Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

51. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Seelye)⁰

Washington, September 20, 1962.

DEATH OF IMAM AHMED BIN YAHYA

1. Implications. We have long feared that the death of Imam Ahmed might prove to be the spark setting off severe internal disturbances in Yemen. The Imam had controlled successfully an explosive situation: the low level of economic activity, frustrated pretensions to the Aden Colony and protectorates, the impecunious state of the treasury, the Islamic sectarian schism, reformist discontent, and tribal restiveness are built-in factors which have long threatened internal stability. The UAR, the USSR and the UK have fished in these troubled waters. The Imam barely managed to keep the lid on by force of personality, a ruthless policy of divide and rule, clever manipulation of various factions in the country, and a repressive police and legal system.

Crown Prince Badr has neither exhibited the stature of the Imam, nor commanded much of an internal following nor displayed qualities of leadership. Those who know him claim he is weak, and fearful of internal opposition. Nevertheless, in recent months Badr has toured Yemen in an apparent effort to win semblance of popular support. He once was thought to be beholden to the Soviets and their potential tool. However, in the last year-and-a-half Badr has made a determined effort to be impartial in his relations with Eastern bloc and Western representatives. He has conveyed word to U.S. Government representatives that he would like to lean more in the direction of the West, but needed tangible evidence of our friendship before doing so.

2. The Succession Question. Badr has evidently assumed power in accordance with his “acknowledged” position as Crown Prince. However, this appears to run counter to the basic Zaydi position that the Imamate is not hereditary; that the Imam cannot be designated prior to his predecessor’s death; and that a new Imam must be chosen by the Ulema (religious elders) on the basis of 13 legally specified criteria and must receive the homage of the prominent tribal and other leaders. It may be that the Ulema have so designated Badr, but, if not, this may invite some resentment in conservative Zaydi circles.

How long the Crown Prince can hold on is a moot question. The key to Badr’s success is the support of the dominant conservative Zaydis, an offshoot of the Shi’a sect of Islam that has long held preponderant influence, and the tribes, who are unreliable and opportunistic. If Badr cannot win over the Zaydis, they may give their support to his more conservative uncle, Prince Hasan. Hasan, who has served as head of the Yemen UN delegation, is reportedly considering leaving the U.S. to organize the opposition to Badr. A dynastic struggle for power could well ensue. Badr must also reckon with the Shafi’i community located in the south and southwest. The latter are anti-Zaydi and comprise 60 percent of Yemen’s population.

The loyalty to the Imamate of the military and security forces who surround the Imam will be put to test over the coming weeks. For his immediate protection the new Imam must rely on his royal bodyguard of between 500 and 600 men (the al-Ufka), the 5,000-strong tribal irregulars (the Barrani), a special battalion of troops called the “Badr Battalion,” a regular Army of some 9,000 men and a reserve force of some 3,000. The loyalty of none of these groups is assured.

So far reports indicate that he has summoned cabinet ministers and princes to the Palace to seek their undivided support. After accepting the resignation of Army commanders, judges and other high officials, he has reportedly reinstated them. He has also given an address over Sanaa radio promising inter alia to “issue regulations” assuring the rights and privileges of all citizens. The latter is no doubt an effort to appeal to reformists, and is in character with Badr’s earlier efforts to persuade the Imam to undertake reform in Yemen.

3. U.S. Role. In the past, the late Imam’s brother and Chief Yemen delegate to the UN, Prince Hasan bin Yahya, has sought U.S. Government support in his aspirations to succeed Imam Ahmed. We will no doubt now come under pressure to provide such support which, for the time being, we must resist. We do not believe that we should involve ourselves in a Yemeni power struggle unless Yemen should veer too far in the direction of the Soviet Union.

There are two basic reasons why we should not support Hasan: in the first place, we question the advisability of placing our support behind a member of the Ruling (Hamid Al-Din) Family, which is so discredited in Yemen and which, being out of step with modern times, may not last for long. Prince Hasan enjoys the support of some elements in the Royal Family, as well as certain tribes, but we are unaware that he has any significant support from the more enlightened elements. (On the other hand, Badr’s announced reformist intentions may enlist the following of at least some of the reformists.) Prince Hasan is over 50, was once a religious zealot, and is not possessed of a particularly strong or magnetic personality. The only thing that commends him is that he is pro-American and anti-Communist. There is the outside possibility that by becoming known to be actively associated with Hasan—these things cannot be kept secret in the Arab World—we shall alienate the very elements who are likely to assume power in Yemen sooner or later.

Secondly, there is some question as to whether our “limited support” of Prince Hasan would have the desirable effect, i.e. put him in power, let alone keep him there. There are several cliques competing for power in Yemen and in the conflict which may ensue, any one or combination of cliques has a chance to take over, but probably not for long. Even if we helped Hasan into power, we could probably not keep him there short of full-scale support. Military allegiances in Yemen are reportedly more with elements which might support Crown Prince Badr (i.e. the UAR or the Soviets). For example, the Soviet bloc has been reported to exercise considerable influence in the air force and among the paratroops. Thus it is probable that Prince Hasan could not long retain power once gained and that the USG would once again be “exposed” (by whoever took over from Hasan) as having connived in the power politics of another country.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.11/9-2162. Secret. Cleared by Harold W. Glidden of INR. Forwarded to Bundy on September 21 under cover of a brief memorandum from Brubeck indicating that the paper might be of interest to President Kennedy. An attached summary noted that the Imam’s death could cause severe disturbances in Yemen and that Crown Prince Badr, who had expressed partiality to the Soviet bloc but proclaimed “positive neutralism,” was weak and had little support. It advised: “We believe the U.S. should avoid involving itself in a Yemeni power struggle unless Yemen should veer too far in the direction of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”