Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, February 12, 1963, 7:40 p.m.

4299. Ref: Embtel 4259 to Dept.¹ Depcirtel 1406.² Request you immediately call UK attention to substance Depcirtel 1406, especially first paragraph. Quite clearly YAR on horns of dilemma. With great difficulty and in face extremist pressures inside regime YAR has exercised commendable restraint re its relations with South Arabia Federation and Aden Protectorate. Yet UK recognition has not resulted and insofar as YAR can see is not forthcoming. This obviously major reason why YAR considering reversal policy of restraint and initiation aggressive policy against Aden. As Aini informed us, YAR has great capability foment trouble in Aden. Likewise YAR can create trouble in Saudi Arabia. Longer British delay, more certain UAR and YAR will become convinced that UK in fact hostile and supporting royalists.

Emb might inquire what UK wants from YAR as prerequisite to UK recognition. It appears to us situation can only get worse rather than better. Reversal YAR policy of restraint would no doubt ruin prospects UK recognition. Foreign Office no doubt will recognize Sallal’s ultimatum to UK “to recognize or get out” makes prompt recognition action even more imperative. FYI. UK seems to have considered that period of quiet which ensued after Gandy’s departure from Yemen made recognition unnecessary. If trouble with Yemen occurs, it doubtless will be used as justification to continue withhold recognition. End FYI.

Since UK may be unwilling to recognize under Sallal threat, if HMG desires USG would be prepared, on receipt UK assurances it will recognize once threat removed, to request Sallal withdraw ultimatum on private USG assurances UK will recognize within week following demarche. We urge UK take this opportunity prevent creation situation in which UK recognition would almost certainly become impossible. USG considers that if UK fails recognize YAR promptly UK likely bring on itself difficulties in Aden area. USG support for UK position in Aden is known to UK and we have privately stressed to YAR and UAR need for restraint.³

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Strong and Bergesen (EUR/BNA), and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, Amman, Taiz, and USUN.
1. This reference should be to telegram 4259 to London, February 9, which instructed the Embassy to make another effort to persuade the British Government to extend recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic, because the absence of British recognition was hampering the entire disengagement effort. (Ibid.)
2. In circular telegram 1406, February 11, the Department of State informed certain posts that on February 11 the Yemen Arab Republic’s U.N. Representative, Aini, had conveyed renewed assurances from Prime Minister Sallal on Yemen’s determination to live in peace with its neighbors. Aini warned against continued attacks from Saudi and Aden soil, however, and noted that revolutionary elements in the Yemeni Government were pushing to launch an initiative against those countries. (Ibid.)
3. An Embassy officer discussed these points with Walmsley of the British Foreign Office on February 13 (telegrams 3113 and 3129 from London, February 13; ibid.), but by this time the British Government had received an ultimatum from the Yemen Arab Republic to close the British Legation in Taiz by February 17. At British request, the U.S. Government assumed responsibility for British interests in Yemen following Yemen’s expulsion of British diplomats. (Telegram 477 to Taiz, February 15; ibid., POL 17 UK–YEMEN) On February 14, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote President Kennedy expressing his regrets that the United States and the United Kingdom were out of step on Yemen policy. (Telegram 4351 to London, February 14; ibid., POL 1 YEMEN; for text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen)