327. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary
(Read) to the President’s Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, September 20,
1963
SUBJECT
- Israel Security Guarantee: Reply to Ben-Gurion’s May 12 Letter1
Attached is a memorandum on an Israel Security Guarantee which Mr. Ball has approved. He has suggested that we
transmit it to you
[Page 706]
together with a
suggested Presidential reply to former Israel Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s letter of May 12. We are also
attaching the Department of Defense study on this same subject.2
Attachment4
SUBJECT
- Israel Security Guarantee: Reply to Ben-Gurion’s May 12 Letter
On July 23 you suggested we tell the Israelis why we do not feel we can
go beyond your May 8 press conference statement in providing new
security assurances. We enclose a suggested letter to Prime Minister
Eshkol responding to
Ben-Gurion’s of May 12.5 If approved, we hope
this would conclude the current dialogue with the Israelis about more
explicit security arrangements. We consider this justified because:
- 1.
- Our public and private commitment to Israel’s security is
clear, inter alia, from your December 1962 talk with Mrs.
Meir, your April 26
letter to Ben-Gurion,
your May 8 statement, and the present reply.
- 2.
- Arab leaders and the world at large are in no doubt as to this
commitment, and the Arabs contemplate no military attack on
Israel at this time.
- 3.
- We concur generally in the view expressed in the enclosed
study by the Joint Chiefs that the United States has more than
adequate military force available for unilateral deployment to
make good its pledge to Israel. What Israel desires is what it
sees as a political advantage deriving from our open military
support.
- 4.
- These factors aside, the present Near East balance favors
Israel and by Israel’s own admission will continue to do so in
the years immediately ahead.
- 5.
- We have the entire security situation in the Near East under
constant study. If there were a change, serious threat of
change, or material weakness in Israel’s defenses, we would be
ready to take immediate measures.
- 6.
- The security arrangements Israel seeks with the United States
would in our judgment harm our interests in the area and weaken
rather than strengthen Israel’s ultimate security.
- a.
- Our carefully built influence with the Arab states
would be set back by the new bilateral arrangements
Israel wants. This influence is useful to us and to
Israel both as a deterrent and in the constructive sense
of helping along those accommodations that we hope will
ultimately make possible Israel’s acceptance in the
area.
- b.
- New United States arrangements with Israel could
result in comparable Soviet-Arab ties, bringing the
Soviets back in, probably in a more permanent and
damaging fashion.
- c.
- As a consequence of (b), impetus would be given to the
area arms race. Our capability to restrain this
competition, which is moving into more sophisticated
weapons, would be reduced and probably
eliminated.
- d.
- One major reason for Israel’s non-acceptance by its
neighbors is its foreignness; expanded ties with a
foreign power would perpetuate its isolation in the
area.
- 7.
- We should retain freedom of decision and action in the Near
East to be able to deal decisively with aggression there from
either disputant. Advance security arrangements with Israel
would tie our hands undesirably.
- 8.
-
Our firm but sympathetic reply to the Israelis can best be
made now because:
- a.
- The imminence of an encircling Arab unity which
might be regarded as threatening by Israel has so
obviously receded since the Cairo declaration of
April 17. While current discord among the Arab
states increases temptations in some to pin-prick
Israel, Arab capacity to cause damage to Israel is
correspondingly limited.
- b.
- We have a fairly satisfactory reply regarding
Dimona inspections. Israel has signed the Test Ban
Treaty. There is broad appreciation for our stand in
the Security Council’s recent discussion of
incidents on the Israel-Syria border, and
consequently a greater confidence that we are
prepared to act in Israel’s interest. These
circumstances create a good atmosphere for frank and
forth-right exposition of our views.
- c.
- Our reply will fall in context with answers
already received from Prime Minister Macmillan and
President De
Gaulle. We know both have answered
negatively to Ben-Gurion’s request.
In short, we propose that your letter again make clear our
concern for Israel’s integrity, but convey our strong sense
that there must be a balance in our approach to the Near
East and that we conceive this, our present approach, as in
Israel’s best interests.
[Page 708]
All available evidence indicates Israel has already
anticipated a negative reaction regarding the formal
security guarantee and will now go on to try to get
alternatives such as joint military planning and assurance
of freer access to United States weaponry. Such alternatives
might cause difficulties as great or greater than the formal
security guarantee. The implications of each should be
examined carefully when and if presented by the
Israelis.