Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

37. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/1

Ankara, April 28, 1961, 2:15 p.m.

UNITED STATES OBSERVER DELEGATION NINTH CENTO COUNCIL SESSION

Ankara, Turkey, April 27–28, 1961

SUBJECT

• Courtesy Call on the Iranian Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Talbot
  • Ambassador Wailes
• Iran
  • Hosein Qods-Nakhai, Iranian Foreign Minister

The Secretary made a courtesy call on the Iranian Foreign Minister at 2:15 today. He was accompanied by Asst. Secretary Talbot and Ambassador Wailes.

After a brief exchange of greetings, the Foreign Minister launched into a long disorganized discourse on the problems the Iranian Government was having with its students, particularly those overseas. He implied that many, if not most, of the students were Communist or Communist-influenced. Later he seemed to take the view that they were spoiled children of the rich with little to do but have a good time and that when their college days were over they would return to normalcy. He then dwelt at some length on the effects of Soviet propaganda on these students, particularly through the medium of Nasser and the UAR. In this connection, he pointed out that there were a number of Egyptian teachers spreading Communism to the Iranian students, particularly in Europe. Furthermore, within the next year a book would be published by Egyptian scholars with local editions in various countries condemning the Shah and the present regime in Iran.

Changing the subject, the Secretary pointed out that in his review of the Iranian situation he had noted that about every six months the Iranian Government and the Shah had asked for assurances of United States backing. He asked frankly what the Minister felt was the cause of these requests. The Minister indicated in his opinion cause number one was the American press, which from time to time had unfriendly and unduly critical articles on the Iranian regime. These had their effect on the Iranian people and the Shah, making them doubt the full backing of the United States. Another reason which he gave was the continued Russian propaganda blasts against Iran which had an unsettling effect on the people. The third reason, which he mentioned briefly, dealt with our aid program and its insufficiency.

The Secretary than inquired whether in view of this unrest of students, etc., as described by the Foreign Minister, Iran’s greatest needs weren’t in the field of economic and social progress rather than military. The Minister agreed in part but also emphasized Iran’s fears of military aggression from neighboring countries, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, with the more remote possibility of a future danger from Nasserism spreading through the Middle East.

In commenting on the Iranian political situation the Foreign Minister said in his opinion his country was not ready for democracy as we envisaged it because the Iranian people had no faith in elected members of their Parliament. One highly critical member recently easily captured popular acclaim by just being different and being against the Government. He pointed out that this was a serious problem for the Shah and one which prevented rapid progress toward democratization. In this context he also pointed out that it was because of these uncertainties that at the present time the Government hesitated to invite CENTO headquarters to move to Iran.

The Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of students and pointed out that the British had been of some help through a women’s organization which took an interest in keeping the co-eds busy and out of trouble. He wondered whether there weren’t some organizations in the United States which could take a similar interest in both men and women students, and thus help the Iranian Government with this major problem.

As a last point in the conversation, the Secretary expressed more or less in question form the idea that the Iranians should build up enthusiasm in their student body and young people with a view toward stimulating serious interest in the welfare of their country and government. The Foreign Minister’s reply was fairly noncommittal, but indicated that some steps along this line were being taken. The discussion ended with an earnest but unimpressive plea by the Foreign Minister for more aid and understanding on the part of the United States.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/4–2861. Confidential. Drafted by Wailes and approved in S on May 18. The meeting was held at the Iranian Embassy in Ankara. Documents relating to U.S. attendance at the CENTO Conference are in Department of State, Central File 378, and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1841–1852; and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Lemnitzer Files, 333.1 (CENTO Meeting), and ibid., 1961 Files, 9070/5410 (21 July 60).
1. According to the record of the Secretary’s staff meeting on May 1, chaired by Under Secretary of State Bowles, Talbot reported on the CENTO meeting and added that “the Secretary feels that an intensive study of the situation in Iran needs to be made.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)