Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State⁰

Tehran, June 24, 1963, 5 p.m.

1150. Fol paras from memo of a conversation held recently between Shah [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

1. The disturbances of the week of June two were naturally unhappy event and could have been avoided if SAVAK had functioned effectively and acted in good time. However some benefits may derive from the now obvious facts that the govt cannot necessarily be cowed by street riots into resigning and that the armed forces will do their duty and use firearms in a disciplined manner when necessary. The death toll is probably about 125 persons, with possibility a few more who were wounded and carried off by friends to places where they died later and were not reported. It was a mistake to delay the use of weapons by the troops the first day. This mistake will not be repeated on future occasions. In any case probably a good lesson has been learned by all, and although further outbreaks are not precluded, it is unlikely that anything as serious will occur again. It is noteworthy that not a single regularly employed factory or other type of regularly employed worker participated in the disturbances. There were, however, bazaar employees, South Tehran gangsters and riffraff, and many unemployed. The main direction of the riots came from the freedom movement and the clergy, but the real force behind the troubles, including also those in FARS, is the reactionary landlords and clergy, the latter receiving massive financial help from both inside and outside the country.

Comment: This statement considered of interest although it does not change Emb-[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] assessment of disturbances or forces behind them.

2. Nothing can stop the “White Revolution” now and certainly no reactionary groups can succeed. In this connection the Shah proposes to do some house cleaning among the people surrounding him, for example, there is that weak old man, Court Minister Ala, who is really of no importance. He and his friends rushed to the Shah during the troubles, wringing their hands and proclaiming the need for an immediate change of govt and negotiations with the Mullahs and other dissidents. There is another useless group like that, including people like Sherif-Emami and Entezam. The problem of finding the right people to carry out the revolution must be solved soon, and also the Shah must be more ruthless in dismissing those officials who fail to measure up to their capabilities.

Comment: Emb will watch process of “ruthless dismissal” with great interest. (Note: Entezam is NIOC Chairman who was offered PriMin before Alam.)

3. Elections will be held on 26 Shahrivar 17 Sept. The study of suitable candidates is proceeding and the elections will be carried out well and in a manner which can cause no complaints. There will be no political parties at this time, although a single political party will be established after elections to become the main political force in the future.

The new political party will be organized, at least in the initial stages, by Hassan Ali Mansur and his progressive group. Mansur himself has a good reputation and is an honest man, which is more than can be said for his father; he can be counted on to do a conscientious job, although it is doubtful that he has the leadership qualities to lead the party effectively when it becomes fully active. Probably the Shah will have to provide that leadership himself, or at least the drive.

Comment: We have been coming to the conclusion Shah intended to use Mansur and his “progressive group” as a nucleus around which to organize and produce Majlis candidates among professional and businessmen, particularly in Tehran. If the Shah actually names Hassan Ali Mansur as head of a new political party, or “reform league” and expects serious political results from this organization, he will indeed have to provide the leadership himself. Hassan Ali Mansur is, to put it mildly, no charismatic leader.

4. The Mullahs involved in the recent disturbances seem disposed to negotiate with the govt. There is really no negotiating to be done as they will have to accept the full reform program as it now stands. They are in no position to make demands, but possibly some magnanimous, generous gesture may be made to help them save a little face if they are willing to be cooperative. In order to dispose of the Mullah problem once and for all, it is proposed to establish soon a ministry dealing with religion and supervising all religious foundations, trusts, and activities. This will permit Mullahs to be placed on a govt salary basis, which should simplify the question of control greatly. Of course there will be resistance to this system, but such resistance should be fairly easy to break.

Comment: Whether or not the pacification of the Mullahs and their reduction to a considerably lesser role in Iran affairs proves to be “fairly easy”, we believe that the Shah will in the end succeed in his endeavors.¹

5. Persian influence must be expanded in the Gulf as rapidly as possible, although there are no means to do so at the moment. Greater commercial contacts with the Gulf Sheikhdoms must be promoted to orient them toward Iran. With current developments in Yemen, where the United States seems to be favoring Nasser’s position, there is real danger of the eventual establishment of a base for Egyptian bombers and submarines, with a sharp alteration of the present balance in the Persian Gulf.

Comment: Although Shah much calmer on this subject at time of Cairo unity talks, this statement is reminder he is insistent in his beliefs that Nasser represents a danger to Iran.

6. There is considerable Soviet pressure for cultural programs of various kinds in Iran. The Shah hopes that the US can step up its cultural programs involving visiting orchestras, musicians, dance groups, and others in order to counter the Soviet offensive in these fields.

In response to a query about reports of a program to encourage Irano-Soviet tourist activity and of the possibility of an Irano-Soviet civil aviation agreement, the Shah replied that he had heard nothing of the tourist matter, and was opposed to tourist exchange. As regards the air agreement, negotiations will take place as it is difficult to decline to hold them. However, Iran will insist on full reciprocity and the right to use foreign pilots in Iranian planes overflying Soviet territory to Moscow. He followed this by a plan for American assistance in setting up a strong, independent national Iranian airline.

Comment: His statement regarding air agreement with Soviets is in line with what PriMin told Ambassador.

Rockwell

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-US. Secret.
1. On August 3, the Embassy in Tehran reported: “Prime Minister office tells us Ayatollahs Khomeni, Qomi, Mavallati were transferred August 2 to “house arrest’ following abrupt change circumstances. Implication was new proposals offering better basis settlement Government/Mullah dispute have been offered. Ayatollahs will be under government control “for some time to come.’” (Telegram 119 from Tehran; ibid., POL 29-1 IRAN)