Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

230. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, April 30, 1963.

McGB—

Though anything could still happen, it begins to look as though immediacy of Jordan problem receding a bit.¹ Both Hussein and Macomber are a bit more relaxed (Amman 503),² and Nasser says (Cairo 1870)³ what’s all the excitement about. We’ve also tried to cool down the Iraqis (Baghdad 709).⁴

In fact I’m beginning to think that the immediate problem is less Jordan than Israel’s obvious effort to take advantage of current tensions to push us into deeds or words which will bolster its security, regardless of the effect on our position with the Arabs. BG’s emphasis on the 17 April UAR Declaration, Harman’s statement that Israel wants us to take formal action to get UAR to renounce it, and all the flak about moving to the West Bank suggest that the Israelis want either to commit us publicly on their side or to get strong private reassurances from us (e.g. joint planning, security commitment).

If Arab unity is really on the upgrade (and this is still moot) we’re unquestionably going to have to do something along these lines. But if at all possible, we must make sure that in return for such assurances, we get some constraints on Israel as well. We cannot commit ourselves to Israel’s defense without making sure that we haven’t given it a blank check.

Since BG’s letter⁵ makes clear that Israel regards itself as still militarily superior to the Arabs, there is no immediate threat to Israel’s security. Nor is it as open and shut as Bob McNamara put it last Saturday⁶ that the West Bank of the Jordan is Israel’s logical military frontier (Mike latched on to this like a shot). The West Bank is such a cul-de-sac that Israel could pinch it off in 24 hours; ergo, no sensible Arab commander is going to put many forces in such a noose (Jordanians don’t now).

The real threat to Israel’s security lies in UAR acquisition of guided missiles and nuclear weapons over next several years. Nasser will undoubtedly go this route so long as Israel seems to be doing the same. We must break this vicious circle (unless we’re willing to settle for a balance of terror in the area). Therefore I’d argue against our giving new assurances to Israel without tying them to movement on arms issue. Am working with State on just such a proposal.

For above and other reasons let’s think twice before reiterating old Tripartite Declaration before we have to do so. It amounts to a security declaration, but in a form which annoys Arabs and won’t satisfy Israelis. Moreover, if it is read as guaranteeing present armistice lines, it might just lead Nasser to think if he ran a coup in Jordan we’d do a Suez by keeping Israel from the West Bank.

Finally, Israel’s patent attempt to embrace Hussein (and lead publicly that we too have done so) is so much a kiss of death to the brave young king as to raise suspicions Israelis want him to fall so they could take West Bank. BG’s letter and other efforts to warn us may just amount to laying the groundwork for such a move, especially now while half of Nasser’s army is locked up in Yemen.

All this suggests we should (1) stay loose; (2) minimize public statements in favor of quiet diplomacy; (3) do some active contingency planning; but (4) avoid being spooked prematurely into actions which we might later regret.

Bob K.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jordan, 4/63. Secret.
1. Notes of the daily White House staff meeting for April 30 include the following report: “Certain elements of the 6th Fleet which were heading into the Eastern Mediterranean because of the unrest in Jordan were turned around yesterday and ordered back to whence they had come.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Memos)
2. Document 226.
3. In telegram 1870 from Cairo, April 29, Badeau reported on a conversation with Nasser, held at Nasser’s request. Referring to Badeau’s previous conversation with Sharaf, Nasser was concerned that the United States had information about an imminent action in Jordan of which the UAR was not aware. Nasser also resisted suggestions that the UAR was planning or sponsoring a coup in Jordan. He said that Arab-Israeli hostilities would be disastrous and that it would be virtually impossible not to send UAR troops if Israel attacked Jordan. Badeau promised that if a coup occurred in Jordan, the United States would use its influence to prevent precipitous Israeli action, but that would require UAR restraint. Nasser, whom Badeau described as “fatigued, sober and concerned,” believed that Hussein would survive the current crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 JORDAN)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., POL 17 US-UAR)
5. See Document 220.
6. April 27; see Document 222.