 5:21 a.m., was the first notice of the coup. Charge Green stated that he approved Magruder’s decision not to release U.S. forces to put down the coup. (Ibid.)↩
- As reported in telegram 1536 from Seoul, May 16, 9 p.m., received in the Department of State on May 15 at 11 a.m. (Ibid.)↩