188. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
We have reached the decisive stage in our effort to damp down Yemen affair before it blows up. Faysal finally seems aware that he’s losing and was receptive to Bunker proposals (though still trying to get UAR tied down first). Nasser and Sallal also seemed most reasonable with Bunche. Our next moves must be two-fold:
- (1)
- Keep up momentum of mediation effort. Since UN is moving too slowly, we’d better send Bunker out again to continue working out mutual disengagement preliminaries. Then perhaps UN could take over. But this complex operation may take weeks.
- (2)
- Therefore, we should do something to make sure nothing goes off the rails during this interim.
Biggest risk here is that if Faysal keeps running guns to royalists, Nasser may resume attacks. He agreed to hold off in response to your flat warning, but only for an indefinite period. True, odds are against Nasser upping the ante again; he’s winning anyway, he doesn’t want to jeopardize our aid, and he’s well aware of risk he’ll end up fighting us (we’ve moved new DD’s to Red Sea, etc). But at some point he could decide we’re merely shielding Saudis. If so, US would almost have to react, having told Nasser we’re on a collision course.
We could try to meet this risk by stringing Nasser along, telling him we’re making progress with Faysal while warning him not to resume attacks. We could lend credibility to this by further precautionary naval movements (part of Sixth Fleet to Eastern Med), and perhaps intelligence signals.
But our best assurance against Nasser upping the ante would be if we could tell him that Faysal has quietly suspended aid to the royalists. Here we could capitalize on Faysal’s own fear (expressed to Bunker) lest Nasser resume attacks before our air cover arrives. I see two options here (both of which could be tried):
- A.
- Go back and tell Faysal that if he’ll quietly suspend aid right now (and let us verify it) we’ll send squadron. Risks of this course are that if Faysal buys it we get ensnarled in a military commitment of indefinite shape and duration to rickety Saudi regime. What happens if there is a revolution while US squadron is there, etc. But we are already committed to send a squadron under Bunker proposal. We want to buy time for Faysal on [Page 417] grounds a bird in the hand worth an unknown in the bush. Finally, Saudi Arabia aside, we must worry about Jordan, Libya, and other places at a time when trend is against the “monarchies”. So we want to show Nasser we mean it when we say we have certain interests we’re determined to defend. Having done so we can then disengage with less risk that Nasser will test us in future cases.
- B.
- If we hesitate to send air squadron now, alternative would be appeal to Faysal to suspend aid temporarily in return for private assurance Nasser would similarly continue to hold off attacks on Saudis. We would negotiate this out, using rationale with both sides that it essential to give mediation time to succeed.
Faysal might not buy either of the above options since they offer him less than the Bunker proposals. But if he’s running scared they at least offer him reassurance against UAR attack. They also cost us nothing if they’re rejected.
In sum, we’re close to success on getting Yemen war damped down. Recommended sequence to tide us over critical period would be:
- 1.
- Since UN moving slowly, send Bunker back pronto, this time to Cairo and Sana to feel them out on our “eight-point” proposals. UN could take over after he’d laid groundwork.
- 2.
- Bunker also return to Riyadh to (a) tell Faysal his “conditions” about UAR withdrawal are unsalable; (b) appeal to Faysal to accept temporary “cease fire” pending mediation along lines option B above; (c) be prepared, if Faysal reluctant, to sweeten pot by offering to send our squadron along lines of option A.
The risks and loopholes involved in these proposals seem to me less than those of failing to follow up fast on your warning to Nasser plus Bunker’s mission, thus risking renewed escalation by Nasser to which we’d almost have to react.