Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, April 1, 1961, 5:03 p.m.

1123. One of greatest concerns you will continue face when you assume your leadership of FE¹ is very dubious future free Korea so long as ROK lacks forceful leadership, exhibits serious weakness in moral fiber, and permits graft and corruption on scale equalling if not excelling that during moral nadir of Rhee regime. Evidence is clear that youth and intelligentsia most Asian countries are in no mood in latter 20th Century to continue stomaching “typically Asian” accommodation to graft, nepotism and apathy of past centuries; and history has shown that they are more ready to accept the high costs in human values exacted by communism (even when these are understood fully, and all the more when they are not) then we tend to find credible before the fact. When sufficiently revolted by apathetic drifting and by illegal gains for the elite, the totalitarian aspects of communism appear less fearsome and its austerity and determined purposes may become positively attractive, in the hunger for national material progress leading, they hope, to national dignity at last. You will be able to draw on your uncommonly thorough knowledge of the antecedents to the China mainland collapse in developing this troublingly recurrent theme in post-war Asian realities. Unfortunately we are having similar problems in Laos, Viet-Nam, and in varying degrees elsewhere. US wealth and military might will prove unavailing in situations where indigenous motivation is weak and governmental actions and self-discipline desultory. Repose of many KMT mainland leaders in childish confidence that “our friend, the great US cannot afford to let the communists take China” comes to mind.

Department hopes that in final talks with ROK leaders you will make occasion for earnest, unhurried exposition of above theme, adapted as you deem most effective and appropriate. We offer below additional points directed more specifically to Korean scene. It is recognized that you have made frequent representations along these lines, but it may be helpful to cite Washington view to lend additional emphasis to seriousness of need for far more resolute leadership in national development if disaster is to be averted in next few years or sooner. Your new position should add considerable weight to the seriousness of your presentations. While we deal below primarily with deficiencies, Department does not overlook positive contributions which Chang government has made and are well known to you. You will wish to interlard these, but restrainedly.

1. ROKG seems unduly concerned with press reactions and postures taken by elements in Korean political scene which deserve examination ascertain whether they are still of importance. Too often it seems here that Chang Govt has plotted its course from old landmarks which are no longer controlling and has failed to recognize the commanding importance of youthful element in the political spectrum which accomplished the April revolution and gave the new ROKG power to move in an area formerly completely stratified. Thus bemused ROKG may overlook salient fact that it must make some visible progress toward the improvement of life and prospects of the youthful element in Korea and their descendants if Administration is to remain in power. Otherwise it might be replaced by some political element equally myopic which if in turn thrown out could leave a highly volatile dangerous situation in which the appeal of unification of the country might be so great as to tempt the South Korean people to enter the Communist crab pot.

2. It must be recognized that with principal exception of National Construction Service, actions so far have generally been removal of past abuses. But even the Construction Service is in urgent need, not only of funds (which may be voted this weekend), but of good planning and energetic follow-through. This imaginative and obviously useful program is of type to win popular support for ROKG and to meet in a tangible way demands of ROK unemployed and underemployed for some progress toward a better life and better use of human resources which comprise ROK greatest asset. Its resolute implementation will benefit all Koreans through irrigation, reclamation, reforestation, highway construction, etc. Its failure will only heighten public sense of frustration and weaken confidence in the effectiveness of the revolutionary government.

3. Department notes mounting signs of frustration and resentment directed at government, and at US as well, over slow pace of reform and progress. Apparent acceptance by ROKG of legislative practice of politics-as-usual feeds fires of press and popular criticism and tends undermine faith in democratic mechanisms for national development. We do not believe that Chang government will fail survive critical month ahead, but we are convinced that its strength will be eroded unless it adopts programs and policies which can command general support of people and pursues them with energy, thereby turning the tables on the venal, malicious, or ambitious opposition it presently faces in the legislature and in its own party.

4. In Washington view recent attempt to widen National Security Law is symptomatic of negative approach to present danger—an approach which will create more problems that it solves. What Korea needs is informed, cohesive society moving in agreed directions toward defined goals. Social discipline and order comes from basic convictions and understanding of men; laws and regulations are of no value without broad popular support and effective social agencies to apply and enforce them.

5. US believes that following points demand immediate attention and action by ROKG:

a. National planning, both economic and social, on practical concepts, with effective participation by leading Korean personalities and promising younger people. Planning activities to be supported by public information program.

b. Energetic, non-political promotion of National Construction Service as a matter of greatest national urgency, and which presents opportunity to train and use practical skills in highway engineering, building and mechanical trades, agriculture and forestry.

c. Removal of police from politics and promotion of its morals and esprit de corps as dignified, self-contained public service agency.

d. Civil Service reform.

e. Continued emphasis on tax reform, including equitable and effective collection.

6. USG prepared to assist to fullest possible extent in planning and implementation and also recognizes that as Korean War era recedes into history US programs must put far more emphasis on development. Nevertheless initiative in planning and implementation must come from Korean leadership if it is to be meaningful for Korean people. USG will continue support for Korean economic and political development and looks forward to continuation this cordial relationship in future and to steadily increasing effectiveness of ROKG in directing and promoting national development to meet popular aspirations for well-being, security and freedom. In last analysis the future of Korea as reunified and sovereign member of Free World community depends upon success of national leadership in bringing about this development. Assistance from other nations can supplement but never replace progress of Korean people themselves and can be effective only when such progress is being made.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4-161. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Peterson, Jenkins, and MacDonald; cleared in substance with Vettel and Bane of NA, and in draft by Bacon; cleared by Steeves; and approved by Peterson.
1. On April 18 McConaughy became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.