325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0
1036. Eyes only Cane for Ambassador. When you see Nasser to review Near East arms limitation, express President’s appreciation for Nasser’s prompt support for limited nuclear test ban treaty which helped gain support for agreement among number other countries. President can understand why Nasser might find suggestions presented by McCloy politically infeasible at this time, but hopes other means can be found to forestall Near East arms race which would not create same problem for UAR.
Therefore, recalling assurances which Nasser gave McCloy not to acquire nuclear weapons or attack Israel and his offer to make these in [Page 703] form of public exchange of letters, explore with Nasser draft letter from President (transmitted separately) and determine whether Nasser willing to respond. Tell him we would hope this letter and his reply could at appropriate juncture become public documents after appropriate consultations. Remind Nasser that such action on his part would reinforce our own continuing insistence that Israel not go nuclear.
As separate matter from exchange of letters you should also reiterate our interest in gaining UAR support for IAEA safeguards program. With signature test ban agreement, we see wider support for principle of IAEA safeguards for nuclear power reactors as next practical step in forestalling spread of nuclear weapons and are encouraging as many countries as possible to lend their support. We have been gratified that India agreed to principle of IAEA safeguards for Tarapur reactor which was facilitated by fact that Soviet Union and US supported proposal before IAEA to institute safeguard system for large reactors not previously covered. If Nasser should raise them, you may say we appreciate UAR’s political apprehensions regarding extensive international verification procedures. However, IAEA is international institution one of whose purposes is establish rational methods assure peaceful uses nuclear power. Since UAR program in nuclear power field is new, it should be relatively easy to accept principle IAEA safeguards for future reactors. If UAR wishes avoid hazards of nuclear arms race, it needs to exercise sovereignty in a way which will contribute to avoidance of hazard. UAR support for principle for IAEA safeguards for yet unbuilt nuclear reactors in UAR would have profound effect in Near East context and support our efforts have IAEA safeguards accepted for reactor now being put into operation in Israel. Thus acceptance and support for safeguards system by UAR would be a wise and responsible exercise of sovereignty, not a derogation of independence. It would be an essential step toward getting other states to move in the same direction.
Finally, you should recall Nasser’s assurances given to Mr. McCloy that he would not accelerate his missile program. You should point out that when this question is raised by others we continue to try to keep this matter in perspective. Exercise of restraint in UAR missile program would be helpful in holding down general escalations in the area as well as improve image of UAR.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/MCCLOY. Top Secret. Drafted by Dickman on September 11; cleared by the President, Hilliker, and Gathright (ACDA); and approved by Grant.↩
- Badeau executed these instructions and delivered Kennedy’s letter (see Document 324) during a meeting with Nasser on October 5. After reading the letter, Nasser stated that he thought something along the lines presented “might be possible,” but was concerned about possible propaganda attacks from other Arab states. Regarding UAR support for the IAEA, Nasser asked whether the United States could obtain a similar undertaking from Israel, and was told that while the United States could not guarantee Israeli acceptance, UAR adherence would place Israel under heavy pressure not to develop nuclear capabilities. (Telegram 799 from Cairo, October 8; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/MCCLOY)↩