Office of the Historian

366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0

Washington, November 20, 1963, 7:50 p.m.

2227. Department trusts UARG sufficiently reassured by President’s statement on US aid (Depcirtel 900)1 to be amenable to US counsels to expedite Yemen disengagement. Immediate action is essential.

This connection, USG notes: 1) evidence UAR forces Yemen remain at 30,000 level—contrary Nasser’s assurances they would be reduced to 26,000 by November 1; 2) continued bombing royalist bases; 3) resumption [Page 796] bombing Saudi territory (Jidda’s 528).2 If Embassy has not yet transmitted Talbot’s six recommendations (Deptel 1937 to UARG),3 suggest this action should be taken now. We leave to your discretion means of transmittal—whether by letter from Ambassador to Nasser, conversation between Embassy officer and Presidency official, or otherwise.

FYI: If UARG genuinely seeks detente with Amman and Riyadh, repatriation of defected aircraft might be effective gesture. Embassy may wish consider utility allusion to this possibility on appropriate occasion.

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 US-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Jones on November 19; cleared by Buffum, Seelye, Killgore, Davies, and Jernegan; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, Amman, and USUN.↩
  2. Dated November 14. (Ibid., AID (US)) Reference is to remarks made by President Kennedy at his press conference on November 14. Speaking in response to a question, the President said that he did not think that the requirement of the Gruening Amendment strengthened the U.S. hand or flexibility in dealing with the UAR, but rather had the opposite effect. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 850)↩
  3. Dated November 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 SAUD-UAR)↩
  4. Telegram 1937 to Cairo, November 6, contained a summary of a conversation between Talbot and Ambassador Kamel, during which the two discussed how to break the deadlock in Yemen. Talbot urged that the United Arab Republic moderate propaganda, broaden the government in Yemen, expand cooperation with UNYOM, stop rotating UAR units into Yemen, evacuate the demilitarized zone, and stop the bombings. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)↩