Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

219. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)⁰

Washington, April 25, 1963.

JORDAN

A. Situation

1. Now stabilized—trouble was largely caused by enthusiastic students reacting to revolutions in Iraq and Syria and to federation movement.¹

2. Army and police—remained loyal and effective.

3. Tension—likely to remain for some time.

4. UAR propaganda—has been an incitement, but little evidence of organized and effective external interference otherwise.

5. UAR intentions—we doubt UAR wishes risk Israeli military intervention in Jordan or take on obligation of budgetary support, or pose direct challenge to US.

6. Israel intentions—protect Jordan by creating impression of readiness to move militarily; pressure US in particular to undertake vigorous campaign to preserve Jordan’s status quo; move into West Bank if a pro-UAR regime is established in Jordan; utilize disturbed conditions in Near East to extract further benefits from US.

7. UK intentions—support Hussein short of military intervention.

B. Future Prospects

1. Security measures—expected to be effective unless constant, severe repression of large segments of population necessary. Army might eventually prove unwilling.

2. New, enlarged UAR—if it is launched and proves successful in operation, will exert great attraction on Jordan. If unsuccessful or obviously unjust to Iraq and Syria, Jordanian enthusiasm for federation will wane.

3. Reform and development—gains under Wasfi Tell likely to be lost in part—new impetus must be provided.

C. Measures Already Taken

1. Public statements—Secretary Rusk on March 8,² Lincoln White April 22,³ Assistant Secretary Talbot April 22 (enclosed).⁴

2. Quiet diplomacy with UAR and Israel.

3. Personal assurances to Hussein we stand by him.

4. Consultations with UK—Assistant Secretary Talbot in London.

D. Measures Planned for Near Future

1. Continue quiet diplomacy—must not overdo public statements openly challenging Arab nationalism. Would be likely to force UAR, Syria and Iraq to use all means to overthrow Hussein. Avoid reacting to Israeli press stories—request Israel cease press provocations.

2. Military survey mission—send US-UK group to Jordan to discuss arms purchases, MAP program for future, and organization and management of Jordanian Army—presence will be construed by other Arabs as evidence of US-UK military support for Jordan. No publicity.

3. Paratroop exercise—Late May—US group participate in Jordanian paratroop graduation exercises on Jordanian Army Day. Low key publicity as training exercise.

4. Destroyer visit—Aqaba—June.

5. Police training mission—after situation calms down.

6. Reforms—Economic Development. Encourage reestablishment of momentum gained by Wasfi Tell.

E. Conclusions

1. Situation manageable currently.

2. Assassination attempt versus Hussein is possible.

3. Strong reasons exist for UAR not to make all-out effort against Jordan.

4. Our evidences of support for Hussein are adequate for now.

5. Return to “normalcy” and emphasis on reform and development should be undertaken as soon as possible.

6. If new UAR federation has serious difficulties, pressure on Jordan will ease.

7. If new UAR federation successful, pressure on Jordan will increase and pose problem of greater magnitude and intensity.

F. Contingency—if situation worsens

1. Consider taking case to Security Council under the so-called “Arab Resolution” adopted August 21, 1958 in the Third Emergency Session.

2. Consider sending US ground and air contingents to Jordan on “training missions”—(contingency paper in preparation).

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 JORDAN. Secret. Transmitted to the White House on April 26 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy indicating that it had been prepared at Komer’s request.
1. Beginning on April 17, a series of demonstrations in Jordan, particularly on the West Bank, precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Rifa’i when he failed to receive a vote of confidence from the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies. King Hussein appointed Hussein Ibn Nasir to head a new Cabinet and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. Under the Jordanian Constitution, new elections were to be held in 4 months.
2. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 602.
3. During the Department of State daily press briefing on April 22, Department Spokesman White described recent developments in Jordan and indicated that the United States was keeping close watch on the situation and was doing what it could to promote peace and stability in the area. An excerpt from the briefing’s transcript is in Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 65 D 5, Public Statements.
4. Attached but not printed. On April 23 speaking before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters, Talbot noted that Jordan was apparently in the process of “adjusting itself to some of the prevailing trends in the Arab world” and that the United States expected Jordan to seek to maintain harmonious and close relationships with its Arab neighbors. The United States also believed that Jordan’s stability was “important to the maintenance of the condition of peace in the Near East.”