Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

77. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

London, July 2, 1961.

1. Mr. Rusk’s message¹ was discussed by the Prime Minister this morning and you should now tell Mr. Rusk how grateful we are that U.S. Govt., in addition to public support it has already given us, has put this proposal to us and the comfort which we draw from the knowledge that the U.S. has forces in the area.

2. As you will see Kasim has a balanced force including armour poised for attack if he means to make it.² Although the balance is moving against him as our reinforcements arrive, and the position has greatly improved, we are still faced with the possibility within the next day or two of an attack by a force of at least numerically greater strength. The question whether Kasim will risk such an attack seems to be dependent on events in the next 24 or 48 hours.

3. If such an attack were made and a battle ensued, it might be very useful indeed to have these American forces at Bahrain. If, on the other hand, the attack does not take place, we are likely to be faced with a political problem, the immediate military threat having diminished.

4. In the latter case, the presence in the area of “Solant Amity”³ might cut both ways. It would show the world the solidarity of American support in a manner which we would greatly welcome, even though that solidarity has already been demonstrated in a most gratifying fashion. On the other hand, the Kuwaiti case will already be formally before the United Nations and the addition of an American force which will be regarded as having been sent to the gulf for this particular purpose (as opposed to the U.S. destroyers which are already in the area) might make it easier for the Arabs and Russians to argue that this was a joint imperialist manoeuvre. The considerations are nicely balanced.

5. My colleagues and I hope therefore that the American Govt. would agree that “Solant Amity” should continue in the meantime to steam North and that we should have an opportunity of reviewing the situation in 24 hours or so and, in any case, before the force reaches Bahrain. (The fact that this force has altered its plans and is proceeding towards the gulf has already appeared in the press which in itself has probably had a good effect.)

6. It emerged from the discussion this morning that the most useful help which the U.S. Navy could give us at the present moment would be if the U.S. destroyer at Bahrain (the other is believed to be at Aden) could proceed to the north of the gulf and make a reconnaissance to see whether there are any signs of Iraqi maritime activities. The reason for this is that there are twelve motor torpedo boats, some with partly Russian crews, at Basra at the moment and reports of Iraqi troops being sent to Fao which may indicate the intention of the Iraqis to embark on some maritime adventure. Our own naval forces in the area are still rather thin and reconnaissance by the U.S. destroyer could be of great help—particularly if at the same time the second destroyer were to be moved round to Bahrain from Aden. Unless you see objection please mention this matter to Mr. Rusk and suggest that if the U.S. authorities were agreeable, the U.S. naval authorities on the spot should discuss the matter with flag officer Middle East at Bahrain.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Rusk vol. 2. Secret; Eyes Only. A paragraph at the top of the source text, presumably typed at the White House, reads: “The following message from Lord Home was handed to the Secretary by Ambassador Caccia during his call on the Secretary at 2:00 p.m., July 2, 1961.”
1. Presumably that quoted in Document 73.
2. An assessment of the military situation prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in a memorandum from JCS Director Wheeler to NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Meyer, July 1. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Kuwait 000.1—1961) See Supplement, the compilation on Kuwait.
3. On June 29, CINCLANT directed the Solant Amity naval force, consisting of two destroyers, three amphibious vessels, and 463 Marines, then in the Mozambique channel en route to Cape Town, to reverse course and proceed north toward Bahrain to be available, if requested, to assist the British in the Kuwait crisis. (Operations/Military Policy Matters, J–3/J–5 Directorates, July 3; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Kuwait, 6/61–7/61)