320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations0
560. 1. President desires as strong a resolution as traffic will bear on Israeli complaint in SC. Accordingly, on assumption it is best we can get, Dept generally concurs in course of action proposed urtel 5891 and fully endorses Yost’s presentation urtel 585.2 After reviewing text of UNTSO Report (which we note fails to provide conclusive evidence of Syrian complicity), we concur that the best we can hope for with regard to Israeli complaint is an operative para which “condemns the murders” following on preambular language which indicates the weight of evidence points to Syrian guilt. We also note that in his speech to the Knesset yesterday, Eshkol calls for “condemnation of the murders” rather than “condemnation of Syria.” We assume that Israel now realizes, on basis of evidence cited in UNTSO Report, that such language is the maximum the traffic will bear re censure of Syria.
2. Re strengthening of UNTSO machinery: we remain anxious to have Council deliberation result in improvement of machinery on the ground. However, the degree of specificity regarding measures to be supported in a resolution is complicated issue, dependent on other factors. Since Israel has objections to certain aspects of the reactivation of ISMAC, we would not pursue this specific recommendation in a resolution unless Israel, as the complainant in this case, will clearly be given satisfaction on condemnation question. Proponents of recourse to UN machinery in Israel should not, in our view, be handed a setback by having Council deliberations develop in such a way that the outcome of this session turns out to be a political defeat for GOI. Accordingly, we much prefer that res not specify precise steps re strengthening UNTSO. We believe same objective can be attained by having SC call on parties to cooperate with UNTSO Commander in implementing the recommendations he has made for maintenance of peace and stability in the area, without specifying what these measures are. (Whether or not specifics are included, we believe Bull should be asked to report back in 60-90 days on progress in implementation.)
However, if in view of fact that Bunche and UK are pressing for specifics in a resolution, it proves necessary to include precise recommendations in order to attract widespread support for a text which condemns [Page 694] the murders, you are authorized to fall back to a position of agreeing to inclusion of such specifics. We believe that in this regard Israel’s concern with reactivation of ISMAC can be mitigated by pursuing concept advanced by Bull. This takes full account long-established positions of both parties, i.e., it envisages dropping controversial past agenda and resuming meetings initially on ad hoc basis to deal with current complaints.
3. Re Syrian complaint in letter dated 21 Aug 1963 (S/5395), evidence cited in Bull Report does not clearly establish Israel’s prime responsibility for shooting. Report does not clearly show which side first began firing, but only that both sides broke cease-fire at one time or another. Accordingly, if possible, res should include para finding that Syrian complaint not clearly substantiated.
4. Re sponsorship, we accept that only sure way of being able to control the situation is for us to take a strong lead, despite obvious disadvantage that we will be put in the middle. We recognize that in order to command reasonable support, any res will have to take account, explicitly or implicitly, not only of Israel’s complaint but also of necessity for parties to cooperate more fully with the UN machinery, and that latter point causes some difficulties for both Syria and Israel. We believe GOI was fully aware in bringing current complaint to SC that debate on such matters could not be confined to specific incident involved and that debate would inevitably be broadened.
Accordingly, you are authorized to take the lead along with the UK in developing support for a res along the foregoing lines.
5. As soon as you are satisfied that such a resolution appears viable, you should inform Israeli Del that, in response to their request, we are prepared to co-sponsor a resolution which would include condemnation of murders of the two Israelis at Almagor. You should also indicate that for our initiative to prove fruitful and for it to represent fully our own policy on utilization UN machinery, res would also have to endorse recommendations for improving UNTSO made by Bull. If Comay reacts strongly, Mission should inform him it will request further instructions from Dept. You may, however, express opinion USG unlikely consider it would be productive to sponsor resolution condemning murders unless it also recommends UNTSO strengthening to help prevent any further such incidents.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum and Campbell; cleared by Rusk, Komer, Grant, and McKesson; and approved by Gardner. Repeated to Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, and Jerusalem.↩
- Not found.↩
- Dated August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ISR-SYR/UN)↩
- Subsequently, the United States and the United Kingdom put forward a joint draft resolution that among other points condemned the murder of Israeli citizens, called Syria’s attention to evidence that those responsible for the killing entered Israeli territory from the direction of the Jordan River, and appealed for cooperation in prisoner exchanges. Morocco sought to impose a series of amendments on the draft resolution, but these were defeated in a Security Council vote on September 3. The U.S.-U.K. draft then failed of adoption by a vote of 8 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, as the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, voted against the draft resolution.↩