Office of the Historian

336. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)0

I-27092/63
Washington, October 8, 1963.

Dear Phil: We have received your request of 4 October 1963 on the extension of Hard Surface,1 and after careful consideration of your views2 the JCS have recommended, and Secretary McNamara has agreed, to a 30-day extension of the force to 16 November. We believe that this time period would offer Ambassador Hart sufficient latitude to negotiate the withdrawal of Hard Surface forces. In my judgment Ambassador Hart is armed with several useful negotiating instruments which we consider would materially minimize any adverse effect on the Saudi Government. These include:

a.
Emphasis on the original character of Hard Surface as a training deployment, whose mission has now been accomplished, and not an indefinite deployment of force.
b.
Reiteration of the President’s commitment to Faysal of last fall to assure Saudi territorial integrity. In this regard, emphasis should be given to the ability of the U.S. to deploy forces quickly to Saudi Arabia.
c.
Formal extension of an invitation to Saudi Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation, to visit the U.S. after the first of the year as the guest of Secretary McNamara.
d.
Our willingness to assist in meeting Saudi air defense requirements, to be financed from Saudi resources. In this connection the U.S. Air Defense Survey Team has completed its report of Saudi air defense requirements. This report was transmitted to the JCS on 4 October and, following JCS and ISA comment, will be referred to you later this month. A quick follow-through with the Saudis on this report should provide another indication of our good faith in being responsive to Saudi defense requirements.
e.
Continued periodic demonstrations of U.S. force in Saudi Arabia in the form of COMIDEASTFOR port calls and brief deployment of U.S. forces involved in CENTO exercises.

Secretary McNamara has also expressed interest in the plan State might develop in response to Nasser-Badeau exchange, in which it was agreed that a political settlement is the best present answer to the Yemen problem. In view of the Secretary’s interest I would appreciate being kept advised of any significant developments bearing on this question.

If my staff can be of any assistance on either of the foregoing matters, please do not hesitate to communicate with me.3

Sincerely,

Paul
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US. Secret. An attached note from Jernegan to U. Alexis Johnson, dated October 8, reads: “Bob Komer has just told me that the President has stated his strong desire that we keep the ‘Hard Surface’ jets in Saudi Arabia so long as necessary to achieve disengagement in Yemen.”↩
  2. Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
  3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Secretary of Defense McNamara to consider the extension of Hard Surface on October 7. Documentation relating to the meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Saudi Arabia 1963; and in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 1963 Files, 9180/3100 (27 Feb 63), Sec. 1a.↩
  4. A memorandum from Jernegan to Johnson, October 8, noted that the Department of Defense had extended Hard Surface for 30 days, not the 60 days requested by the Department of State, and described the difficulties that this would create. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US) Ambassador Hart had requested a 60-day extension of Hard Surface in telegram 328 from Jidda, September 27. (Ibid.) In telegram 290 to Jidda, October 11, the Department of State forwarded the list of “negotiating instruments” proposed by the Department of Defense to secure an earlier withdrawal of the U.S. squadron. (Ibid.)↩