Office of the Historian

234. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, May 2, 1963.

Here are moves in train to show military interest in Jordan:

1.
Most important, we have a US/UK survey mission led by a BG going to Amman next week. It’s really to discuss MAP but we won’t say so, and let Nasser speculate it’s for joint planning.1
2.
We now have 13-man paratroop training team at Jordan paratroop school.
3.
We’re sending 15–20 men with 2 planes third week in May for joint exercises at school’s graduation.
4.
On word of honor of Saudi Defense Minister, Faysal’s brother, that Saudis stopped all supplies to royalists last Sunday, we’re going to send advance party of air squadron to Dhahran, but without combat aircraft.

All these will give Nasser and Iraqis pause. Other options we’re considering are: (a) destroyer visit to Akaba; (b) send additional fighter squadrons or even a couple of brigades to Adana, Turkey, if show of force needed; and (c) redeploy Sixth Fleet as necessary. But Macomber cautions we must be careful not to embrace Hussein so close as to label him a US stooge.

As to air squadron promised Saudis on “training exercise”, it should be in place by 15 May. If both sides announce disengagement on 3 May without waiting for UN (as may be in cards), we can consider moving earlier. But State and DOD are both nervous about changing signals especially since Jordan and Saudi situations quieted down:

1.
We’ve made a major production of not sending them till Faysal officially starts disengagement, and Nasser does too.
2.
Firm evidence Faysal was still shipping in arms till a few days ago, and that Egyptians thinking of another air strike, suggests (a) we ought to hold Faysal to our bargain and (b) not let him think we weren’t serious after all.
3.
We also told Nasser (Cairo 1759)2 squadron would not be sent until disengagement actually underway.

Bob Komer
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I. Secret.↩
  2. The Department of State transmitted to the Embassy in Amman in telegram 504, May 2, the terms of reference for the tripartite military advisory team that would be headed by a Brigadier General. Telegram 504 and additional documentation relating to the mission are in Department of State, Central File DEF 19 US.↩
  3. See footnote 1, Document 213.↩