Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, February 15, 1963, 7:37 p.m.

490. From McGhee to Duce.¹ Embtel 654.² Much appreciative your efforts our behalf which have been very useful. Before departing Saudi Arabia, would appreciate your seeing Faysal again and making final plea for SAG disengagement from Yemen. You might use revolution in Iraq as point of departure and make following points as appropriate:

1. Although quite obviously no immediate prospect revolutionary upheaval in Saudi Arabia, success of coups d’etat in Yemen and Iraq cannot help but give psychological fillip to nationalist elements in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, revolutionary regimes now flanking Saudi Arabia in southwest and northeast are in position, if they so choose, abet these elements and thus contribute to strains on internal stability Saudi Arabia. Your view that only way alleviate these strains and minimize possibility outside revolutionary interference in Saudi internal affairs is a) Saudi disengagement from foreign adventure in Yemen (which you understand is unpopular with large segment Saudi intelligentsia and military) and b) devotion undivided attention to strengthening internal fabric of government and society. In this fashion—and in this fashion only—can Saud regime win full support progressive forces in Saudi Arabia and greatly reduce or even eliminate prospect of chain reaction effect on Kingdom of revolutionary successes in neighboring countries of Yemen and Iraq.

2. Your understanding that USG believes that progressive regime with Saudi family at helm is best hope for Saudi Arabia. USG measures in face attacks by UAR on Saudi soil indicate clearly USG determination protect Saudi integrity. However, if Saud regime dissipates its resources and energies in Yemen and fails move rapidly carry out reforms it has charted, you can foresee situation possibly arising where USG might start questioning whether its efforts on behalf Saudi Arabia can be effective and how far should be pursued. USG is SAG’s best friend and staunchest supporter. It would be in interests of neither party if this relationship were jeopardized.

3. Accordingly, Faysal should seize earliest opportunity seek practical yet honorable way out of Yemen involvement. Prospective appointment UN emissary seems to offer such an opportunity and you would urge Faysal cooperate fully with his efforts. If both UN and USG feel USG formula for disengagement is only effective solution, if both believe Saudi and Yemeni interests best served by this formula, if both are determined assure UAR forces leave Yemen under this formula and since USG has given SAG strongest commitment of support you have ever seen in writing and at highest level (President Kennedy’s letter)—commitment which risks being tempered if SAG continues on its present course, there appears no reason for Faysal’s doing otherwise than cooperating fully with UN effort.

Before you return, please report fully to Ambassador Hart. Will leave to you and Hart whether you should concert before your parting audience with Faysal.

Many thanks and warmest personal regards.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Strong, Talbot, and Ramsey; and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to Dhahran.
1. Terry Duce, former Vice President of Aramco, visited Saudi Arabia in late January and early February 1963 with the encouragement of Secretary Rusk and McGhee to supplement Hart’s efforts to obtain Saudi agreement to a disengagement in Yemen. (Telegram 624 from Jidda, February 3; ibid.) Telegraphic reports from Duce, sent through Roger Channel, are ibid.
2. Telegram 654 from Jidda, February 11, contained a report on a 2-hour conversation between Duce and Faysal on February 8. (Ibid.)