Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State⁰

Amman, October 6, 1962, 3 p.m.

197. Policy. Embassy telegram 192.¹ King Hussein summoned me early afternoon October 6. Also present Prime Minister Tell and Chief Royal Diwan Sherif Hussein.

King said he very worried by UAR and perhaps Soviet intervention in support Yemen revolutionary regime. He had firm reports bombings of tribesmen loyal to Prince Hassan by planes and helicopters which could not have been flown by Yemeni since latter have no operable planes nor competent pilots. Also had reports “over a thousand” UAR troops embarked on ship or ships. King, supported by Tell, said Prince Hassan, who now at Saada, about 40 miles inside Yemen, had support of nearly all tribes in all parts of Yemen. Rebels held only [garble] cities and few other small places but did not control roads between them. Nonetheless, outside support would enable them hold on indefinitely there despite fact Prince Hassan firmly in control remainder country.

King then reiterated grave concern at foreign intervention in aid revolutionary regime, pointing out this would compel Saud intervene behalf Prince Hassan and Jordan actively to support Saud. Consequences this chain reaction for stability of area were obvious. Urged everything possible be done to prevent further UAR intervention and that Yemenis be left settle matter themselves in which case he confident Prince Hassan’s eventual victory.

During conversation I twice said I sure U.S. Government firmly opposed foreign intervention and considered Yemeni situation one for Yemenis themselves to resolve.

Comment: Believe King and Tell so concerned re reports UAR activities, which they believe true, that there is strong possibility their taking soon some action in support Prince Hassan beyond merely prodding Saud. Therefore, urge I be authorized assure King U.S. Government is doing everything possible restrain Nasser from active support revolutionary regime with arms, planes or troops.²

Lewis

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-662. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Baghdad, USUN, Damascus, Taiz, Aden, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Paris for CINCEUR.
1. Telegram 192 from Amman, October 4, reported on a conversation between Macomber and Prime Minister Tell regarding the situation in Yemen. (Ibid., 786H.00/10-462)
2. Circular telegram 615 to Amman, October 7, informed Macomber that he could assure King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell that the United States maintained a continuing interest in avoiding an escalation of the warfare in Yemen that would come with foreign intervention. U.S. opposition to foreign intervention and the U.S. position that the situation was one for the Yemenis themselves to decide had been made clear to Arab governments. The Department added for Macomber’s information that as of October 6 it “had no confirmation any sizeable UAR involvement Yemen.” (Ibid., 786H.00/10-762)