Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

167. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts⁰

Washington, February 28, 1963, 2:32 p.m.

1493. Deptel 269 to Baghdad; Deptel 2399 to Amman; Deptel 637 to Beirut; Deptel 342 to Damascus; Deptel 507 to Jidda; Deptel to London by Pouch; Deptel to Moscow by Pouch; Deptel 495 to Taiz; Deptel 580 to Tel Aviv; Deptel 1515 to Cairo.¹ For use in dialogue with Foreign Minister and others, following are USG policies towards Near East states; (excluding GTI countries: Airgram being pouched)

1. Policy towards Individual Countries of Area. US will continue seek mutually beneficial bilateral relations with each country of area and avoid involvement in inter-Arab quarrels to greatest possible extent. Our role in Yemen conflict is rare exception to policy and stems from lack of other suitable means of preventing escalation and possible chaos, not to mention opportunities for exploitation by Soviets. US aid programs, which conducted without political strings, are aimed at promoting stability and assisting peoples in developing human and material resources, thus contributing toward modernization their societies and realization their aspirations. We convinced this policy in best interests USG and consistent with true interests all peoples of area. It enables people of each country enjoy free choice for political future.

2. Attitude towards Intra-Area Rivalries. Consistent with (1.) above USG will maintain posture of strict impartiality towards intra-area rivalries. No country in area is authorized act on behalf of USG in any way. We have no chosen instrument in area and we confident GOI will give no credence to any reports to contrary. As between Arab states and Israel, USG follows course of impartiality and is equally interested in integrity and well-being all states of area.

3. Policy towards Arab Unity. USG has noted GOI statements supporting concept Arab unity. We wish GOI know we neither favor nor oppose this concept. Problem of unity one for Arabs settle themselves. If unity accomplished without use of force, is not directed at other states, and is approved freely by majority peoples concerned, USG will not object.

4. Attitude towards Neutrality. With respect announced GOI policy follow neutral course in Cold War, USG has no quarrel. We seek world of free, strong, truly independent states and eschew domination one country by another. Unlike Communism which ineluctably tries dominate all it touches, American system happily lends itself to aspirations for human freedom and desire of countries for true independence.

5. Iraqi Relations with Turkey and Iran. Insofar as we are able, we would like to encourage relations based on friendship, mutual confidence and respect between Iraq and Turkey and Iran. While US has special defense arrangements with these latter states, they are based on recognition common danger; Turkey and Iran are not satellites of US but fully independent and sovereign states with full freedom of action. We believe good relations these states will enhance stability in and progress of area.

FYI. Forthcoming Airgram contains interim US policy guidelines for each country and problem of area, as affected by new Iraqi regime. During initial “get acquainted” contacts with GOI, however, we believe in US interests avoid initiating exchanges which suggest future areas of conflict or divergent interests between USG and GOI in latter’s external relations. Contrary USG position might complicate GOI attempts attain reasonable solutions serious internal problems, in which both Governments have stake. We believe proper time discuss possible conflicting area interests will be when (1) official Embassy–GOI relationships have ripened to mutual confidence, (2) GOI has solved most serious internal problems, or (3) potential conflicts begin manifest themselves. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL NR EAST–US. Secret. Drafted by Killgore on February 27; cleared by Strong, McGhee, Bracken, and Slater; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Ankara, Athens, Baghdad, Beirut, Belgrade, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow, Nicosia, Paris, Rome, Taiz, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Warsaw.
1. In this telegram, 269 to Baghdad, February 21, also sent to the other posts listed here, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to increase its contacts with Iraqi Government officials to convince them of U.S. friendship and interest in the success of their revolution. (Ibid., POL IRAQ–US)