Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert)⁰

Washington, September 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Base Problems

In your memorandum of 20 September 1961,¹ you recommended that any program of US support for the Moroccan Air Force, involving under present circumstances no guarantee of post-1963 SAC tenure in Morocco, should be carefully designed to avoid prejudicing our relations with Spain and future tenure at our Spanish bases.

In considering whether to recommend to the President that an assistance program be undertaken, we have had this aspect of the matter uppermost in mind. While we would hope that the program might later produce Moroccan cooperation on any continuing SAC post-1963 requirements, we foresee no assurance of this. The purpose of the program would be a calculated effort, albeit without certainty, to preclude further Soviet penetration of the Moroccan Air Force with equipment and technicians. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force have emphasized the threat which such Soviet penetration presents for our operations in Morocco and in Spain.

We agree that the impact of this program on US-Spanish relations is a critical aspect of the problem. ISA has now concurred in the program, because of the considered judgment, at the highest levels of the State Department, that the proposed program would not jeopardize our continued use of the Spanish bases after 1963 (although) we can anticipate increased Spanish demands for military assistance).

The recommendation to the President will be that the program should be kept to a minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support to the Moroccan Air Force. Initially, we would ascertain whether the establishment of flying training facilities and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco’s air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, our offer would be limited to F-86s. Should the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insist on an improved type of jet, a further determination must then be made in Washington weighing all circumstances at the time, whether to proceed with our offer of assistance. It is clearly understood by all concerned that F-100s are not now available due to the Berlin and other contingency planning.

Ambassador Bonsal has placed heavy emphasis on the need for a highly competent Air Force officer, fluent in French and preferably of general officer rank, to discuss the program with King Hassan and senior officers of the Moroccan Air Force. The success of evolving a program satisfactory to the King, which also falls within limits acceptable to us, could well rest on the influence this officer can bring to bear. Accordingly, it is requested that an officer be carefully selected at the earliest possible time to carry out this task, with the possibility in mind that he may be called to Morocco in the early days of October. It is impossible to predict the length of his stay there. However, we should plan on his being available for this project for at least three months.

As to a JCS opinion, the Chiefs have already given us a military judgment on the desirability of retaining the Moroccan bases, and we are well aware of the importance they attach to the Spanish bases. Since the crucial question is one of political judgment—whether this offer to Morocco will jeopardize the Spanish position—I do not think a further opinion by the Chiefs is required at the present time.

Robert S. McNamara²

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco 686, 10 Jan 62. Secret. Drafted by Lang. Attached to a memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to Secretary McNamara recommending that he sign the attached response to Secretary Zuckert’s memorandum, and noting that if he and Under Secretary Bowles approved, the proposed offer would be conveyed to the President.
1. Secretary Zuckert’s memorandum had argued that since there was little or no possibility of effective use of U.S. bases in Morocco after 1963, the only significant benefit to hope for was precluding their future use by unfriendly forces. This meant that the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on its Spanish bases and thus any U.S. action in Morocco should not prejudice U.S. relations with Spain. (Ibid.)
2. Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.