142. Telegram From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan0
CAP 63065. Message for the Prime Minister from the President.
I recognize that this is an area with which the British Government has had long experience. But I do wish that you would give this matter renewed consideration. Whatever action your judgement dictates will be satisfactory to me.
As we move forward on task of engineering disengagement in Yemen, a task I am persuaded is in both our interests, I’d like to ask about your plans for recognition of the YAR. I wonder whether non-recognition still has value; it seems to risk exacerbating relations between you and the UAR/YAR without at the same time enhancing the prospect that the Royalists will win out.1
It seems likely that, while the civil war may seesaw back and forth almost indefinitely, the Royalists are not going to be able to crush the superior UAR forces. They may occasionally cut the roads, but they show little capability for seizing the major towns. We gather, for example, that there are some 8000 Egyptian troops in Sana’a.
While Faysal is undoubtedly hurting Nasser, the latter is so committed now in Yemen that he can’t afford to pull out without at least an ostensible victory. Despite some added cost, he can certainly increase his forces there if needed, and no doubt the Soviets have agreed to replenish any equipment losses.
Indeed the big risk as we see it is that Nasser and his little brother Sallal will in their frustration adopt more extremist lines. They may well try to foment trouble in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. We’ve already seen them try to cow the Saudis by bombing Najran, and only the strongest words from here appear to have temporarily turned them off. If Nasser escalates and the Saudis then hit back with mercenary pilots, we may [Page 325] have the Near East aflame. I’m sure this will suit the Soviets, but you and I would surely be the losers.
We are equally worried over the effect of Faysal’s unpopular war in Yemen on his own domestic position. He and Hussein think they’re defending themselves against Nasser in Yemen, but we think they’re making themselves more vulnerable to Nasser-inspired revolution at home. At the least, they are diverting badly needed attention and effort from domestic reforms. A revolution or serious disturbance in Saudi Arabia would hardly strengthen our position in Aden and the Gulf.
On the other hand, once Nasser is deprived of an excuse to maintain a heavy presence in Yemen, natural Yemeni distaste for what is really an alien occupation should soon reassert itself. We doubt that Nasser will find the Yemenis willing tools, any more than he found the Syrians or Iraqis so. But if we force the UAR to reinforce rather than reduce its presence in Yemen, and give the Soviets the chance to do so too, we may end up with a situation far more threatening to us.
For these reasons we have pursued a policy which would trade acceptance of the YAR for assurances that the UAR and YAR would respect our joint interests elsewhere in the peninsula. We’re under no illusions as to the value of such words but we see them, plus the vested interest of both in US aid, as buying us time to get on with strengthening our own positions in Aden and Saudi Arabia.
I gather that you have been delaying recognition until relations could be resumed with the Saudis and the Aden Federation could be launched. Since these have come off smoothly, our joint interests might best be served by your recognizing the YAR and thus helping to isolate Faysal.2
Message ends.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President Kennedy’s Correspondence with Prime Minister Macmillan. Secret; Eyes Only. The Department of State sent the text of the message to the Embassy in London for its information in telegram 3950, January 26. (Ibid., Central Files, 786H.00/1–2663) The Department of State telegram indicates the message was drafted in the White House.↩
- On January 11, the British Foreign Office informed the Embassy in London that the British Cabinet had decided to defer decision on U.K. recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic, because of concern over the Aden situation. (Telegram 2600 from London, January 11; ibid., 786H.02/1–1163) On January 16, the United Kingdom announced that it was resuming diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia that had been broken by Saudi Arabia at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956. Documentation on this subject is ibid., 641.86A. On January 25, Talbot called in Greenhill, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, to urge U.K. recognition of Yemen. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 786H.02/1–2563)↩
- Macmillan responded on January 27 that the U.K. Ambassador to Taiz had been recalled for consultations and the British Government would continue to review the Yemen situation. (Telegram 4075 from London, January 31; ibid., 786H.00/1–3163) Kennedy responded on January 31 that he was “delighted” Macmillan would take another look at the Yemen problem, particularly in light of progress toward appointing a U.N. mediator. (Telegram 4068 to London, January 31; ibid.)↩