Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

89. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)⁰

Washington, July 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Status Report on Kuwait Situation

On July 20, 1961, the Arab League Council passed a Saudi-proposed resolution on Kuwait. Its principal points include: (a) Kuwait will ask for the withdrawal of British troops as soon as possible, (b) Iraq should undertake not to use force in connection with Kuwait, (c) any Kuwait desire to unite or federate with Arab League member states should be supported, (d) welcoming Kuwait’s membership in the Arab League and (e) promising Arab states’ support for Kuwait’s application for UN membership, and (f) stating that the Arab League will take “practical assistance” to safeguard Kuwait’s independence. The Iraqi delegate stalked out of the Arab League meeting when Kuwait was admitted. There is no indication, however, that Iraq will withdraw permanently from the League, although it may keep its participation in suspense for a time.

With respect to the “practical assistance” cited above, Secretary General Hassouna is reportedly planning to explore this matter and will shortly visit Arab capitals with a view to ascertaining the possibility of obtaining Arab troop contingents to replace the British troops in Kuwait. Thus, the search for an “Arab solution” to the Kuwait problem appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Such a solution should provide the British with a convenient peg on which to hang troop withdrawal. While Kuwaiti membership in the Arab League has not caused Iraq to drop its claim and is not likely to do so, it should prevent any overt action by Iraq.

The foregoing developments are in line with the view expressed by the American Consul in Kuwait (Kuwait’s 26)¹ that a combination of Kuwaiti membership in the Arab League and in the UN, coupled with the British readiness and capability to respond with military forces to the Ruler’s request for aid, is probably sufficient protection for Kuwait. This might be supplemented further by a UK military training mission in Kuwait.

It is also consistent with Jidda’s assessment (Jidda’s 32)² that Saudi Arabia would participate in Arab League efforts to find an “Arab solution” to the problem of assuring Kuwaiti independence and would probably not be adverse to replacing British with troops from Arab League member states. The present Saudi contingent might even be incorporated into an Arab League contingent, and Saudi Arabia would most likely wish to participate in such a mixed force in order to counter UAR participation.

Our Embassy in Baghdad, though stressing the need for a face-saving device for Iraq, believes (Baghdad’s 37)³ that a mixed Arab contingent in Kuwait, once Kuwait has been admitted to the Arab League, should provide a moral deterrent against Iraqi aggression and that Iraq would not attack such Arab forces. This is clearly also consistent with UAR thinking, although it is highly doubtful whether the UAR would wish to provide troops or, for that matter, whether Kuwait would welcome UAR participation. There are reports of Lebanese willingness to provide troops for Kuwait, and the Sudan has also been mentioned as a possibility.

All in all, we believe the need for any sort of a UN presence in Kuwait is receding, although Kuwaiti membership in the UN is still an early desideratum. Our Consul in Kuwait opines that a UN commission in Kuwait is neither “necessary or workable.” Although USUN (USUN’s 105)⁴ has expressed itself in favor of a UN rather than an Arab League umbrella, without producing any strong arguments for this, our posts at Baghdad, Jidda and Cairo show little enthusiasm for a UN presence.

The most auspicious feature in the Kuwaiti situation, as it has developed in the last few days, is that it appears to be returning to an Arab context, in which it could probably have been resolved from the beginning. The UK is already reducing its troops in Kuwait. It would now appear to be feasible and in the British interest to recognize that Kuwaiti admission to the Arab League and the Arab League’s attendant moral commitment to look after Kuwait’s independence, with the UK-Kuwaiti Treaty of June 19 still conveniently situated in the background, offer reasonable assurances that Kuwait’s independence will be protected. In the circumstances, the U.K. would be well advised to attempt to persuade the Ruler, if Arab League action has not already done so, to indicate that the British may now, with his blessing and thanks, withdraw the balance of their forces or at least all but a token company or so.

You may wish to explore the foregoing with the British (Greenhill) in the next few days.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Chron. Asst Secretary NEA Correspondence. Confidential. Drafted by Eilts. A copy was sent to Cleveland.
1. Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 686D.87/7–1761)
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 686D.87/7–1661)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., 786D.00/7–1461)
5. On July 31, the Embassy in London reported that the British Cabinet had approved an approach to the Ruler of Kuwait that would provide for a British buildup of Kuwaiti forces and encouragement for the Ruler to seek a realistic military force from other Arab states. (Telegrams 346, 439, and 456 from London, July 24, 28, and 31, respectively; all ibid., 686D.87) On August 12, the Kuwaiti Government and the Arab League Secretary General signed an agreement leading to the replacement of British forces with Arab League troops. The British withdrawal from Kuwait was completed by September 19. See also Supplement, the compilation on Kuwait.