Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco⁰

Washington, December 24, 1963, 5:36 p.m.

1246. Ref. Rabat’s 947.¹ Following are suggested talking points your further discussions with British, French, and Spanish ambassadors Rabat relating King’s latest approach. FYI. Department hopes replies governments to King can be as much in accord as possible, but at same time does not wish commit U.S. join others in any line of action which may be counter our broader objectives. End FYI.

1. King’s approach has two elements: his immediate difficulties with Algerians and his desire for additional arms.

2. We believe conditions which King reports Algerians have attached resumption full diplomatic relations unwarranted. Reports from other sources, however, suggest conditions may be less onerous than those described by King. They would seem center about completion work mixed commission, with which we certainly would not take issue, and normalization treatment Algerians in Morocco, which seems logical request from Algerian point view. If we do determine Algerians have posed conditions as described by King, U.S. willing use such influence as it possesses in Algeria emphasize benefit resumption full relations and seek removal conditions.

3. We are guided primarily by desire preserve present momentum toward African solution. This objective directly conditions our attitude toward additional arms for Morocco.

4. We agree evidence indicates Algerians moving to position of materiel advantage and, with completion current training, may become tactically on par with Moroccans or superior to Moroccans. Due weight should be given, however, to fact UAR has not demonstrated great military prowess elsewhere. King’s concern over their role, while understandable, may overemphasize real danger. Direct Soviet role has been limited and Cuban role minor, though symbolic. UAR desires keep Cubans out.

5. Morocco does, in our view, face threat from instability in Algeria and from continued risk break in cease-fire by stray shot or initiative individual commanders for political purposes. We also have evidence Algerians may still have substantial military stocks in Libya which Libyans may be prepared release to them.

6. Before considering alteration our present policy toward aid to Morocco, however, believe we must assure ourselves King is not seeking alternative to acceptance African solution. We know he has been reluctant accept withdrawal arrangements worked out on frontier and agreed to by Algerians. We know his military commanders reluctant accept any solution which may require Morocco give up areas now under their control. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He may feel current circumstances give sufficient weight this picture to persuade us of need for additional aid and commitment to Moroccan side. U.S. continues believe King running major risk in isolating himself from remainder of Africa. This danger would be accentuated by accepting conspicuous new Western aid.

7. Prospect additional Soviet arms Morocco is naturally matter of concern. King can hardly sustain picture his pro-Western stance, however, and accept substantial Soviet aid. Believe we should make every effort dissuade him, but yet not indicate this so alarms us we are prepared go extraordinary lengths prevent it.

8. King’s approach further concerns us since it represents continuation his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] efforts acquire arms without any indication careful planning, either from financial or military standpoint. Evidence substantial purchases in Europe points to this.

9. Given these factors, believe our initial response to King should be designed: (a) assure him our continued support for independence Morocco; (b) assure him continued reasonable flow normal Western military assistance; (c) indicate our willingness make representations Algerians with respect diplomatic relations problem, if Algerians have set unreasonable conditions; (d) urge his continued cooperation with African solution including withdrawal agreement; and (e) consideration his raising problem with Haile Selassie and Keita and point out acceptance Soviet arms would weaken his case both with West and with Africans who have tended support Morocco because of arms buildup in Algeria.

10. U.S. would be prepared re-examine situation in light responses these demarches. FYI. Policy set forth in Deptel 1965 to Madrid² remains basis our approach. However, in view serious limitations on foreign aid, U.S. response in military aid terms would probably be minimal in event further aid deemed necessary. End FYI.

Algiers’ 1307³ just received. Department has no objection your seeking reaction French, British, and Spanish ambassadors suggestion para 4. You may also explore privately with French Ambassador (without reference to Porter) ideas paras 5 and 6. Preparation actual reply to King must await your further discussions your three colleagues and receipt comments other interested posts.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Symmes, Long, Ortiz, Hadsel, Adams, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris, London, Madrid, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Tunis, and Algiers.
1. In telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, Ferguson reported that King Hassan was gravely concerned over the danger from Algeria and worried that Moroccan military strength would soon be outmatched by Algeria’s. He indicated that he was considering accepting deliveries of Soviet arms. Hassan complained that the Algerian Government had refused to accept the appointed Moroccan Ambassador or return their Ambassador to Rabat until the Bamako frontier commission had completed its work and Morocco normalized its relations with Egypt and Cuba, which Algeria did not wish to offend. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 1965 to Madrid, December 2, outlined the U.S. position toward the Algerian-Moroccan conflict as presented to Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Munoz Grandes in conversations with Rusk and Williams in Washington November 25-26. The United States supported an African solution to the crisis; it agreed with Spain that Morocco should not be permitted to fall under anti-Western influence; if Algeria broke the cease-fire and continued its extraordinary military build-up, the situation would be out of control and would require reassessment. In such an event, the United States hoped Spain and France could provide aid to Morocco, which it would back up with some assistance of its own. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1307 from Algiers, December 24, Porter suggested trying to induce the French, British, and Spanish Ambassadors to emphasize to the Algerian Government that the situation was moving into a dangerous stage because of the continuing arrival of Soviet and UAR arms. Porter also recommended inducing the French Ambassador to take the lead. He reported that he had already discussed with the French Ambassador certain ideas, including expressions of concern over the influx of Soviet and Egyptian arms and the need for demilitarization of the frontier. (Ibid.)