Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

329. Paper by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff⁰

Washington, September 20, 1963.

THE NEXT ROUND IN YEMEN

We’re trying hard to breathe new life into our faltering Yemen enterprise. The interesting questions are why it’s dragging, and what to do?

First, let’s grant that this shoestring operation, however far it still is from ultimate success, has been a net gain to date: (1) we’ve kept a peanut war confined to Yemen and forestalled a direct UAR/Saudi confrontation; (2) in so doing, we’ve protected the rickety Saudi monarchy and our oil investment (something the oilmen don’t seem to grasp); (3) we’ve done so while still preserving our influence with Nasser and Faysal—no mean feat; and (4) we’ve helped keep the Soviets from achieving paramount influence in the YAR (an objective we share with Nasser). And we’ve done all this with a minimum US outlay by dragging the UN in between; we’ve even gotten the UAR and Saudis jointly to foot the bill. So net cost to us so far is a temporary deployment of 8 jets and 500 men (this sure beats the Congo). Nor, looking back even with wisdom of hindsight, can I see that we had any viable alternative. Had we stood aside, like the UK, and let Nasser and Faysal fight it out, Gamal would have promoted revolution in Saudi Arabia, or at the least done much more bombing than he actually did. Then we would have been under great pressure to defend the Saudis or see our oil investment endangered.

Why hasn’t disengagement worked? Basically, we and Nasser both miscalculated how long and how much it would take to subdue and pull together this non-country; it was easy to seize all the towns, but another matter to control the mountain tribes (this was the case under the old Imamate too). Saudi gold and arms have kept the tribal pot boiling; while Saudi aid was cut back when UNYOM got in, some is still going in (which is why the UAR kept bombing the supply routes). Faysal may even be conning us, or at least turning a blind eye. Worse yet, the UK may be at least covertly encouraging the Saudis and the royalists.

Where do we stand? Nasser is trapped in Yemen. It’s bleeding him, but he can’t afford either the sharp loss of face in letting go or (we hope) the risk of confronting us by starting on the Saudis again. But as Cairo 631 attests,¹ the UAR probably thinks we’re either being hoodwinked by Faysal or conniving with him behind the screen of disengagement. On top of this, Nasser has deep economic trouble at home, and now an open fight with the Baath. Nasser cornered is a dangerous animal, and we want to be mighty careful how we handle him.

We’ve real problems with Faysal too. Saud is back and may try to knife him. His advisers (and the UK) must still be telling him royalists can “win” in Yemen if Saudis only keep it up a bit longer. And he’s got our squadron to protect him if Nasser goes too far.

Finally, the Yemen regime we recognize is a non-government. As Nasser told Diefenbaker (attached),² the UAR has to run the whole show. If the UAR pulled out precipitately we’d have chaos. There is little likelihood that any quasi-royalist regime would be more stable than the YAR. Yemen will be a mess for a long time to come.

Where to from here? No one has a viable solution to, or a firm grip on, this mess. Not Nasser, not Faysal, not us. But there are roughly three ways we could influence the short-term outcome:

(1) Let disengagement collapse, UNYOM withdraw and Saudis resume all-out aid, while we warn Nasser off Saudi Arabia. This is what the Saudis and UK have wanted from the start. Now the SYG wants to pull out too. Big risk here is that a desperate Nasser would react, not by cutting his losses but by upping the ante. He might resume bombing (which would force a US/UAR showdown or make us look like paper tigers). To protect himself, he might invite a much greater Soviet presence in Yemen and the UAR. These are the very things we’ve tried to forestall from the beginning of the civil war.

(2) Go all out in backing Nasser and YAR, insisting Faysal really cut off aid or we’ll withdraw our squadron and leave him to Nasser’s mercy. We could subsidize the YAR economically, and beat up UK to stop shafting us and recognize YAR. True, Saudis have nowhere else to go and might cave, but Faysal (or Saud) is just as likely to rise up in righteous wrath and take his chances with Nasser, meanwhile harassing us on oil.

(3) Keep plugging away at disengagement, trying to keep UNYOM in place as the indispensable buffer while we (a) press Saudis to halt remaining covert aid; (b) make clear to Nasser the cost to him if he resumes bombing; and (c) seek some form of compromise reshuffling of YAR regime which both Nasser and Faysal (as well as YAR and royalists) might buy. NEA in State sees this as our best bet. It won’t be easy to patch up a regime acceptable to UAR as well as Saudis, since each will be jockeying to load the dice in its favor. The same goes for the various royalist and republican factions; there is nothing remotely akin to a cohesive political grouping on either side.

I think State is right.³ It’s always easier to come down on one side or the other than to steer a middle course (especially when each side sees this as meaning you lean toward the other). But what happens in Yemen itself remains far less important to us than to protect our Saudi investment, maintain decent relations with Nasser, and keep the USSR from making real gains. The middle course best serves these multiple interests. It also keeps our commitment limited by minimizing the risk we’ll get dragged into the fray. Finally, it plays on Nasser’s desire to reduce his overcommitment in Yemen without losing face by deserting the YAR, and Faysal’s fear that if he goes for broke in Yemen the US might desert him.

Nonetheless, this road will be a rocky one. It will be hard to get Nasser to keep withdrawing rapidly enough to give some color to idea that disengagement is proceeding, however slowly. It may be even harder to keep Faysal signed on to disengagement unless we get at least such minimal compliance (though air squadron gives us some leverage). And we’ll have to stem the SYG’s desire to wash his hands of Yemen mess, since the UNYOM buffer between the UAR and Saudis is indispensable for buying time until some political settlement can be patched up.

My only reservations about the way we’ve handled Yemen have been tactical; on occasion I’ve favored leaning harder on whichever party was backsliding. But I think all would agree that to keep disengagement alive until we can promote a political settlement will now take even fuller exercise of all our leverage than before. Unless we prescribe clearly the limits of our tolerance this affair can easily flare up again. So I recommend that:

(1) We make very clear to Nasser personally (a) our bona fides to date in Yemen—we’ve not tried to snooker him; (b) our plain view that disengagement plus political settlement, which presupposes UAR/Saudi rapprochement, is in his best interest; (c) if he disagrees we will be compelled to reassess our policy; (d) if he agrees, then the minimum we expect from him is gradual withdrawal plus absolutely no bombing raids; (e) if he plays ball we intend to press the Saudis and UK to do so too. We need to clear the air with Nasser, removing mutual suspicion to the extent possible and banking on his own desire to reduce his Yemen commitment at a time when he has so many other troubles.

(2) We take a harder line with Saudis too about obvious aid leakage, frankly telling Faysal we know some of his people (e.g. Sudairi) are taking advantage of him. Unless we can pin non-compliance on Saudis we have no case for pushing them toward political compromise. We may have to remind Faysal that if disengagement fails we will withdraw our squadron (i.e. leave him to slug it out with Nasser).

(3) We actively promote a compromise reshuffling of YAR regime which will bring in some of “royalists”, along lines of To Jidda 220 attached.⁴ We’ll have to tell Faysal we’re flatly opposed to restoration of the Imamate, but tell Nasser he can’t have it all his way either.

(4) Meanwhile, we convince the SYG to keep UNYOM going, and if possible to beef it up. It has been a real shoestring operation, partly because in our effort to get it in quickly we led U Thant to believe that the war was practically over and only a temporary UN umbrella needed (even so it took six weeks to get the SYG latched on). U Thant would no doubt love to disengage and can find plenty of excuses for doing so. We’ve got to keep reminding him that the UN’s prestige as well as ours is tied up in this affair.

In sum, I see no better prescription than sustained diplomatic pressure on both Cairo and Jidda, repeated leaning on the UN to keep up its flagging energy, and no doubt the continued presence of our eight planes (which we originally hoped to have out in sixty days or so). We simply have to readjust for a longer pull, be willing to accept continued UK sniping and other criticism, and play for the breaks. But so far we’ve kept Yemen from blowing up into something far more painful; with luck we can keep it that way until some deal can be worked out.

R. W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 09/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 9/26/63).” A covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy reads: “Here’s a Yemen paper which I’ve done to sort out my own thoughts, advise JFK and you, and jog State. Latter’s instincts are good, but it simply isn’t pressing hard enough to minimize risk that this minor league exercise in preventive diplomacy will come apart at the seams. So I’d hope you could endorse this on to JFK for weekend or evening reading, with request he approve recommendations. We could then convey these informally to State as JFK-endorsed doctrine, giving us the needle we need.” A memorandum from Komer to Bundy, October 10, indicates that Kennedy approved this memorandum. (Ibid.)
1. Dated September 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
2. Not further identified.
3. Interestingly enough, the head of the Foreign Office Arabian Dept. also sees no alternative to US continuing “efforts to bring about SAG-UAR detente from which some Yemeni settlement might ultimately flow” (London 1356, 19 Sept.). [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Dated August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 SAUD/UN)