Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

86. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Letters to Arab Leaders

Pursuant to our conversation on July 10,¹ you will be interested in the following outline of the rationale behind the letters from you to the Arab leaders and our assessment as to the usefulness of the letters.

1. Arab Forebodings. It was with considerable concern that the Arab world viewed the incoming of the new United States administration. Not only have the Arabs considered former President Truman as largely responsible for the partitioning of Palestine and the creation of Israel, but they were disturbed by 1960 campaign statements which they thought suggested that a Democratic administration would seek to coerce the Arab states to make peace with Israel.

2. Tranquility Urged. Partly in an effort to forestall United States initiatives, Arab representatives in their contacts with officials of the new administration urged that the relative tranquility which has prevailed in the Near East during the past two or three years should be preserved. Israeli representatives made similar recommendations, based largely on the fact that under conditions of calm Israel has been making tremendous economic strides. For our part, we were preoccupied with the Congo, Cuba and Laos. We thus happily concurred in not stirring up the Near East.

3. Disquieting Developments. In March and April three developments disturbed Arabs:

a. Loan to Israel. At a Presidential press conference on March 15 it was announced that Israel was receiving a $25,000,000 Eximbank line of credit.² Sums more than twice this amount have been extended to Israel in each of recent years with no Arab reactions. However, announcement at the Presidential level, rather than routinely as previously, was construed by the Arabs as indication of a pro-Israeli trend.

b. Jerusalem Parade. Despite a ruling by UN authorities that such action would be a violation of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, Israel displayed heavy military equipment in an Independence Day parade in Jerusalem on April 20. Jordan brought the matter to the UN Security Council. While supporting two operative paragraphs condemning Israel, we were instrumental in adding a third paragraph stressing the importance of all parties respecting the armistice agreements and machinery. This addition was fully in accord with previous UN actions, but the Arabs chose to consider this a pro-Israeli move.

c. UNRWA Debate. Inconsistent with their exhortations to us not to take any initiatives, the Arabs sought at the General Assembly this spring to inject a highly controversial concept in a UN resolution concerning the Arab refugees, i.e. the establishment of a UN custodian for Arab properties left in Israel. Arab representatives obviously wished to make a test case of their voting strength in the expanded General Assembly. Had they succeeded a whole series of anti-Israel moves could be expected. Despite our urgings that new controversial elements should be deferred to the general review of the refugee problem scheduled at the General Assembly this fall, the Arabs pressed for a vote. They did not achieve the required two-thirds UNGA majority. Their defeat was naturally, and with good reason, attributed to United States opposition.

4. Refugee Approach. In a memorandum dated May 2 [April 28]³ which you approved on May 4 the Department outlined its view that an approach be made to the Arab refugee problem under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (US, UK, and Turkey). Essentially the reasons were:

a. Arab-Israel peace. While recognizing that a permanent overall Arab-Israel settlement is remote, progress on the refugee problem might well be the key to an Arab-Israeli modus vivendi.

b. UNGA Wrangling. The more than one million Arab refugees are being cared for by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Inevitably the annual discussion of the UNRWA report at UNGA results in Arab-Israel wrangling, as it did this past spring. Inevitably too the United States is a scapegoat. Ambassador Stevenson was particularly concerned this spring when Arab displeasure produced anti-American votes on major issues such as Cuba.

c. XVIth UNGA. Pursuant to a resolution of two years ago, the UNGA will this fall review the whole refugee problem with a view to deciding on the future of UNRWA. Progress on the refugee problem before this fall’s debate would assist greatly in reducing acrimony.

d. Reconstitution of PCC. Unless some progress is made on the refugee problem, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the Arabs will seek to promote a reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Some Arab spokesmen are advocating reconstitution along “troika” lines. By the very nature of things a Commission less friendly to Israel is apt to recommend proposals unpleasant to Israel and difficult for us.

e. Congress. In the absence of progress toward a solution of the refugee problem, Congress is apt to curtail funds for UNRWA which depends on us for 70 per cent of its governmental contributions. The collapse of UNRWA could easily result in political turmoil in the Near East, including perhaps an upheaval in Jordan. This would be to the detriment of United States interests and to the benefit of Soviet interests.

f. Domestic Expectations. Inasmuch as Israel’s many friends in this country were expecting specific action by the new administration, the approach to the Arab refugee problem could be cited as a step toward tackling the key obstacle to an Arab-Israel settlement.

5. Ben Gurion Complication. It was at a critical juncture that President Ben Gurion decided to visit the United States. The Department feared the visit would clinch Arab suspicions that the new administration was pro-Israeli. Our effectiveness would accordingly be limited in dealing with the Arab world. More specifically, the Arabs would suspect any approach to the refugee problem to be the product of alleged collusion with Israel on the part of the new administration. For these reasons the Department opposed the timing of the Ben Gurion visit. When it was decided that the visit would take place, the Department hoped to convert a potential minus into a plus, e.g. your speaking to Ben Gurion about Israel’s cooperation with the refugee approach.

6. The Letters. It was at this point that the Department, after obtaining the concurrence of our posts abroad, proposed the letters to Arab leaders. As suggested in a covering memorandum to you dated May 6,⁴ the letters were designed:

a. To set forth, as had previously been done with respect to Latin America, the broad lines of our policy of friendship for all the countries of the Middle East,

b. To make clear our impartiality in Arab-Israel matters,

c. To demonstrate our support for the PCC refugee approach, and

d. To cushion the effects of the Ben Gurion visit.

7. Arab Reactions. Because of deep Arab bitterness over Palestine and because Arab leaders would assume that replies to your letters would eventually be published, it was not unexpected that the Arab responses would feature restatement of Arab grievances against Israel. It was significant, however, that in general the public reaction in the Arab countries was mild and moderate, obviously in accordance with government wishes. Furthermore, we have reports that at a conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo it was decided that: a) propaganda replies would be sent, but b) the Arabs would see what the PCC approach had to offer. While varying in tone and in content, Arab responses to date bear out these reports.

8. Iraq’s Qassim. Among President Qassim’s eccentricities is his attitude toward Israel. A veteran of the Palestine war, he is reported to have shown a visitor as long as two years ago a medal which he has had struck for bestowal on future Iraqi heroes recovering Palestine from the Israelis. With regard to your letter, he has indicated publicly that no reply was requested and none will be sent. He obviously realizes that accepting the PCC approach implies an Arab willingness to coexist with Israel. Fortunately, he is alone thus far in taking this totally uncooperative position.

9. Jordan’s Hussein. In his lengthy and rambling reply King Hussein condemns both Communism and what the Arabs describe as the Palestine “injustice”.⁵ His tone is relatively friendly, however, and he leaves the door open for the PCC effort. A number of moves he has recently made, including his dwelling on the Palestine problem in his reply to you, are no doubt efforts to compensate for the political handicap he recently acquired in marrying a British girl.

10. Lebanon’s Chehab. President Chehab’s letter speaks warmly of US-Lebanon relations but also restates Arab views regarding Israel.⁶ While he does not foreclose the PCC refugee approach, President Chehab suggests using the Lausanne Protocol of 1949⁷ as a basis for discussions leading to an Arab-Israel settlement. It is probably the Lebanese view that this Protocol might lead to a recovery of Western Galilee from Israel, thus opening a convenient area for settling the Moslem refugees who now threaten Lebanon’s delicate confessional balance.

11. King Saud. King Saud’s reply is undiplomatic to the point of being insulting.⁸ It was no doubt written largely by his UN delegate, Ahmed Shuqairi who is a notoriously venomous former Palestinian. The letter reflects the King’s increasing insecurity, which was also evidenced by the precipitousness with which he recently announced the non-renewal of our Dhahran Airfield agreement. The King’s chief rival is Crown Prince Faisal. The latter in great anger stalked out of the UN Assembly when the partition resolution was passed in 1947. He has since that time harbored and frequently manifested deep resentment. The King’s letter no doubt was designed to show himself as patriotic as his fraternal rival. The only redeeming feature in the letter is a brief paragraph in which he agrees that the PCC should have a “final chance” to work on the refugee problem. In the devious Arab mind this green-light to the PCC refugee approach could well require as a counterweight seven pages of vitriolic anti-Israel haranguing.

12. UAR’s Nasser. Your letter to Nasser arrived in the midst of the recent propaganda exchanges between the UAR and the Soviet Union. While we have no explanation of Nasser’s failure so far to respond, he may feel that a rigid pro-Arab reply might prejudice his improving relations with the US, while a more forthcoming answer would be politically unwise in the light of the inter-Arab consultations referred to above. Nasser’s failure so far to reply may therefore have some slight significance.

13. Israeli Reactions. Just prior to President Ben Gurion’s arrival we informed Ambassador Harman of the gist of your letters to the Arab leaders.⁹ This has helped restrain Israeli reactions. In fact, the Israelis appeared pleased that in your letters you made clear to the Arab leaders that we believed in the integrity and independence of all the Near East states (in effect the Tri-Partite Declaration of 1950). It should be noted, however, that upon his departure from Idlewild, President Ben Gurion disclosed to the press the gist of your conversation with him about a possible “solution” to the refugee problem. This disclosure and similar subsequent publicity from Israeli sources concerning a “Kennedy Plan” have been very unhelpful. They have deepened Arab suspicions and have caused Secretary General Hammarskjold to be very cautious about the PCC approach for fear that the United States is seeking to employ the UN as a front for its own plans with respect to the refugees.

14. Results. While no one can condone harshness such as that expressed in King Saud’s reply, it is our view that your letters have definitely served a useful purpose. No communication other than one from you would have been able to achieve the following results:

a. US Policy. You have placed clearly on the record the desire of this government to maintain friendly and fruitful relations with the Arab states. While because of their sensitivities and suspicions, they were bound to emphasize their views concerning Palestine, there can be little doubt that they inwardly welcome the broad outline of our policies as set forth in your letter. Moreover, it will be possible for us at all times in the future to indicate that early in your administration the hand of friendship was extended to the Arabs.

b. Impartiality. While some needling of the United States for its role in the creation of Israel was to be expected, the Arab leaders undoubtedly are now aware of our desire to be impartial in Arab-Israel matters. Certainly the trend of this past March and April when the Arabs were rapidly concluding that we were hopelessly pro-Israel, has been arrested. This means that opportunity for our working with the Arabs has been preserved.

c. Refugee Approach. Had your letters not been sent, it is likely that the Ben Gurion visit would have wrecked all chances for success of the PCC refugee approach. There is general agreement that prospects are slim at best and only limited progress may be achieved. By showing that the United States is prepared to back efforts along lines which include Arab hopes for some repatriation, the United States places on the Arab leaders the onus for the lack of progress. Unless they act responsibly, their position in future UN debates will be awkward.

d. Cushion. There is no doubt your letters helped to forestall a major Arab uproar over the Ben Gurion visit. When the Israeli Prime Minister came here a year ago, the press in the Middle East was extremely hostile to the United States and Arab diplomats came to the Department en bloc to voice their concern that his visit would impair Arab-US relations. In large part because of your letters, the Ben Gurion visit passed this year with almost unbelievably mild reactions in the Near East and without damage to basic US-Arab relationships.

15. Whither? We see no need for further exchanges with the Arab leaders at this time. In view of the harshness of King Saud’s letter, you and we have already spoken rather sternly to the Saudi Ambassador. Assistant Secretary Talbot on July 10¹⁰ reiterated your views that it would behoove the Arabs to look ahead instead of backward and that if our well-intended efforts to be helpful to their interests were unwelcome we would certainly not press them. This attitude should in itself have a salutary effect.

In our view, a major effort with regard to the refugees is still of first importance. Since the Arab replies do not foreclose this approach, we are renewing our endeavors through the Palestine Conciliation Commission to undertake a reconnaissance mission of the refugee situation in the Near East. The minimal objective is to enable the formulation of constructive recommendations to the General Assembly this fall for inclusion in the important resolution on the refugees. We believe that a large majority of UN members will welcome such a constructive approach. Our Congress will also welcome such initiative by us. If nothing else such an approach may forestall the successful implementation of increasingly extremist moves by the Arabs in their continuing dispute with Israel. Meanwhile because of your letters to the Arab leaders and our sincere support for PCC efforts with regard to the refugees, our own posture will be such as to permit our maximum maneuverability with regard to the future of the refugees and with respect to our general relationships with the Arab world.

Dean Rusk

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 7/61–10/61. No classification marking. Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Kennedy on July 14.
1. See Document 83.
2. For the transcript of the news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 182–190.
3. Document 38.
4. Document 42.
5. A June 14 memorandum from Battle to Bundy summarizing the contents of Hussein’s reply of June 12 is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–1461. The text of Hussein’s letter as transmitted in telegram 1154 from Amman, June 12, is ibid., 611.80/6–1261. For Battle’s memorandum, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
6. A July 12 memorandum from Battle to Bundy summarizing the contents of Chebab’s reply of June 24 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/7–161. The text of Chebab’s letter as transmitted in telegram 4 from Beirut, July 1, is ibid. For Battle’s memorandum, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
7. Reference is to the protocol signed at Lausanne on May 12, 1949, by the Governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The protocol provided that talks with the Palestine Conciliation Commission commence based upon a map showing the 1947 partition lines. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. VI, p. 998.
8. See footnote 3, Document 81.
9. See footnote 4, Document 47.
10. The memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.5622/7–1061.