Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

338. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Jordan Waters

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
• Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
• NEA—Deputy Assistant Secretary John D. Jernegan
• NEA/NE—William R. Crawford, Jr., Officer in Charge, Arab-Israel Affairs
• NEA/NE—H. Earle Russell, Jr., Officer in Charge, Lebanon-Israel Affairs

Mr. Jernegan recalled Mr. Talbot’s mention to the Ambassador two or three weeks ago of our wish to get together on some problems relating to Jordan waters. Our concern is that with the beginning of diversion by Israel we anticipate a strong reaction from the Arab states. We want the firmest possible platform on which to act in support of Israel’s plan to make use of its share of the waters. We want to be able to assure the Arabs and others that what Israel is doing is fair and in accordance with what to all intents and purposes was agreed on in 1955. Partially as a result of Mr. Criddle’s early July visit to Israel, we have identified a few points that need pinning down:

We have assured Israel of our willingness to support its Jordan waters project on the basis of this project’s being consistent with the 1955 Unified Plan.¹ Israel has assured us of its intention to observe the provisions of the Plan.

To provide the best foundation for effective United States support, a number of things have been done or suggested.

As one of these, we suggested four themes Israel might use in quiet, public statements designed to cast its actions in a light that would facilitate our support.

Three themes have been used. Israel has resisted public use of the fourth: affirmation of willingness to accept international observation of its Jordan programs provided the Arabs do likewise. Israel’s argument is that the United States has full information; that this is sufficient; that we are not saying specifically what we have in mind; and that Israel’s statements along this line would open the door to new obstructionism by the Arabs.

We have given careful consideration to Israel’s point of view, but continue to feel this fourth theme should be used at an early, appropriate opportunity. We are not suggesting anything new regarding a mechanism for international observation. This was fundamental to the Unified Plan. It was accepted by Israel in 1955. The Arabs know this. If the Arabs have nothing but our assurances as to Israel’s intentions, they may well doubt their validity because of our close ties with Israel. If the Arabs don’t accept international observation, Israel doesn’t have to. We feel this is an important point. Its use will make considerable difference in our ability to support Israel’s actions effectively.

As a second approach to supporting Israel’s plan, we asked Mr. Wayne Criddle to take a look at how the 1955 plan fits 1963 circumstances, and to examine how Israel’s intended actions compare with this. We are very grateful for the whole-hearted cooperation given to Mr. Criddle. We are pleased, also, to receive confirmation that Israel’s intended actions are consistent with the 1955 plan. If in our background representations to the Arabs and other interested governments we are able to combine the knowledge born of Criddle’s findings, with reference to an Israel public statement of willingness to accept international observation if the Arabs do, we will have a good base. Whether it will succeed with the Arabs, we can’t say, but at least it will be as firm as we can make it. As regards the current situation in the Arab countries on this problem, we would be glad to compare notes at a subsequent meeting if the Ambassador wishes. This is probably fully understood, but we would caution Israel against mentioning Mr. Criddle’s visit in public or to any other nation.

Another premise of the Unified Plan was that no water would be taken out of the Valley until provision had been made to satisfy the actual and potential irrigation needs of persons living within the basin. Related to our joint interest in getting through the difficult period ahead without a major upset in Near East stability is the need to minimize the effect of Israel’s plans on Jordan, which is the primary, rightful beneficiary of the Valley’s water resources. That Israel shares our view of how important this is was evidenced by the talk Dr. Wiener had with Mr. Strong on May 13 this year and by the remarks made to Mr. Criddle during his Israel visit. In this consideration of how the effect on Jordan can be minimized, there may be other points to be brought up later, but at this time the following seem to us the essentials.

• First, we want to continue to be informed by Israel, with precision and in advance, of its scheduling for testing and withdrawal.

• Second, it was agreed in 1955 that Jordan’s share of upper Jordan waters was 100 mcms. It was also recognized that there would be roughly 30 mcms of water from saline springs in Tiberias that it would be desirable to dispose of in the interest in keeping the lake’s salinity to a minimum. In a meeting with Ambassador Johnston on October 13, 1955, Prime Minister Sharett and Mr. Eshkol, who was then Minister of Finance, agreed to a fifty-fifty sharing of this 30 mcms between Israel and Jordan. We now require Israel’s definitive reassertion that the amount of saline water Israel would attribute to Jordan’s 100 mcms entitlement would be limited to 15 mcms; in other words, that Israel would deliver to Jordan 85 mcms of water of average Tiberias salinity.

  Ambassador Harman interjected that there seem to be two different ideas here. An entitlement of 100 mcms with 15 mcms included is not necessarily the same thing as requiring delivery of 85 mcms of sweet water with 15 mcms of salt water going elsewhere.

  Mr. Gazit said the situation contemplated in 1955 is not the situation today. Then, it had been anticipated that a substantial amount of Yarmuk water would be stored in Tiberias, significantly reducing the salinity in the lake.

  Mr. Crawford said that in 1955 Jordan’s entitlement was confirmed as 100 mcms. This is a principle which remains. What we are saying now, as in 1955, is that we recognize Israel’s right to attribute to Jordan’s share up to 15 mcms of saline waters disposed of from Tiberias. We are recognizing that this Jordanian 50% share of the saline waters could be disposed of elsewhere.

  Mr. Jernegan said our object is to meld what was agreed on in 1955 with present practical considerations.

  Returning to his theme, Mr. Jernegan said, thirdly, we require Israel’s agreement that its Yarmuk withdrawals during the summer months for use in the Adasiya triangle will not exceed 25 mcms. In 1955, Ambassador Johnston compromised with Israel in suggesting this figure as Israel’s entitlement. At that time, Israel’s historic usage of Jordan waters in the triangle was at most 15 mcms. Ambassador Johnston offered 25 perhaps out of recognition that there might in future be a more intensive irrigation and cultivation in the triangle. Ambassador Johnston made it clear he could not accept Israel’s claim to 40 mcms, since this would have established a water/land ratio considerably higher than that approved for the rest of the lower Jordan Valley. Thus, had Ambassador Johnston gone along with the Israel claim, Jordan could have countered with a request for more water and the result would have been less residual water for Israel diversion out-of-basin.

• Fourth, we wish to obtain official confirmation of the assurances given Mr. Criddle that Israel would be willing to release Jordan’s upper Jordan entitlement on a reasonable demand schedule to permit most efficient usage during summer months.
• Fifth, we would like Israel to keep us informed of streamflow and salinity data so that we will be in a position to reinforce our arguments that Israel’s actions are in accord with the Unified Plan and are not depriving other riparians. Obviously, the supply of this data to the United States would no longer be necessary if and when Unified Plan arrangements for international observation came into being.

Mr. Jernegan said Mr. Criddle also put forward the concept, inherent in the Unified Plan, that Yarmuk flood water picked up by Israel might be stored in Tiberias for release to Jordan. We are not now pursuing this with Israel, but we would expect to return to the point at some later date.

Lastly, points two and three seem to us of particular importance. Our phrasing of these conforms to Ambassador Johnston’s position in 1955 as he explained this to both Israel and the Arabs. Any variation from this position as we have again expressed it would in our view constitute a revision of the Unified Plan and be, necessarily, ad referendum to the other riparians.

Mr. Crawford noted that for those officers in the Department who have worked on the Jordan waters problem over the years current developments are regarded as among the most constructive and hopeful in which the U.S. is involved in the area. Mr. Jernegan said what we are driving for here is sensible and will benefit all parties, particularly Israel and Jordan.

Ambassador Harman said he assumed the Department does not expect him to react in detail until his Government has had a chance to study the presentation. It is somewhat difficult to grasp what the U.S. is seeking to accomplish here. Certain of Mr. Jernegan’s remarks convey “an undertone of conditionality” regarding U.S. support. Such conditionality would not be consistent with the President’s exchange of letters with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. Further, Israel has in the past made suggestions in a spirit of cooperation which are now being put to Israel as U.S. requests. The Ambassador said he hopes he can report to his Government that there is no element of conditionality and that the current discussion is in the same spirit of common approach that has prevailed in the past.

Mr. Jernegan said the principle of U.S. support is not in question. Our wish is to confirm previous understandings and push on to consider one or two points which had been left hanging in the past: the use of the fourth theme we suggested Israel include in low-key public statements, and the Yarmuk allocation for Adasiya.

Ambassador Harman said a third unresolved question is that of the saline waters component of Jordan’s entitlement. Mr. Jernegan said that we would regard this as a matter on which agreement has already been reached. According to our report of the October 13, 1955, meeting between Prime Minister Sharett and Ambassador Johnston, the latter then agreed on the fifty-fifty sharing formula.

Mr. Gazit commented that in October 1955 Israel had said there would be no problem in accepting a 25 mcms allocation for Adasiya if this were the only final gesture necessary to win Arab signature on an agreement. With the Arabs rejection of the plan, this offer immediately became null and void.

Mr. Jernegan replied that our position in support of 25 mcms only is based on the more fundamental consideration that anything in excess of this amount would not be consistent with the land/water allocation elsewhere in the Jordan Valley, and therefore could not be defended under the broad principles of the Unified Plan.

Mr. Gazit referred to an earlier informal suggestion he had made to Mr. Davies, in which Jerusalem has now concurred, that the United States consider speaking to the Yugoslav Government about the Maqarin Dam project. Presumably the Yugoslav Government would have enough influence over the Yugoslav engineering firm now surveying Maqarin to suggest the firm recommend that a dam capable of storing more than 300 mcms would be uneconomic. Such independent confirmation of Ambassador Johnston’s position would help Jordan in justifying to other Arab states a limitation on the size of the dam.

Mr. Crawford said this is an element in our thinking. Our objective today, in the same spirit with which we have discussed these problems with Israel in the past, is to pin down certain loose ends. Once this is done we would contemplate talking to the Jordanians to help them in the problems they will face once diversion begins and to show them how they can make most effective, prompt use of their just share of the waters. In conjunction with our approach to Jordan, we have had it in mind to suggest that they revise their contract with the Yugoslav engineering firm to seek not just one blueprint for an excessively high Maqarin but cost-study estimates for several alternative sizes of dam. We are confident these would confirm that 300 mcms storage is as high as Jordan can go and still hold the cost of water within an economically justifiable range. We have leverage because Jordan is unlikely to receive the necessary international financial help for the dam unless it is a sound economic proposition.

Mr. Gazit said this might be a good approach but the Yugoslav report might be turned in before the U.S. has had a chance to go to the Jordanians.

Mr. Jernegan said we would look into the feasibility of talking to the Yugoslav Government.

Note: Following the foregoing conversation, Mr. Bar-Haim discussed his record with Mr. Crawford. On several of the critical points Mr. Bar-Haim was provided with the precise phrasing used in this memorandum. Mr. Bar-Haim assured Mr. Crawford his report to Jerusalem would use verbatim quotes on these points.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crawford on October 14. A briefing memorandum from Symmes to Jernegan, October 7, is ibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Jordan Waters Meloadmoranda.
1. For documentation relating to the Unified Plan for Jordan waters, negotiated by Eric Johnston, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume XIV.