296. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
McGB:
On UAR “poison gas”,1 we made following tough private noises: (1) On 6 July Badeau prodded Ali Sabri, Nasser’s No. 2, registering strong [Page 643] concern—he “strongly urged their discontinuance as imperiling disengagement and generating grave fears in US and other circles re UAR bona fides” (Cairo 64);2 (2) we told Badeau to see Field Marshal Amer and raise this and other concerns (To Cairo 133)3 but Badeau thought this redundant; (3) Talbot called in Kamel 11 July to emphasize our concern and point out spot UAR would be in if poison gas charges validated;4 (4) Badeau saw Nasser on 11 July (Cairo 121)5—latter evaded but Badeau urged gas “self-defeating” in Yemen and “strongly aroused deep concern in USG”; (5) we sent follow up (Deptel 195)6 on 12 July telling Badeau go back to Ali Sabri, stressing “grave implication UAR use gas would have for its position in US.” But Sabri was away in Baghdad, and Badeau complains strongly (Cairo 130)7 that, having put UAR unmistakably on notice, further representations “would be ineffective and self-defeating.”
I’ve been pressing State hard for last two weeks (many of above messages were at my instigation). But Talbot, like Badeau, feels we’ve made our views crystal clear and shouldn’t push harder.8
As to public noises, we’ve been saying we’d hold up comment until investigations were completed. Certainly, we’ll have to make strong condemnatory noises, but JFK said Friday we should let others get out in front (UK and UN are). There’s no percentage in ourselves pushing issue to point of helping destroy our own policy—what would this gain? See Nasser’s own explanation of Yemen delays (Cairo 121) for evidence UAR not wholly at fault.
I hate to sound defensive, but even I confess that staying on even keel with slippery UAR is hard. It seems to involve one prickly issue after another. But strategic gain to us is real: (1) Nasser has listened to us on Yemen and other issues; (2) we have brought him from pro-Soviet position to one where Soviets have as much trouble with him as we. Other gains are harder to pin down; they may largely amount to what Nasser hasn’t done that he otherwise would. Do all realize that we’ve never been in better position in Arab world; we’re on reasonably good terms with [Page 644] revolutionary Arabs, yet without losing our old clients. This is right where we want to be, despite pain and strain involved in staying there.9
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 6/63–8/63. Secret.↩
- CIA Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on July 12 an intelligence report revealing that the UAR had used in Yemen a munition containing a chemical warfare agent. (Ibid.) A memorandum from Kitchen (G/PM) to U. Alexis Johnson, July 5, described a variety of reports, mostly from journalists, that the UAR had been using a toxic chemical bomb against the Yemeni Royalist forces since late May. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–10 YEMEN)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 294.↩
- Dated July 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN)↩
- Reported in telegram 214 to Cairo, July 13. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)↩
- Document 294.↩
- Dated July 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 SAUD-UAR)↩
- Dated July 13. (Ibid.)↩
- A marginal notation in Komer’s hand at this point reads: “He called Kamel in again Friday [July 12], and reamed him on gas.”↩
- On July 17 in a memorandum to Bundy, Komer indicated that he had again spoken to Talbot about the poison gas matter, but Talbot was adamant that the United States had pushed the UAR as hard as it could. Komer thought that U.N. condemnation, if the charges were proven, would be a better way, but it was crucial to get the Yemen disengagement going so that the issue would recede. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 6/63–8/63)↩