Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, October 16, 1963, 7:19 p.m.

1114. Ref: Rome’s 1062 rptd Bonn 128;¹ Mogadiscio’s 305 rptd Bonn 49.² Reftels indicate there may still be room for saving western aid program and precluding Soviet arms to Somalia. Department particularly notes President Aden’s appeal to President Segni for support from west, coupled with Aden’s remark about confronting two plans of military aid in order allow Somalis balance political and economic as well as military factors. Also significant are Abscir’s statements to effect final commitment to USSR has not yet been made by GSR and that President Aden may still be able exert influence against arms deal with Soviets.

Department requests US reps explore with Germans and Italians following lines of action:

1. Presentation in writing western military aid plan, giving approximate size and scope of program and indicating willingness to meet with Daud and other Somali military reps to discuss requirements and programming. At same time inform Somali officials clearly that contemplated western military aid program could not be carried out if GSR accepts arms assistance from Soviet Union or any other bloc source.

2. Note to GSR to be followed by joint meeting at Mogadiscio with reps western embassies on one side and top level GSR officials on the other at which western reps will stress to GSR officials the political and economic difficulties which would be created if GSR accepted Soviet arms offer.

Points listed by western reps could include: (a) observation that western military aid program is largely grant whereas Soviet policy is usually insist on cash or credit terms; (b) disastrous effect of Soviet arms on Somali budgetary and financial situation. Western powers ask how GSR can meet payments to USSR as well as provide substantial support costs needed to implement Soviet program; (c) despite GSR’s proclamations of neutrality, acceptance Soviet arms offer will inevitably lead in minds African and western states to strong identification Somalia with Soviet policies and objectives; (d) western powers recognize that on various and frequent occasions, GSR has reiterated its intention pursue national policy goals only by peaceful and legal means. If GSR accepts Soviet arms, however, Ethiopia and Kenya will almost automatically conclude that such arms would be available for use in Ogaden or NFD. On other hand, if GSR receiving military aid only from western sources, Ethiopia and Kenya would retain some degree of confidence that no encouragement being given by aid suppliers to using of arms in irregular actions. Moreover, fact that west is source of supply would reduce temptation engage in preventive action against Somalia.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Robinson, O’Mahony, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rome, London, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi (by pouch).
1. Telegram 1062 from Rome, October 15, reported that the Italian Government was prepared to come up with a definite plan to meet Somalia’s defense needs. (Ibid., POL 7 SOMALI)
2. Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 19 SOMALI)