112. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- United States Recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic
Our negotiations with the United Arab Republic and the Yemen Arab Republic over the content of the public statements we have suggested [Page 261] they issue may be in the final stage. Therefore we consider it desirable to have authority to proceed with recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic and to agree promptly with the United Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic on the timing of release of their statements and of ours, contingent upon final agreement on the texts of the United Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic statements.
Texts of the United Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic statements, with appropriate indication of the final changes we are seeking, are enclosed as is the text of our proposed release which would follow by 12–24 hours the publication of the United Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic statements.1 If the United Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic agree to the suggested changes, their statements not only will meet the conditions outlined in the President’s letter of November 16 but also will be acceptable to the United Kingdom, as is our own proposed statement. We have kept in close touch with the United Kingdom throughout.
While it is believed in some quarters that the royalists’ position in Yemen is improving, it is our considered judgment that the royalists will be unable to regain effective control of Yemen as long as United Arab Republic forces are present in strength. Whether the royalists can long continue a serious military campaign after withdrawal of external support and after general recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic seems doubtful. Our immediate concern is less with what transpires inside Yemen than the prospect that our failure to recognize the new regime will lead to escalation of the conflict endangering the stability of the whole Arabian Peninsula. Likewise, failure to recognize will result in termination of an American presence in Yemen and is likely to lead to a considerable increase in Soviet influence. Following recognition we shall be confronted with the difficult task of working out the modalities of disengagement by all external parties. The United States may have to play the leading role in this operation. After foreign intervention has terminated the Yemenis should be in a position to work out their own future and we believe the natural frictions between Egyptians and Yemenis will serve to limit United Arab Republic influence in Yemen.
Prince Faysal and King Hussein have expressed displeasure with our formula for recognition, advocating delay until United Arab Republic troops are withdrawn from Yemen. However, we are convinced that our action is in their overall interest as well as our own. Just before extending recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic we plan to release publicly the President’s letter of October 25 to Prince Faysal and to [Page 262] deliver to King Hussein a letter from the President (telegram enclosed)2 underlining the identity of United States-Jordanian interests. These measures are designed to make more palatable to them our recognition of Yemen, to show clearly our continuing support, and to stress our interest in a strong reform program in Saudi Arabia. We plan to continue periodic, overt military demonstrations in Saudi Arabia as long as these are welcomed by Faysal.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.02/12–662. Secret. Drafted by Seelye and Strong and concurred in by Talbot. Komer transmitted this memorandum to President Kennedy under cover of a December 6 memorandum recommending that the President approve the Department of State request. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Correspondence) Komer’s memorandum also forwarded telegram 464 from Jidda, December 5, in which Hart emphasized Royalist military gains and their ability to continue military action. Hart recommended that the United States not give up its recognition plan, arguing that without recognition, a Soviet presence would replace the U.S. presence in Yemen, and that continued Saudi involvement in Yemen would undermine Saudi stability. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/12–562) A handwritten notation on Komer’s memorandum reads: “Oked by Pres. per McGB evening 6 Dec “62.” For text of Komer’s memorandum, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Sent as telegram 254 to Amman, December 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–2062) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.↩