Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

181. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State⁰

Dhahran, March 8, 1963, 3 a.m.

252. From Ambassador Bunker. Accompanied by Ambassador Hart and Sabbagh, met with Prince Faysal at Dammam March 7 from 9:45 to 11:45 p.m. Omar Saqqaf again attended. Prior to meeting Saqqaf summoned Ambassador Hart to private meeting in home of friend in Al-Khobar where Saqqaf (protect source) urged that coming session devote itself to specific eight points regarding disengagement contained in memorandum presented to Faysal evening March 6 and that presentation start with flat statement United States backing for Saudi Arabia was beyond question, that what we wanted was to advise SAG as friend how to get Yemen problem off dead center and that, without discussing “conditions”, we proceed point by point through our program emphasizing that we recognized dispute was between Cairo and Riyadh not between Sana and Riyadh, that we prepared to exert great efforts to have Nasser stop his attacks as well as radio and subversion campaigns against Saudi Arabia and to work, if SAG desired not only for abatement of quarrel but even for meeting of UAR and SAG under aegis Secretary General. Saqqaf also suggested we make proposal that if Faysal wished, both parties issue declarations regarding disengagement referring to good offices of United Nations. Saqqaf said parenthetically he saw no reason why unspecified SAG representatives (he probably had himself in mind) should not attend forthcoming Arab League meeting Cairo and use this occasion to talk privately with Egyptian leaders. Saqqaf told Hart he had spent two hours with Faysal after our departure past midnight March 6–7 and had informed Faysal that all that we had set forth regarding Yemen was true and he should face up to it. Further “no one is with us on our Yemen policy”. Faysal’s father, Abdul Aziz, had unified the Arabs. It now fell to Faysal to see House of Saud isolated from Arabs because of Yemen. Saqqaf has assured Faysal he personally was with him come what may, but that this would not save House of Saud. SAG could indeed go to the French and get help (Saqqaf volunteered that so far no deal made with French). French would give help: Planes, pilots, arms of various kinds. But they would do it for their own purposes which certainly included revenge on Nasser for Suez debacle and perhaps also in reflection deteriorated French relations with United States and United Kingdom. But when time came French would turn away again. Meantime what would Arabs say to spectacle of House of Saud taking its main protection against UAR from country which for long time has been regarded as Arab enemy. Americans on other hand, were offering help because they were genuine friends. SAG long relationship with them should be preserved. Saqqaf again urged that we say nothing during forthcoming discussion which would touch Faysal’s deep sensitivity.

My presentation to Faysal followed approach suggested by Saqqaf and discussion specific 8 points disengagement program. These were:

1. An agreement by the SAG to suspend its support to the Royalists.

2. An agreement by the UAR to begin withdrawal of its troops simultaneously with suspension of aid to the Royalists by the SAG.

3. Agreement to stationing of neutral observers in Nejran–Jizan area to certify support activities suspended and at Hodaydah and YAR airports to certify to outward movement of UAR forces and equipment.

4. Cooperation of SAG with SYG’s representative to reach agreement on modalities thru him with YAR and UAR. (Faysal made clear he wants nothing to do with YAR, only with UAR.)

5. Prevention by SAG of efforts of Imam’s adherents to obtain continued support from Saudi territory.

6. Implementation of UAR pledge to remove troops, and restatement publicly of its determination to withdraw.

7. Military support to the SAG to deter attacks and, if necessary to shoot down intruding, hostile aircraft; development of an adequate air defense system; expediting training of Saudi Air Forces and Air Defense personnel.

8. Encouragement of moderation and concentration on domestic affairs by YAR.

Faysal obviously had prepared self to follow approach similar to mine since had opened Arabic copy last evening’s presentation at exactly this spot. Discussion which followed differed considerably in atmosphere from that of March 6, being on a practical rather than broad political plane and without Faysal’s earlier emotional display. He indicated he prepared to accept in principle suspension of aid provided that he could be assured that UAR forces would indeed get out of Yemen, reiterating on numerous occasions he had no confidence whatever in Nasser. He nevertheless affirmed sincerity of his government’s desire to facilitate my mission which he greatly appreciated. He would have to refer any tentative decisions reached at this meeting to his government but was of course hopeful of its concurrence. (Comment: By this Faysal has in mind probably consulting primarily Princes Khalid, Fahd and Sultan and to a lesser extent other members of the Council of Ministers.) Regarding need for assurances that UAR forces would indeed be withdrawn, I stressed that reciprocity and simultaneity were basic principles of program. Faysal then said he wished to have following points included in program of suspension of aid to Royalists:

1. There should be stoppage of all UAR raids and all other actions of aggression on Saudi territory whether by air or sea.

2. At the time that simultaneous disengagement agreed upon there should be cessation of all military actions by UAR forces in Yemen.

3. These UAR forces should return from field activities to their bases in Yemen, pending withdrawal, where they would be under supervision of neutral observers.

4. These UAR forces should then be withdrawn with all officers and ammo, and all the equipment such as tanks, planes, etc, which they had introduced into Yemen.

5. As soon as there is agreement on all these points, Saudi Government will order cessation of all aid to the Royalists.

6. There must be a time limit to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Yemen.

I responded that these were matters properly to be addressed not to me but to mediator and subject for negotiation with him. I would be glad to pass them on to the Secretary General but they were not my business to handle. I emphasized this point particularly.

Prince Faysal then said he was ready to hear from me regarding point 7 (the nature of the military support which the United States Government prepared to extend to Saudi Arabia against further aggression). I outlined this and he expressed appreciation but asked what would happen if between now and the time disengagement was reached, Saudi Arabia suffered further attacks. He felt matter urgent in extreme as there was “something like revolution developing in country and people are asking “where is Government of Saudi Arabia’”. I responded that President has addressed very strong personal representation to Nasser asking that there be no bombing during period mediation effort. We inquired whether Faysal had reports of any bombings during last few days. Faysal and Saqqaf replied in negative but Faysal thought this meant little as attacks had been stopped before only to be resumed. I responded I felt confident that if I had Faysal’s agreement on various points disengagement I could be back in United States by Saturday evening and have attention of Secretary General at once drawn to urgency of mediator’s presence in Saudi Arabia, that mediation and disengagement process could then be set in motion very rapidly. Faysal replied that he did indeed concur in principle on United States proposals although he would have to consult his government.

Faysal requested that details regarding United States proposals for developing Saudi Air Defense program be sent via Colonel Wilson direct to MODA as these matters were technical.

At close of meeting Faysal warmly expressed gratitude for my mission and for President’s letter to him with which he said “I am in one thousand per cent agreement”.

Comment: Believe way now open for prompt contact with United Nations mediator indicating his presence here urgently desired.

I plan return Washington Lufthansa flight 645 leaving 0110 March 9 due Washington 1700 same day.

Horner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, London, USUN, and Taiz.