Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

140. Assessment Prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, January 24, 1963.

MISSILE POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR)

1. The UAR is engaged in a missile program aimed at developing domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). This program is heavily dependent on private foreign assistance; German rocket specialists designed the missiles, German technicians supervised their construction, and many essential components were purchased abroad. The UAR is also proceeding with the development of a missile test range. In this connection, we know that they are currently attempting to purchase range instrumentation in the United States.

2. In the course of the July 1962 celebrations of the Revolution, the Egyptians fired four missiles from a site about 50 miles northwest of Cairo and some six or seven miles from where reporters had been brought to watch.¹ They also paraded twenty missiles of two sizes through Cairo’s streets in the same month. Transportation for both types of missiles appears to have been rigged specifically for the parade. This suggests that operational ground support equipment of a mobile nature for the missiles’ erection and firing is lacking.

3. The larger missile paraded was the Conqueror (al Kahir) which appeared generally similar to the improved World War II German V-2. The missile is reportedly 40 feet long and four feet in diameter with a cluster of four nozzles at the rear. It is believed to be a single stage liquid fueled rocket, probably using nitric acid as an igniter and turpentine as a fuel. At the time of the departure from the UAR in 1961 of Dr. Saenger, the chief of the German design team, no work was known to have been done on the development of a guidance system in the missile program. It is estimated the Conqueror could carry a 500 pound payload to a range of about 200 nautical miles, plus or minus 50 miles.

4. The smaller missile in the parade, known as the Victor (al Zafir), might have a maximum range of 220 miles, but analysis suggests that its range with any worthwhile payload would be considerably less. The Victor is reportedly 18 feet long and thirty inches in diameter. It is believed to be a single stage, liquid fueled, unguided rocket, developed from the design of a French sounding rocket.

5. The UAR does not now have any capability to develop a nuclear weapon that could be used as a warhead in either of the above two missiles. While it does have a small nuclear research reactor and an associated research program, both are so small as to preclude their having any potential for nuclear weapons development.

6. For the near future, neither the surface-to-surface missile nor the nuclear program appears likely to have a significant effect on the purely military balance in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is possible that the UAR could deploy a small number of missiles by mid-1964.² The number of missiles deployed would be too few and the absence of nuclear warheads would sharply limit their effectiveness. The missile program would, of course, be valuable for propaganda purposes and for psychological warfare.

7. The UAR has turned to outside sources for other types of missiles. The USSR is in the process of supplying eight battalions³ of surface-to-air (SA-2) missiles to the UAR and is training local forces in their use. Some SA-2 sites probably will be operational and manned by the Egyptians during 1963. The UAR has recently received from the USSR three Komar-class guided missile patrol boats. Each boat is designed to carry two cruise missiles, which have a range of 10-15 nautical miles. The USSR has furnished the UAR with 45 MIG 21 (Fishbed) jet fighter aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles and is training Egyptian forces in their use. Each aircraft is designed to carry two AA-2 air-to-air missiles. The optimum attack range of the AA-2 system is six nautical miles in a tail-on attack.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 1/63–3/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination. Forwarded to General Clifton at the White House under cover of a note from Brigadier General Linscott A. Hall, Assistant Director for Processing of DIA.
1. A Current Intelligence Memorandum, prepared by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence, dated July 22, entitled ”UAR Rocket Launching,” described the launching as “by and large a propaganda stunt of the kind in which Nasir excels” and advised that “the launchings actually have little significance in terms of any real scientific or military capability.” (Ibid., 7/62/-8/62) A July 27 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy indicated that the Department of State did “not consider that this latest development alters significantly the balance of military power in the Near East,” although it did represent “a psychological coup for Nasser vis-?is his Arab rivals as well as Israel” and represented “another step in the arms spiral.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.5612/7–2762)
2. An assessment prepared for the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence, January 8, on “U.A.R. Delivery Capability for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,” estimated that the UAR might be able to deploy a few missiles by mid-1964 provided that West German technicians remained in the UAR and the flow of components from Europe continued. The assessment also indicated that the UAR had no potential within its current program for nuclear weapons production and almost no capability in the biological warfare field, but did have a small stock of toxic chemical munitions that it had received from the Soviet bloc. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, 1/4/63–1/14/63)
3. These battalions will probably be organized in accordance with Soviet doctrine. A Soviet surface-to-air (SA-2) missile battalion has six launchers. [Footnote in the source text.]