Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

300. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 23, 1963.

The 4:30 Tuesday meeting is to consider next steps on UAR-Israeli missile/nuclear limitations, and the intimately related question of Israeli security guarantee. McCloy and Badeau will attend.

Our original idea was to get Nasser tentatively signed on to nuclear missile scheme and then use this as the quid pro quo to sign up Israel. Nasser balked on political grounds, but did talk about an exchange of letters with you. Before going to Israelis, therefore, we ought to see what we can get out of Nasser along these lines.

Even if Nasser comes through, Israel will still try to exact a price for nuclear self-denial and for agreeing to lie low if Jordan collapses. We haven’t yet responded to BG’s 12 May letter requesting security guarantee, and Israelis are getting itchy. If we now send McCloy to ask them to give up nuclear option, they’ll immediately ask “what’s in it for us.” Dimona inspection is obviously being held up for just this reason.

So there’s no point in sending McCloy to Israel until we’ve thought through guarantee problem. Our dilemma is that the more we talk about inspection, nuclear self-denial, and Jordan the more the Israelis will see leverage to get guarantee, arms, and joint planning from us.

State sees a public guarantee as really giving Israel little more security than the tacit but widely understood commitment it has already, yet forcing a sharp Arab reaction and giving an opening to the USSR. Thus we would roil up the area to neither Israel’s interest nor our own: We would (1) undermine our even-handed ME policy, thus reducing our leverage on the Arabs to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions; (2) invite the Soviets to offer similar guarantees to the Arabs; (3) in fact, give Israel a blank check to be obstreperous in its Arab policy, confident that our guarantee would protect it from any adverse consequences of its actions. State doesn’t see how we can guarantee Israel without automatically binding ourselves to Israeli position on armistice lines, water, refugees, Jordan, etc., unless we negotiated all these issues out in advance.

So State’s preference is to try and talk the Israelis out of a guarantee on the above grounds. They propose an early letter to Eshkol along these lines. This seems a useful first thrust (if only to put our counter-arguments before the Israelis), but I doubt that it will wash. Israel just doesn’t see the problem as we do (witness the clash over our UAR policy). They’re willing to risk Arab reaction, even a Soviet response. As Israel sees it, the only language Arabs really understand is strength and that if we once make clear to the Arabs that war with Israel is out, they’ll subside.

In any case, Israel will not give us nuclear promises unless we either: (1) literally force them to back down; or (2) pay a price. So we ought to look at the minimum we may be able to get away with, while still limiting risk of strong Arab reaction and Soviet response. In fact, such a price may even be necessary to permit us to continue a flexible Arab policy without such constant Israeli harassment as to make the domestic cost of such a policy too high. What are the possible options:

A. It’s just possible that, if we could trade some form of security assurance for Israeli nuclear self-denial, we could use this as sufficient justification to the Arabs to forestall a violent reaction. We’ve let Nasser know our concern over risk of Israeli escalation via McCloy probe. A test ban agreement will further buttress our stand. If we could let Arabs think we were really succumbing to Israeli “nuclear blackmail”, we might just get away with it.

B. Some kinds of “guarantee” might be less painful than others. Israel wants a full-fledged alliance, with all the trimmings—joint planning and MAP aid. At other extreme, State wants nothing beyond reiteration of our 8 May assurances to all parties, not just Israel. But an alternative might be a public letter to Eshkol (in response to nuclear self-denial assurances), reiterating our deep interest in Israel’s security, reminding him your 8 May statement meant US would protect Israel, but telling him we’d have to be on the other side if Israel attacked. We might even explore the road of private assurances to Israel, though risk of deliberate leak would be high.

C. Could we get away with arms aid or joint planning in lieu of a guarantee? If we argue Israel really doesn’t need any tighter assurances than it has already there may be other ways to prove we mean to protect her. Hawk set a precedent (though we’ve gotten little credit for it); we could assure Israel we’d go further if and when there was a proven need (and tell Nasser we’d have to do so if he got a lot more from the USSR). We could at least tell Israelis unilaterally how we planned to come to their aid if attacked, though they’d come right back that our plans are inadequate.

In sum, we can’t separate nuclear self-denial and Jordan issues from Israeli demands unless we’re willing to cram our policy down Israel’s throat. But failure of current Arabs unity move, plus US/USSR test ban creates a psychological situation in which we may be able to pay a lot less than Israel wants. State should be asked to explore these possibilities urgently. Attached paper does not,¹ and is merely a first whack at this terribly complex problem.

In the meantime we need an interim reply to BG letter, either a note from you or opening of a secret dialogue as a holding operation.

R. W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, UAR/Israel Arms Limitation, 07/11/63–07/31/63. Secret; Cane. Attached to the source text is another copy of this memorandum bearing a marginal note in Komer’s hand: “Mac—State couldn’t clear its paper in time (it was poor job), so I’ve sent this in. JFK needs something.” Also attached to the source text is a note by Komer entitled “Issues for 4:30 meeting,” which reads: “1. What is the next step with Nasser? 2. Timing and nature of McCloy probe in Israel, if any? 3. How far should we go down guarantee road in order to get nuclear self-denial from Israel? 4. What reply, even interim, to Israeli request for security guarantee? I doubt that any of these can be finally decided today, but it is essential we get some forward motion.”
1. At this point the phrase, “but it has not been approved by Rusk,” is crossed out. The attached paper, a July 23 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, is initialed by Rusk and printed as Document 301.