Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia⁰

Washington, November 12, 1963, 7:31 p.m.

429. OAU Foreign Ministers’ Conference. Following is your guidance re U.S role at OAU Foreign Ministers Conference¹ on Moroccan-Algerian conflict: (Appropriate background material pouched Nov. 8)

A. General: U.S. desires continue its unobtrusive but active encouragement settlement in African context. As has been case during development conflict and at Bamako, we desire you keep us currently informed of progress conference and send urgently any recommendations for steps U.S. might appropriately take to facilitate solution. At same time, we are conscious conspicuous U.S. role could be misunderstood by Africans and particularly by one or other of parties to dispute.

To meet this objective, suggest your primary effort follow conference be with IEG officials. You will wish to avoid any early initiatives in seeking out Moroccans and Algerians and be wary, if approached, of their seeking to involve U.S. in the details of their dispute. Such contacts once begun by one side or the other should be to the extent possible balanced. In exchanges of information you should confine yourself chiefly to European missions, particularly French. In order avoid too great attention our role, suggest circulation by U.S. Embassy representatives among other delegations be kept to minimum except at public and social events where contact expected.

B. Presidential Message: To establish basis U.S. interest, you will receive separately message from President to Emperor.

C. Oral Demarche: Suggest prior conference, you set forth U.S. position as set forth Depcirtel 826,² making following additional points:

1. U.S. concerned, as result its contacts with interested African states, that Morocco and Algeria may each be concentrating on seeking votes for its regime and basic position on frontier rather than for means of settlement. Concentration on choosing sides in present conflict could be serious for African unity as well as frustrating genuine efforts find means of solution. (FYI—We are also concerned by possibility Emperor may himself opt for Algerian position on frontiers with Somali problem in mind. While some similarities exist, many features are different. We trust Emperor can be encouraged exercise maximum influence by not himself choosing sides to determine success conference. End FYI.)

2. From our study of problem, we doubt solution can be found in brief span of meeting. We would hope impartial arbitrators could be appointed and time provided for cooling off of current tempers. During this period, cease-fire must be maintained. We remain concerned that in absence clear withdrawal by both sides more observers, equipped for rapid movement, may be needed.

3. We hope conference can focus, also, on problem limiting outside intervention in conflict through excessive shipments military material and introduction foreign troops and technicians. U.S. recognizes right both countries acquire needed equipment in present crisis, but is apprehensive some outside powers such as UAR, Cuba and USSR may seek occasion build up own positions without reference need for peaceful settlement.

We strongly believe injection large numbers foreign advisers and troops likely to exacerbate situation and should be avoided.

U.S. military program in Morocco was initiated in 1959, is of modest proportions and designed to permit GOM to ensure its internal security only. With exception small number USAF personnel in purely and temporary training function there are no U.S. personnel involved. There is no U.S. intention to increase program in present conflict.

4. Consequences failure reach agreement on means for solution could be resumption conflict with much greater threat escalation, general disappointment in African organization, and introduction problem in United Nations. Neither we nor Africans desire this.

D. (FYI) Relations with Disputants: U.S. has sought follow impartial policy between Morocco and Algeria. King Hassan had hoped for more conspicuous and forthright support from U.S. We have not believed this in his interest or ours. Consequently, Moroccans sensitive over U.S. role. In view key U.S. interests Morocco and close association, it is important Moroccans be given no cause believe U.S. in any way favoring Algeria at conference. At same time we wish avoid any Moroccan efforts identify us with their viewpoint.

Relations with Algeria currently on even keel after Yazid talk with President and general recognition impartial U.S. role. However, this subject rapid change in this disorganized country. (End FYI)

Embs. Algiers and Rabat should provide make up and evaluation delegations sent.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and McClintic and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid.
1. The Bamako agreement called for a special meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The conference took place in Addis Ababa November 15-18.
2. Document 28.