63. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee)0
I have read carefully the memorandum you forwarded from NEA on prospects for dealing with Nasser.1 I understand very well that in working with Nasser, we are now working within narrow limits; and I did not have in mind that there was any possibility of getting Nasser to look at the world with Washington’s eyes on the many specific matters in which we are at cross-purposes.
Nevertheless, my impression is that the tone of that memorandum may be over-cautious; and its suggested courses of action may lead to our missing some opportunities.
Specifically, I sense from current intelligence that Nasser is worried about three things: Syria; his economic position in general; and his over-commitment to Moscow economically, which is leading Moscow to exert on him quite severe and overt political pressure. We can help him to a degree on all three fronts.
I conclude that it would be worth exploring with him the possibility of substantially expanded long-term economic arrangements within the framework of his plan and our foreign aid program—quite apart from the P.L. 480 business now in hand. The quid pro quo for which I would look is not an “improved atmosphere in U.S.-UAR relations.” I am very skeptical of bargaining economic aid directly for such short-run atmospherics. The objective of getting closer to him on a long-run economic basis, as I see it, would be to strengthen the foundations for his independence and to build up a whole range of more intimate human contacts with his people. Our experience with India has indicated, for example, that one is likely to accumulate more short-run political benefits from this kind of approach—which does not explicitly tie aid to diplomatic positions—than from trying to balance at every stage along the way. I would hope, for example, that without much explicit bargaining we could expect over a period of time to temper Nasser’s activities a bit in Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, etc., if he were to go with us on long-run development on an enlarged scale.
Moreover, if we decided, in the wake of Vienna, to reply to Nasser’s last long letter, we may wish to say some things about our view of neutralism [Page 156] and non-alignment that bear on the forthcoming conference. The subject matter of Nasser’s letter—which I found interesting—gives a good opening.
As you know, I do not regard myself as a Middle East expert. My only firm conclusion is that we want a paper that argues some of the issues beyond the present memo.2
- Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 308, UAR, 1961, United States. Secret.↩
- Document 58.↩
- A brief June 7 note from McGhee to Talbot, attached to the source text, reads: “Rostow remains unconvinced. Why don’t you make an appointment and talk with him about this?” A June 19 memorandum from Strong to Talbot indicates that Rostow, Rusk, and Talbot discussed the status of U.S. efforts to take full advantage of current opportunities in U.S.-UAR relations on June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/6–1961) No memorandum of this conversation has been found. The June 19 memorandum from Strong to Talbot also describes 10 different areas of U.S. efforts to improve relations with the United Arab Republic. For text, see Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.↩