175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0
1652. You should seek earliest appointment with Nasser to deliver an oral message from President and to explore in depth problems threatening US–UAR relations. Do not deliver to anyone else. Text of oral statement follows:
“I have asked you to receive Ambassador Badeau because of my deep concern over recent events related to Yemen. Because of the rising level of action in and beyond Yemen, I think there is real risk that events might lead to a collision involving the interests of our two countries. The question is how to avoid such a collision. My hope is that Ambassador Badeau can seek out with you means for reducing these dangers.
As you know, I am dispatching Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Saudi Arabia in search for a peaceful termination of the conflict in Yemen. He will do his best to support the efforts of Dr. Bunche. If there is restraint by the parties I cannot but believe that somehow these able men will in time find the answer. Therefore, I urge you to contribute to an appropriate atmosphere by confining military action to Yemen territory. This will also contribute notably to a fruitful cooperation between the UAR and the U.S.
I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that the US and the UAR will be able to work out the means of avoiding any collision between us.”
In discussion of this letter the President would like you to point out to Nasser that he has personally made a great effort for improved relations with the UAR and has taken this course in the face of much public opposition in the US. He has recognized the new Yemen republic and accepted UAR action there. He has sought to bring the UK to a similar course, and has made strenuous efforts to persuade Faysal to disengage. He has now sent Bunker as his personal emissary to Saudi Arabia for this latter purpose. In these circumstances, continued UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia are bound to produce very grave consequences in opinion in the US, and the President personally would be placed in a most difficult position.
Additional points you should make follow.
Nasser must recognize US determination that the integrity of Saudi Arabia be defended. Our restraint to date must not be considered to [Page 391] reflect US acquiescence in UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia. US considers that bombings of Saudi Arabia and airdrops of weapons UAR not only make Saudi disengagement more difficult but are forcing US close to point where we will have no alternative but to make good our obligations to Saudis. Moreover, Bunche and Bunker, on whom we have pinned hopes for peaceful solution, cannot work effectively in such atmosphere. It is imperative in order to give these talks a chance to succeed that military attacks of all kinds by UAR against Saudi Arabia cease. American opinion generally is becoming deeply disturbed over apparent UAR willingness use its superior military force to attack weaker neighbors. Revulsion against UAR in this country likely run very deep if UAR pursues this course. We think it urgent for UAR review its priorities and determine relative value of pursuing aggressive and violent course in Saudi Arabia, as against benefits to be found in continuation of developing relation with US and other Western countries which have already afforded great advantage to UAR and give promise of even greater benefits in future.
FYI. We wish avoid rancorous dispute with UAR if possible but unless UAR stops overt attacks on Saudi Arabia USG will be forced review its policy toward UAR. It is essential that in addition to speaking to Nasser you engage in persistent dialogue with politically important officials and make clear that a) current UAR actions are running US–UAR relations onto rocks; b) this is not what we want and we believe it is not what they want; c) there are means and time to square things away; d) and sooner adjustment undertaken the less damage will be done.
We have long shared your view that if UAR is balked in Yemen it would be tempted to lash out increasingly at Saudi Arabia. However, we obliged consider whether UAR in fact planning deliberately use Yemen as springboard for action designed overthrow Saudi regime. We have accepted Nasser’s efforts in the Yemen but we cannot accept the same course against Saudi Arabia. Bear in mind growing adverse US sentiment exemplified by Alsop Washington Post article 25 February. We do not want be forced by UAR actions into choosing Saudi Arabia over the UAR. President depending on you to get these thoughts across. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. The source text indicates the telegram was based on a White House text. Cleared by McGhee and Grant and approved by Rogers (S/S). Repeated to Jidda and London.↩