Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

93. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 4, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Deepening Crisis in Iran

Despite its much lower visibility, the continued slide toward chaos in Iran could result in as great a setback as in South Vietnam.

When the Iran Task Force reported to you on May 19, it regarded the newly-formed Amini government as the best, and perhaps the last, chance of averting political chaos and the possible loss of Iran to the West. You approved a program of “vigorous action” by the US to seize the opportunity created by the advent of Amini, which appeared to provide several further months of grace.

We have now used up three of these months, and the Washington consensus is that the situation has gotten worse instead of better. Amini has been trying to carry out a vigorous reform program; as always, however, it is a lot harder to execute than to announce reforms, especially in a gimcrack country like Iran. Amini is saddled with a weak cabinet, a fact he recognizes but is as yet unable or unwilling to alter. Moreover, he has not been able to develop any middle-class political backing of his own. Contrary to most fears, the Shah has to date been surprisingly strong in backing Amini, but he complained the other day that he seemed to be Amini’s only supporter. Meanwhile the National Front, a disparate congeries of middle and left politicians, who seem able to unite only on their opposition to Amini (he stole most of their reform program), are seeking to topple him through demonstrations and calls for free elections. Such a slowdown in Amini’s momentum is largely inevitable (in one sense he’s already accomplished more than all his predecessors since 1953), but it is cause for real concern.

What has the US done? By some fast financial footwork approved by you, we bailed Amini out of an immediate cash crisis. But now he faces another budget crisis plus a deficit in the final year of the Second Iranian Development Plan. We are trying to get the Germans, who are interested, to help cover these remaining gaps (then we will both help finance the Third Seven Year Plan, which at first reading looks pretty good).

But these immediate financial bail-out measures only buy us time at best. The modernization of Iranian society will be a long-term process. Even Amini’s promising reform program will require four or five years in office to carry out. Amini still looks better than any other moderate leader in sight—and far better than either the right wing military dictatorship or chaotic National Front takeover which are the most likely alternatives if he fails.

Thus the gut problem is still political—how to keep in power a regime which still seems by far the best bet for achieving a “controlled revolution” in Iran. To do so, we must develop an effective political corollary to our economic support. Here we have moved less vigorously than the situation seems to demand. Our reasons for caution are understandable. To press Amini and the Shah too hard may label them as US puppets; worse still, it may lead them to bite back.

But desperate times call for desperate measures. If we are treading the thin edge of potential disaster in Iran (for which Khrushchev sits patiently waiting), we must treat this as a crisis situation, and take crisis measures, as in South Vietnam. At a time when we face crises in Berlin and Southeast Asia, can this Administration afford not to take every step to avert a setback in Iran?

What can we do? Diagnosis is easier than prescription. What is needed most is to push harder on all fronts:

1. Treat Iran as a real crisis situation by using Iran Task Force (on Vietnam model) as an operating mechanism, largely as a means of keeping pressure on State. Request a progress report and revised action program for NSC.

2. Do whatever is necessary to keep Iran afloat financially and to get a real development program going. This is no time for too much haggling.

3. Complement this with a vigorous political action program:

a. Reiterate to Shah that Amini is our man, and that we think he needs all-out support (there are already rumors Shah is considering a replacement).

b. Sell Shah and Amini on glamorizing Third Development Plan as bold new effort to modernize, around which all elements of society should rally.

c. Get Amini to make some other dramatic moves, e.g. bringing some grafters to trial or making at least a token cut in military budget, to refurbish his popular image.

d. Press him to reorganize cabinet, and especially get rid of incompetent Minister of Finance.

e. Urge Amini to start developing a base of political support; offer to subsidize it if necessary.

f. Get UK to join us in all-out backing for Amini. There is reason to believe UK is not sanguine as to his prospects and already coppering its bets.

g. Keep going back at Shah that real threat is internal not external. He should stop bleating to us about more military aid, and instead make token cut in his own military outlays (which take 43% of government budget).

h. Do what we can to help Amini split National Front and get at least its more moderate fringe in his camp.

4. Since the hour is late, start quiet contingency planning against risk that Amini may nevertheless fail. This planning to be on two alternative bases: (a) military regime; (b) how to live with National Front.

There are numerous cogent arguments against the above, as infeasible or counter-productive. And there are real limits to what the US itself can accomplish in dealing with Iranians. But the crucial need is to treat Iran as a crisis problem and to get the necessary momentum into our response. Then, if we lose out, at least it won’t be for want of having tried hard enough.

R. W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 8/1/61–8/14/61. Secret. An attached note from Komer to Bundy, dated August 4, reads: “As I described at morning session you missed, last Iran TF meeting (called to ratify more emergency financial aid) was extremely gloomy. State’s main idea of coping with Iran crisis is to subsidize budget and planning development deficits. I have argued vigorously that this is not enough. State (and Holmes in Tehran) do not seem to be moving on political side as effectively as deteriorating situation would require. My concern is such that I have chosen attached device to get some movement. I would hope President would express his concern and ask SecState to get moving.” Copies of the note and its attachment were sent to Walt Rostow and Hansen.