Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, November 10, 1962, 7:31 p.m.

506. Assistant Secretary Talbot called in UAR Ambassador Kamel November 10 and with reference Badeau-Nasser conversation November 9 (Cairo Embtel 726)¹ stated USG appreciated Nasser’s assurances non-invasion Saudi territory and willingness consider mutual disengagement. Now necessary take positive actions break vicious cycle. Thus he conveying specific timetable of actions which US thinks would create proper atmosphere for resolution of crisis stating would appreciate UAR reaction by November 12.

1. On November 14 President would address identical secret messages to Nasser, Faysal, Hussein and Sallal proposing following:

a) termination external support to royalists;

b) phased withdrawal UAR forces from Yemen;

c) withdrawal Saudi-Jordanian forces from vicinity Yemen border;

d) public statement by YAR reaffirming intention honor international obligations, seek normalization relations with neighboring states and concentrate on domestic affairs.

2. On November 15 we would hope following steps could occur:

a) US announce recognition YAR.

b) UAR issue statement signifying willingness undertake reciprocal disengagement and phased removal of troops whenever 1) situation stabilized; 2) Saudi and Jordanian forces removed from frontier and 3) Saudi and Jordanian support of royalists stopped.

c) YAR simultaneously to make announcement described in President’s message.

d) In order offset blow to Faysal occasioned by US recognition we may also publish separate Presidential message to Faysal affirming our intention support his efforts carry out program internal reforms.

3. US recognition YAR conditional upon no further military acts by UAR exacerbating situation.

Kamel made two personal comments namely 1) simultaneous US recognition and UAR publication of statement would smack of “deal”; 2) publication of President’s letter to Faysal² might be exploited against Faysal in sense portraying him subservient to US. Strongly urged quiet diplomacy. However believed proposals essentially along right lines.

For Cairo: Suggest Ambassador follow up appropriately with Ali Sabri with view obtaining UAR response by November 12.³ FYI: If UAR balks at public statement you authorized state private acceptance of President’s proposals would serve purpose with understanding we propose inform Faysal. End FYI.

For Jidda: Suggest Ambassador Hart convey foregoing formula to Faysal changing emphasis in argumentation as appropriate.⁴ View expected UAR objection publication Faysal letter (hinted by Kamel) might be preferable let Faysal determine whether should be published or not. If Faysal thinks this unnecessary to strengthening his position, we inclined not publish. Ambassador may at his discretion decide whether put this up to Faysal.

For London: You may convey to FonOff for information.

Comments from posts welcome.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Barrow, cleared by Strong, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Jidda, London, Amman, Dhahran, and Taiz.
1. Dated November 9. (Ibid., 786H.00/11–962)
2. Presumably that in Document 88.
3. In telegram 728 from Cairo, November 11, Badeau reported that the United Arab Republic welcomed the U.S. proposals set forth in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1162) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen. Ambassador Badeau’s presentation to Kamel on November 12 contained somewhat different observations. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1262) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
4. In telegram 364 from Jidda, November 12, Hart objected to several parts of the plan proposed in this telegram as being unacceptable to Faysal. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1162)