Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, October 14, 1963.

McGB:

Trouble ahead with Algeria. We are now seeing a major Soviet and Chicom effort to woo Ben Bella regime. First step was Soviet $100 billion [million?] three-year credit. Now we have reports USSR may give Algeria 12 MTBs, 3 sub-chasers, and some MIGs; this may be a result of Boumedienne’s recent Moscow visit. 450 Algerians are getting military training in the Bloc. Chicoms have entered the competition with $50 million credit at no interest.

At this very time, our relations with Ben Bella have been cooling noticeably. BB’s nationalizations (especially of three papers) led to a spate of press criticism here (Newsweek was worst—BB another Castro). Algerians reacted violently; they even protested that campaign seemed inspired. Then US press overplaying of Kabylia “revolt” led to expulsion of several newsmen. This will give BB an even worse press here, just when Moscow and Peiping are moving in.

If Ben Bella were in real trouble [1 line of source text not declassified] I’d be less worried. But we and French both think BB is in the saddle for quite a while. So holding off in hopes of some new faces leaves me cold.¹

Another complication is that the French, who have been carrying the chief aid burden in Algeria ($200 million this year), might draw back if BB reacts violently to their next A-test or puts squeeze on their oil. If so, BB will no doubt lean even further east.

Thus I see a potentially quite adverse trend in our Algerian affairs, especially painful since we gained quite some capital by our responsive attitude during formative stages of Ben Bella regime. I have no panaceas to suggest; I question whether we could or should enter a major competition with the East. But I don’t see our present effort as enough either, however. We gave $77 million in food FY’63 and are planning about the same this year (plus $2 million or so for students and Four Areas food-for-work deal). Perhaps $20 million is available for project loans but nobody is pushing this.

If Algeria were Chad or Dahomey, I’d worry less, but it’s the key to the Maghreb on the one really important coast of Africa. It’s worth a larger investment than at present (compared to over $300 million on Congo or $50-55 million on Guinea through FY 64).

More important than aid, however, is to be reasonably sympathetic during BB’s Sturm und Drang period, no matter how outrageously he may behave. Like Nasser, he may take what he wants from the Soviets without leaning too far East, if we keep a Western door open too. Here again, the problem is how to stay on good terms with a young, doctrinaire and dubious regime, braving the necessary criticism (from Morocco and Tunisia as well as domestically) while keeping our eyes on the long pull. I’m sure the President feels this way, yet unless he gives a clear signal (e.g. by such gestures as receiving BB, or sending suitable delegation to 1 November celebration), the bureaucracy is going to stay timid.²

R.W. Komer³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. The source text indicates two attachments: A memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 14, which discussed the revolt in the Kabylia region of Algeria, which had begun on September 29, and the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict, which had escalated since the first serious armed clash on October 8 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG); and telegram 734 from Algiers, which advised against sending a high-level U.S. delegation to the Algerian ceremonies planned for November 1, the anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria’s revolution in 1954, which Communist governments intended to attend at the ministerial level (Ibid., POL 17-4 ALG).
1. A handwritten note in the margin by Komer at this point reads: “State reached same conclusion. See attached. RWK.”
2. On October 17, Komer sent the President a memorandum stating that Guellal had just informed U.S. officials that Ben Bella had definitely cancelled his U.N. trip. Guellal had also said that Ben Bella had “much appreciated” the word he had received indicating that Kennedy wanted to see him and that he wanted them to understand that the cancellation was caused solely by his problems at home. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.