Office of the Historian

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya0

Washington, June 29, 1963, 2:22 p.m.

262. Tripoli’s 351.2 Believe you should at this time leave to Prime Minister Fekini’s initiative any discussion changed Libyan attitude toward Wheelus. Endorse your feeling that in such discussion you should not exhibit alarm nor frame your remarks as being on instructions Washington. Subject to your views, Dept inclined believe that matter as basic and important in US-Libyan relations as GOL attitude to Wheelus if it is to be broached from US side by Ambassador should preferably be in conversation with King sometime after his return from his relaxing and therapeutic visit to Greece. Likely in present context Fekini will assume extreme concern if matter is raised probingly at this time because it is so early in your tour in Libya and particular issues of Parliamentary questions do not seem yet to have come to such head as to be upsetting equanimity of Libyan Cabinet.

Dept endorses Embassy officer’s statements to Foreign Office in Benghazi’s 2793 and believes Abdiyyah’s vigorous denial change Libyan policy and subsequent expression of welcome for idea of visit by Vice President or Secretary of State to Libya may indicate that official Libyans are concerned lest GOL’s unusually close working relations with US are not sufficiently recognized and appreciated on US side.

We have been giving much thought to importance building up in near future confidential, trusting relationship with King and to extent possible similar personal rapport and comfortable working relationship with Fekini and other key members of Cabinet. If Libyan policy is gradually being drawn into greater alignment with prevailing breezes of change in North Africa, these personal relationships plus concrete proofs of friendship such as expanded military assistance program seem likely to prove firmest anchors which we can hold against any drift contrary [Page 155] to our strategic and other interests in Libya. Would welcome your suggestions re best tactics accomplish foregoing.3

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Tasca, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli.↩
  2. In telegram 351, June 28, Lightner indicated that he intended to sound Fekini out concerning his government’s attitude toward Wheelus. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram 6 from Benghazi, July 3, Lightner reported that he had met with Fekini, who had brought up the recent Addis Abba conference resolution on the elimination of military bases, to which the Ambassador had replied that he thought it was possible to defend the concept that bases contributed to the defense of a country that was not yet ready to defend itself. Lightner added that he had not pressed the issue, but he did not have the impression Libya was about to demand that the United States give up Wheelus. He indicated that he would comment soon on the tactical problems of combating “Libyan policy drift,” but that he was sure the Department would agree that any formal approach to the King on the base problem should be kept in reserve until the situation became much clearer. (Ibid., POL 15-1 LIBYA)↩