Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, December 1, 1963, 2:36 p.m.

440. Next Steps in Yemen.

I. Introduction

Department has carefully reviewed Jidda’s 506,¹ 523 and 525² and has noted in particular:

A. Importance Embassy places (a propos prospective Spinelli visit to Jidda and talks here with Pharaoun) on continuing emphasize to SAG primacy of UAR troop withdrawals when discussing Yemen.

B. Embassy Jidda’s suggestion President dispatch personal message to Faisal in lieu Embassy’s earlier proposition we submit to Faisal unequivocal USG statement re withdrawal Hard Surface if Faisal resumes aid to Yemeni royalists.

C. Faisal’s illusion USG insisting broadened Yemeni regime exclude Hamid Al-Din family and Jidda Embassy’s view broadened YARG must include some representative royalist leaders in order be acceptable to Faisal.

D. Faisal’s statement to French Ambassador Saudi friendship with US “unshakeable” although our interests may occasionally diverge; and equivocal French response to Saudi request for specific indications French assistance in defense Saudi Arabia.

Department has following comments re foregoing:

A. We have instructed Cortada caution Spinelli this regard (Deptel 1438 to USUN, rptd 2134 to Cairo, 404 to Jidda, 367 to Taiz, 3145 to London).³ Same time we must consider whether time may not have arrived begin prepare Faisal for unpleasant fact appreciable draw-down UAR troops may not occur by January 4, 1964. Our best estimates are that despite Nasser’s promise 6,000 UAR troops would be withdrawn by November 1, 1963 and his belief another 5,000 would depart by January 1, 1964, current UAR troop strength remains—and will probably continue remain—at about 32,000. View foregoing, problem is how long we can tell Faisal we expect imminent appreciable UAR troop withdrawals and hold him to Bunker agreement. (For this reason in talk with Pharaoun November 18 Talbot refrained from indicating belief we expect “important progress” re UAR troop withdrawals, contrary to Embassy Jidda’s recommendation.)

B. We agree Presidential messages to Faisal should not be reserved for emergency stages. Same time believe should insofar as possible reserve such messages for matters considerable import. Thus, we have in mind Presidential message only in circumstances described below (C, 1, f).

C. We gratified Embassy has taken steps disabuse SAG of belief USG insisting broadened YARG must exclude members Hamid Al-Din family (Embtels 506 and 525). Obviously decision up to Yemenis; informal Departmental views expressed to Shami represented realistic assessment of situation, not USG preferences. Same time appears clear to us that Faisal, despite his contention, emotionally attached to Yemeni royalist cause and stating own preferences rather than known Yemeni attitudes.

D. We welcome Faisal’s reaffirmation of bed-rock USG-SAG friendship and fundamental mutuality US-SAG interests. Dilemma is how make Faisal understand we fully share these sentiments and that our Yemen and UAR policies wholly consonant therewith. How do we get across to Faisal basic truth that while meddling of UAR and Saudi Arabia in Yemeni internal affairs harms both parties—each in somewhat different way—USG less concerned with harm Yemen conflict causing UAR than possible adverse consequences to Saudi Arabia of its Yemeni involvement?

II. Plan for Consideration of Addressees

A. In consideration of foregoing Department contemplating plan of action re Yemen which flows from following premises:

1. Present UNYOM mandate will end January 4, 1964 but UN will maintain political presence and possibly small group observers.

2. UAR will not have withdrawn appreciable number of troops from Yemen by January 4, 1964.

3. In absence satisfactory UAR compliance with disengagement agreement, Faisal determined resume his aid to royalists January 4, 1964, regardless existence Bunker agreement; and in retaliation UAR will be tempted resume series air attacks over Saudi territory.

4. Spinelli effort assist in developing broadened Yemeni regime will not have borne fruit by January 4, 1964 (although his report should provide basis for new emphasis on coalition effort as precursor to UAR troop withdrawals).

B. Our objectives in Yemen remain as before, i.e.:

1. Termination of foreign military intervention in Yemen permitting self-determination and measure of internal stability.

2. Prevention of escalation and spread of conflict.

3. Protection of US interests in entire Arabian Peninsula.

4. Prevention enhancement of Soviet influence and position in Yemen.

C. Recognizing realities of premises in “A” while not losing sight of objectives in “B”, Department proposes following course of action re Yemen for consideration of addressees:

1. In Jidda inform Faisal:

a. Bunker agreement succeeded in preventing SAG-UAR military confrontation which was primary objective. It is now clear, however, various factors beyond our control have obstructed our undertaking to Faisal to obtain “expeditious” withdrawal UAR troops during six-month period of UNYOM’s official presence (ending January 4, 1964). While there have no doubt been extenuating circumstances causing UAR footdragging, from any vantage point UAR performance in fulfilling disengagement agreement has been unsatisfactory. In view of foregoing and Faisal’s decision resume aid to royalists January 4, 1964 (as transmitted by Pharaoun to Talbot November 18), USG considers Faisal is relieved of his commitment to use us under terms of this agreement and that time has come develop new strategy.

b. This does not mean USG has abandoned concept of disengagement in its efforts to get UAR troops out of Yemen. USG continues seek return Yemen to Yemenis and believes no external parties have right to speak for Yemeni desires in respect to kind and composition their government. While continuing to press UAR on withdrawal, USG placing emphasis on Yemeni coalition effort, which if comes to fruition would appear offer most effective means get UAR troops out and restore measure stability in Yemen.

c. In view our and UN support Yemeni coalition effort and our recognition YARG, USG would regret resumption Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists. In fact, view Faisal’s decision resume such aid USG has determined it best withdraw Hard Surface from Saudi Arabia in late December 1963 in order USG not be placed in unacceptable position of appearing offer protective umbrella to Saudi intervention in Yemen. In any case, Hard Surface sent to Saudi Arabia on temporary basis and by year’s end will have been there some six months. Faisal can rest assured that USG stands behind him in defense his nation against aggression, provided of course he does not resume arms shipments to Yemen. In latter contingency and in event such action invites UAR air attacks against Saudi Arabia, Faisal must understand USG disposition stand by him will be adversely affected and international community might very well seek condemnation SAG actions by UN. (FYI. Security Council might actually condemn hostile acts by both sides. End FYI.)

d. Still our view best course for Faisal in strengthening his country—and preserving Saud regime—against Nasserist danger is avoid exposing Saudi military and other weaknesses to undue stresses. If Faisal resumes aid to Yemeni royalists, Saudi weaknesses will be exposed as result retaliatory UAR action, with further danger weakening whole structure Saud regime. Better tactic is for Faisal to concentrate his energies on course he has already charted in direction:

(1) improving SAG military capability to defend itself;

(2) strengthening fabric Saudi society.

Progress made on these two fronts will reduce threats posed by Nasser both in Peninsula and throughout Arab world. If Faisal continues to withhold support to royalists while pursuing courses in (1) and (2) we consider time on his side in view of serious problems UAR already facing by virtue its commitments to Yemen.

e. While USG cannot be expected pull Faisal’s chestnuts out of fire which he appears intend rekindle in Yemen, it can and will continue assist him in both (1) and (2) above. Re (1) USG about to submit comprehensive plan for shoring up Saudi air defenses and in this connection disposed sell Saudi Arabia certain types modern military armaments and equipment.

f. If SAG should reconsider its decision to resume aid to royalists and undertake avoid meddling in Yemen for indefinite period, President prepared dispatch message to Faisal (which could be published if Faisal desired) underscoring not only USG support for Saudi integrity (as in President Kennedy’s October 1962 message) but for Faisal regime which moving in direction of reform. We visualize that latter might also get into specifics of kind action US might take through UN and on our own to come to military support SAG if externally attacked in unprovoked fashion. We would expect that affirmation of US support would be in lieu of continued deployment of Hard Surface.

g. Meanwhile USG again urges Faisal it in his best interests to appoint high level Saudi meet secretly with UAR representative for purpose exploring possibilities of SAG-UAR detente. Modus vivendi between two countries, even if only minimal, could be instrumental in attaining objectives which all parties seek of leaving Yemen to Yemenis.

2. In Cairo tell Nasser:

a. We consider failure UAR withdraw any, or any appreciable number, troops from Yemen after six months UNYOM presence forces USG consider Bunker agreement at end as of January 4, 1964. USG can no longer expect Faisal fulfill his part of bargain in absence satisfactory UAR performance, extenuating circumstances notwithstanding. USG so informing Faisal, stating its best efforts secure “expeditious” UAR troop withdrawals in vain.

b. Nevertheless, USG continues adhere to disengagement concept as in best interest all parties and will continue urge both SAG and UAR abide by concept—though not on basis any previous commitment. Only difference now is neither side “committed” to USG to abide by specific disengagement agreement and we in effect acknowledging impossibility of bringing about “expeditious” UAR troop withdrawals. Regrettable aspect in new turn of events is lessening of USG capability impose restraint on Saudi activities in Yemen. However, despite lessened leverage available to us, we will continue do all possible restrain Faisal with some expectation we will succeed in this endeavor.

c. Nasser should clearly understand that USG has important interests in Saudi Arabia and has pledged its support to reformist-minded Faisal regime. USG would continue take exceedingly dim view of UAR air attacks against Saudi Arabia—whether or not UAR considers it has adequate provocation—and would remind Nasser that while USG seeks maintain cordial relations with UAR and would wish avoid UAR-USG confrontation, we cannot do so if price is imminent threat to Saudi integrity and disappearance of Faisal regime at Nasser’s hand. USG will not stand idly by should Nasser carry “battle” into Saudi Arabia. Moreover, issue might be likely to go to UN where UAR would not be in defensible position, particularly in view its failure to disengage. If SAG resumes aid, proper response of UAR and YAR might be complaint to UN SC.

d. USG placing increased emphasis on development coalition regime in Yemen and again urges Nasser in strongest terms cooperate fully in this endeavor. Creation some semblance viable YARG is best prospect for solving difficulties now being encountered by all sides. There have been reports which suggest UARG actively discouraging indigenous Yemeni efforts broaden base YARG. We believe international community will expect all external parties to Yemen dispute to respect idea of Yemen self-determination and Yemen for the Yemenis.

e. US continuing press SAG agree send representative meet with UAR secretly for purpose clearing air between two countries. Discontinuation UAR propaganda against Saudi Arabia still appears key to bringing about such meeting.

f. Nasser must open eyes to dilemna he faces in Yemen. We question whether “revolutionary” ardor of Yemenis will long continue unless UAR finds way to extricate itself. Longer UAR remains there, more Yemeni opposition aroused against UAR presence and thus against YARG. Tribes in north have capability resist central government for many months even without Saudi assistance. USG has endeavored and will continue endeavor help UAR extricate self from Yemen without loss prestige. Unless UAR now takes statesmanlike advantage opportunities presented, Yemen imbroglio can only go from bad to worse causing instability to entire Arab area and incidentally casting discredit on Arab nationalism and “revolution”. Spinelli mission currently offers best hope for UAR in Yemen and Nasser should not let this golden opportunity pass.

D. Concluding Comment

Questions left unanswered are (1) what USG does if after we have withdrawn Hard Surface from Saudi Arabia Nasser bombs Saudi Arabia and (2) what further actions might be taken by UN after January 4, 1964 in advancing Yemeni solution. Foregoing plan of action designed preclude first eventuality; if occurs, we have several alternatives open to us which we shall have to face when time comes. We are still canvassing possible courses of action through UN and recognize that substitute to Bunker agreement (pegged to Spinelli report or some specific Security Council action) must be devised as framework for modified disengagement and for continued UN presence in Yemen.

Request urgent views of addressee posts.

For Jidda

Department would appreciate your views above suggested courses of action⁴ prior commenting your 561⁵ which just received.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye on November 27; cleared by Davies, Colonel Robinson, Sisco, Komer, Colonel Bunte, Quinn, and Christensen; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Cairo, Taiz, London, and USUN.
1. In telegram 506 from Jidda, November 12, Hart reported on a conversation with Saqqaf and forwarded several recommendations concerning the Yemen situation. Hart also asked that he be given specific instructions concerning whether Hard Surface would be withdrawn if Saudi Arabia resumed aid to the Royalists. (Ibid.)
2. Dated November 17 and 18, respectively. (Both ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
3. Dated November 15. (Ibid., POL 2 YEMEN)
4. Responses to this telegram from the Embassies in Riyadh, Cairo, Aden, and London are ibid., POL 27 YEMEN. In telegram 462 to Jidda, December 9, the Department of State, on the basis of these comments, modified its course of action outlined in telegram 440 to include: “(1) continuing use Bunker Agreement as reference point for disengagement and (2) leaving Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia until end January assuming SAG does not resume support of royalists.” (Ibid., POL 26 YEMEN)
5. Document 372.