Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

232. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, May 1, 1963.

McGB:

1. We now have field comments on advisability of reaffirming Tripartite Declaration.¹ Macomber thinks Jordan doesn’t need public reassurance now so prefers delay, adding that to extent fear of Israeli attack on West Bank acts as a deterrent to externally-inspired revolution in Jordan, such a statement tends to undercut it. Badeau prefers quiet diplomacy too, suggests JFK letters to A-I chiefs of state, but recognizes pressures for some public statement. If so, he favors pegging it to substance of last para. Tripartite Declaration, but not reaffirming Declaration itself. Adlai strongly advises President reaffirm substance of last paragraph now.

2. Repercussions. Such a statement doesn’t really give Israelis what they want (straight bilateral security guarantee plus joint planning on how to carry it out). But it may reduce heat on us from Israelis, while calming down on Hill.

Arabs will inevitably see in statement (given its present context) a pro-Israeli move. So we can’t stop adverse public reactions in most of Arab world, though it shouldn’t be too long-lasting or painful. We can mitigate impact on Arab leaders (especially Nasser) by explaining carefully what we up to, and reminding them this longstanding US policy so marks no change in our attitude. But we’ve got to be careful not to let Nasser think statement gives him umbrella under which to promote revolution.

3. Ergo, I feel (State does too) that public statement at this time unnecessary for foreign policy reasons, and will entail some adverse Arab reaction. So issue turns on whether it is desirable for domestic purposes here.

If we have to say something, President’s idea of responding at press conference seems best. Let’s not refer to Tripartite in any way, but say something like:

“US remains, as it has been since 1950, deeply interested in the maintenance of peace and stability anywhere in the Near East. It remains strongly opposed to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area as well as to the violation of frontiers or armistice lines.”

RWK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jordan, 5/63–11/63. Secret.
1. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File POL 26 JORDAN. A draft memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, dated April 30, “Implications of Reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration and Presidential Response to Press Inquiries—Study Undertaken by Department at President’s Request,” which apparently was never sent, is ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 65 D 28, Tripartite Declaration; for text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Jordan.