119. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Navy (Fay) to President Kennedy0
SUBJ
- Retention of Department of Defense Facilities in Morocco
The Eisenhower-King Mohammed V agreement in December 1959 stated in part that the United States would withdraw from its bases in Morocco prior to December 31, 1963 with the possible exception of certain communications facilities in Kenitra. This latter exception was deliberately included to protect and retain if possible, not only the Navy’s main radio [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but also the supporting Navy air and sea communications facilities in Kenitra proper. This complex is the Navy’s most important in the European-African area.
It is the Navy’s position that if certain moves are made, she will be able to keep her very important naval communications installations near Port Lyautey. Our justification for this position is based on the following.
King Hassan II had personally scheduled a departure call on Thursday, 13 July for Captain John L. Counihan, File Number 071627, who was under orders to return to CONUS for duty.1 Prior to Captain Counihan’s appointment, the King scheduled Ambassador Phillip Bonsal for his initial discussions which, it is understood, included the question of United States bases.2
During the conference with Captain Counihan, the King expressed his personal and Morocco’s regret at the Captain’s departure and [Page 183] inquired if the Captain was interested in remaining in Morocco for a longer time. He said that he would like to have the Captain serve as a special technical adviser to his Minister of Interior and Chief of Royal Cabinet, M. Guedira, in matters pertaining to the bases. He indicated he would amplify these instructions upon the return of Captain Counihan to Morocco after his discussions with the proper Washington officials. He then added that he recognized the importance of the U.S. Navy communications facilities in Morocco to the support of U.S. Navy forces in the Mediterranean and he, the King, felt that a suitable arrangement could be made between the Government of Morocco and the United States for their continued use after 1963. As to the main Navy base in Kenitra, he expressed an opinion that after the French withdrawal, the base could be converted to a Moroccan base in which the U.S. Navy would remain as tenants and with an additional role as instructor in maintenance and technical fields for the Moroccan Armed Forces on that base. He thought that the Moroccan Navy (2 PCs) could profit from U.S. Navy’s assistance.
He then asked that Captain Counihan personally convey these sentiments in a closely held manner to the responsible authorities in Washington.
This unique arrangement could present some problems. It will take the nicest sense of judgment in the relationship between the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, U.S. Naval Activities to successfully exploit this unusual opportunity to influence Moroccan programs and policies regarding the bases.
There is a possibility that an opportunity might even arise during this period which could result in extension of tenure of certain U.S. Air Force facilities on a joint basis with Morocco.
Captain Counihan has been Commander, Naval Activities, Port Lyautey since 15 December 1957 and has built up an unusually friendly rapport, not only with the King, but with the Moroccans in general in Rabat and Kenitra. He was instrumental in providing extensive aid to the Moroccans during the Agadir earthquake.
It is our belief that without Captain Counihan working in this capacity, we stand to lose not only the SAC bases, but all of our military facilities and therefore feel that if the State Department will agree to letting Captain Counihan accept the King’s offer, we will be able to retain the approximately $100,000,000 communications facilities that the Navy uses to serve the Mediterranean area.
Very respectfully,
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61-10/61. Secret. Attached to a transmittal note from Kenneth O’Donnell to Bundy stating: “The President would like you to read this and give him the benefit of your thinking as rapidly as possible.” A handwritten notation says “done.” (Ibid.)↩
- On July 26, the Department of State sent a report of Counihan’s conversation with the King “Eyes Only” to Ambassador Bonsal in telegram 111 to Rabat. Bonsal was informed that Counihan had met personally with the President following his return to Washington, and that the Navy intended to follow through with its previous decision assigning him to Washington. Noting that the King had said nothing to either Counihan or Bonsal about his conversations with either, Rusk asked the Ambassador to keep these facts in mind in preparing his final recommendations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/7-2661)↩
- Bonsal summarized the portion of his July 13 conversation with the King dealing with bases in telegram 84 from Rabat, July 14. The Ambassador reported that the King had dropped his previous attempt to hasten U.S. evacuation of the bases and was most interested in a careful study of the possibilities of converting those bases to Moroccan purposes. Hassan also said that the Soviet technicians in Morocco had completed their work and would depart soon, and that he believed an arrangement could be reached under which the United States could maintain communications facilities in Morocco. (Ibid., 771.56311/7-1461)↩