99. Editorial Note
On August 18, 1961, in response to a White House request, the Department of State forwarded to the White House a status report on the Saudi arms request, which among other points contained a Department of Defense estimate that it would take from 6 weeks to 6 months to determine definite availability of all items on the Saudi list and might take 8 months or longer to deliver them. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56/8–1861) On August 20, President Kennedy signed NSAM No. 73, directed to the Secretary of Defense, demanding to know why it would take so long and noting “It seems to me that we could speed this up.” (Ibid., NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 73)
Following expedited action from the Department of Defense, the Department of State delivered to the Saudi Embassy on September 18 and 20 Letters of Offer covering the greater portion of the arms requested. The United States was unable to provide F–100D jet fighters and B–57B jet bombers owing to their unavailability, but U.S. officials were optimistic that Saudi Arabia would realize that the F–86 fighters that its armed forces were currently using in training were more appropriate for their needs and capabilities. (Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, September 28; ibid., Central Files, 786A.56/9–2861) On October 9, the Department of State sent to the White House for President Kennedy’s information an additional list of arms and equipment the United States was offering to sell Saudi Arabia. (Memorandum from Battle to Bundy; ibid., 786A.56/10–961) See Supplement, the compilation on Saudi Arabia, for all these documents.