298. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Eshkol’s interim reply on Dimona,1 which merely says he’ll give careful study, further confirms that Israelis regard Dimona inspection as a bargaining card on security guarantee. We’re unlikely to get full satisfaction until larger issue is resolved.
We’ve been holding up on latter pending McCloy probes. He was to go to Israel shortly, but we need to revise previous bidding because Nasser didn’t buy our scheme. To go to Israel without being able to deliver Nasser puts us at Israel’s mercy. So we should try first at least to get the self-denying letter Nasser offered.
Israel will almost certainly insist on some form of greater security reassurance as its price for not going nuclear and lying low on Jordan. So immediate question is what, if anything, we might do. State is extremely chary, arguing that we already guarantee Israel and that anything we do to make this more public will only spook the Arabs, to Israel’s disadvantage and our own. This just won’t convince the Israelis, however, so we have to look at other options. With Badeau and McCloy back, we plan to put our thoughts before you Tuesday.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, UAR/Israel Arms Limitation, 07/11/63–07/31/63. Secret; Cane. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 7/19/63—Tab 10).”↩
- The Embassy in Tel Aviv conveyed the text of Eshkol’s July 17 letter in telegram 74, July 17. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Pres. Kennedy-Johnson/Israel Correspondence: 1962–65)↩