157. Editorial Note
On November 20, 1963, the Department of State conveyed its reservations about highlighting U.S. withdrawal from U.S. bases in Morocco any more than absolutely necessary to Ambassador Ferguson in Rabat. The Department noted that despite U.S. efforts to get Moroccan cooperation on post-withdrawal operation of the bases, the Moroccans had given no indication of their readiness to take over, and Washington agencies (except in the case of Nouasseur) were not prepared to assume long-term responsibility. The Ambassador was instructed to inform the Moroccan Government that the U.S. Air Force intended to relinquish Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane on December 2 and Nouasseur on December 16, and that all U.S. responsibility for the bases would cease on those dates. It was hoped that news of the early withdrawals from Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane would move the Moroccan Government into taking some action at Nouasseur, where a breakdown of operating capability would be all the more embarrassing in view of the plans for its utilization. The Department stated that civilian technicians still in Morocco could operate the Nouasseur utilities if hired promptly by the Moroccan Government or AID, but not unassisted for any length of time. (Telegram 1159 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-10 MOR-US)
On December 6, the Embassy in Rabat reported that the last Air Force contingents had left Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir on the morning of December 2, but that it had received no reaction to its note of November 22 giving the evacuation dates nor any expression of interest in employing technicians after December 16. (Telegram 873 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department asked the Ambassador on December 9 to raise the question of widespread pilferage at the bases formally and at the highest possible level, and to reiterate that the United States accepted no responsibility for the condition of the bases at their transfer since the Moroccan Army had been present on them for months for the specific purpose of maintaining their physical security and equipment intact. (Telegram 1199 to Rabat; ibid.)
On December 11, Ferguson reported that he had told Foreign Minister Guedira that the United States was not planning any base turnover ceremonies at either Nouasseur or Kenitra, and that Guedira had asked whether some of the U.S. officers in Morocco could be present at such ceremonies if they were organized by Moroccans. (Telegram 901 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department responded that the Ambassador was authorized to permit participation in such ceremonies to the extent he thought required. (Telegram 1216 to Rabat, December 12; ibid.)
Before the turnover ceremony on December 16, Ambassador Ferguson met with King Hassan, who expressed his dismay at the condition in which Ben Guerir had been left by the U.S. Air Force. (Telegram 917 from [Page 241] Rabat, December 16; ibid.) The King reviewed the agreement reached in Washington concerning United States use of the communications facilities at Kenitra, and told the Ambassador that the turnover ceremony marked a new phase of the U.S.-Moroccan relationship. (Telegram 918 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) Ferguson reported that a brief ceremony was held before the last U.S. airmen left Nouasseur at noon. He had spoken in general terms of the friendship between the two countries at the Kenitra ceremony later that day, and Guedira’s speech had attributed the Kenitra cooperation to the close ties between the King and President Kennedy. (Telegram 923 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.)