Office of the Historian

190. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, March 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • The March 8 Coup in Syria1

Enclosed is a study of the motivations and internal political implications of the March 8 coup in Syria.2 Our analysis of the external implications is as follows:

(1)
The coup appears to be essentially an effort to end Syria’s isolation in the Arab world and to bring about internal re-alignments which would make Syria acceptable to both Baghdad and Cairo.
(2)
Our tentative belief is that there are both strong Baathist pro-Iraqi and strong pro-UAR influences, and that the regime inclines slightly toward Baghdad.
(3)
Both Baghdad and Cairo are, for tactical reasons, supporting the new regime but a contest between the two for pre-eminent influence in Syria may well emerge later.
(4)
The coup obviously will increase apprehensions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel and will engender more pressures both within and against Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion:

In our view the coup increases the urgency of bringing the Yemen conflict to an early close and makes it all the more important that Crown Prince Faysal be persuaded to withdraw from Yemen and concentrate on internal reforms.

Grant Hilliker3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 SYR. Secret. Drafted by Barrow on March 9 and cleared by Talbot.↩
  2. Notes of the Secretary’s staff meeting for March 11 indicate: “Commenting on the Syrian coup, Mr. Talbot said that the Baathists are in control for the time being. The group in power is not seeking recognition and we are trying to get more information prior to deciding on our own position. Referring to the flavor of the coup, Mr. Talbot said that the Syrians and the Iraqis both appear to be seeking close links with Nasser while avoiding domination by him.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) Also on March 11, Rusk’s Special Assistant Emory C. Swank reported to Rusk, who evidently had not attended the meeting, that ”Talbot commented that Baghdad appeared to know more about the Syrian coup before it happened than Cairo. We think the Baathists are for the time being in control in Syria and will not seek union with Nasser.” (Ibid.)↩
  3. Attached but not printed.↩
  4. Hilliker signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.↩