Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

314. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs⁰

Washington, June 30, 1962.

I. U.S. Courses of Action Tending to Relieve Tensions in the Near East

(A) Our constant concern for alleviating tensions in the Near East derives directly from our primary task of promoting our national security interests by limiting the spread of Soviet influence, identifying ourselves adequately with the aspirations of the peoples for modernization and development, and preserving Western access to oil reserves and lines of communication. In fact we can best promote these interests in an atmosphere of relative tranquility.

To serve these interests we seek to demonstrate our respect and support for the independence and sovereignty of each state; to encourage orderly political, economic and social progress; and to maintain a position of impartiality between the Arabs and Israel, with due respect for the security and well-being of Israel. The road to progress, however, is strewn with obstacles such as Arab suspicions of the West, internal stresses arising from the modernization processes, the Arab-Israel problem, and conflicts among the Arab states themselves. The Soviets have established a foothold in the Near East and no doubt will continue to look for issues to exploit to our disadvantage.

In determining courses of action in the Near East we are constantly concerned to reduce tensions. For example, we conduct our diplomacy quietly and avoid public pronouncements; we avoid placing overt pressures which would lead to counterpressures and reduction in our influence; we have ceased interfering in the internal affairs of Arab states and playing one group or state against another; we seek to ameliorate various facets of the Arab-Israel problem; we have met critical financial needs (U.A.R., Syria, Jordan and Israel) which, unsatisfied, would have exacerbated tensions; and, within the limits of our policy not to become a major supplier of arms to disputants in the Palestine problem, we have made available to Israel significant quantities of nonoffensive military equipment.

(B) Other U.S. measures in recent years have been aimed more directly at dealing with the underlying problems causing Near East tensions:

1. The Palestine refugee problem remains the most threatening and difficult aspect of the Arab-Israel dispute. The United States bears 70 percent (some $23 million annually) of the cost of supporting the refugees.

We have encouraged the United Nations Relief and Works Administration to expand vocational training to facilitate refugee movement out of the camps into profitable employment in the surrounding Arab countries.

Meanwhile, we have sought urgently for a solution which might lead gradually to elimination of some of the inflammatory potential of the refugee problem and to reduction of the burden it imposes on the U.S. taxpayer. We are handicapped by strong emotions and inflexible attitudes on both sides. The Israelis are deeply apprehensive over the implications for their security of repatriation of any significant number of Palestine Arabs. (The United States has frequently assured the Israel Government that we would never support a refugee solution that could affect Israel’s security.) The Arab governments continue to assert the right of the refugees to return to their former homes and resist strongly any solution, such as that suggested by the Hammarskjold report of 1959,¹ which envisaged intensive economic development of surrounding Arab countries which might be expected gradually to draw the refugees out of their camps and into new homes and useful employment.

In an effort to provide some movement toward progress, the United States stimulated the three-nation Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the United States is a member, to appoint last summer a Special Representative for the refugee problem. The selection of Dr. Joseph Johnson, his trip to the area, and his report to the Commission which was, in turn, conveyed to the Sixteenth General Assembly provided the basis for a United States sponsored resolution, supporting further efforts by Dr. Johnson to find some common elements in the positions of the two sides. While recognizing the difficulties with which Dr. Johnson must contend, his mission is a positive token of United States intention to take constructive action on the refugee problem. It is the first effort of this kind in several years and has been accepted tolerantly, though not enthusiastically, by both sides.

Dr. Johnson has just completed another trip to the host government capitals and to Israel, and we expect he will soon complete a detailed proposal for his next move. He was received in friendly fashion in both the Arab states and Israel, and he commenced the important conditioning process needed to prepare both sides to consider practical alternatives.

2. Recent months have seen steadily increasing concern among both Arabs and Israelis at the implications of Israel’s proposed withdrawals from the Lake Tiberias-Jordan River waters’ system scheduled to commence within the next eighteen months to two years. On its side, Israel has feared Arab military or diplomatic action aimed at preventing water uses for which the Israelis have over the last several years erected costly and elaborate installations and which are urgently required for Israel’s agricultural and industrial growth. The Arabs see Israel about to commence diversion of waters much of which rise in Arab lands and in which, as riparians, they have a right to share. They feel Israel may well intend to withdraw quantities beyond its equitable share. The recent U.S. assurances with regard to Israel’s right to water withdrawals and reciprocal Israel assurances protecting Arab rights is, of course, aimed at preventing eruption of hostilities. In addition we are quietly encouraging the Arabs to proceed with the development of their share of the waters, by this means hoping to reduce some of the tensions in concentrating on a constructive facet.

3. Events of the summer of 1958 demonstrated the crucial position of Lebanon as a focal point for area conflict and tensions. On December 31, 1961, an attempted military coup was crushed by loyal Lebanese forces but repercussions within Lebanon and surrounding countries have continued. To offset a deep Lebanese sense of insecurity and in response to Lebanese requests, U.S. officials, including the President, offered affirmations, without military commitment, of our support for Lebanon’s stability, independence and integrity. These assurances played an important role in returning Lebanese internal affairs to a more normal course.

4. In mid-March hostilities flared in the northeastern area of Lake Tiberias. When Syria’s complaint against an Israeli retaliatory raid was brought before the Security Council, the U.S. stood, as it has in the past, for a firm reproof of this type of Israeli action. The Security Council’s unanimous acceptance, with but one abstention, of the U.S. resolution demonstrated once again the international community’s preference for use of United Nations mechanisms for settlement of area problems rather than a dangerous resort to escalating hostilities. Since then, the U.S. has impressed upon both Syria and Israel the urgent need for restraint in this tense area, and we propose to support United Nations efforts to improve the effectiveness of its machinery in the area.

5. Following reaffirmation of Kuwait’s independence in a Kuwaiti-United Kingdom exchange of letters in June 1961, Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq reiterated in threatening manner his country’s claim to Kuwait’s territory. The U.S. has backed up the United Kingdom fully in the latter’s determination to support Kuwait. Qasim realized that any attempt to seize Kuwait would be met by British military force, and that the U.S. stood squarely behind the British position.

6. Occasional visits of Sixth Fleet vessels to Eastern Mediterranean ports are arranged. We have in mind resumption of visits of Sixth Fleet units to Haifa at a suitable time in coming months.

7. When news of construction of Israel’s Dimona reactor led the Arabs to fear creation by Israel of a nuclear weapons capability, the Department arranged for an inspection of the reactor by two American scientists on the basis of whose visit we were able to reassure the Arabs that the reactor is designed for peaceful purposes. Arrangements for further periodic inspections followed by renewed assurances to the Arabs are being undertaken.

8. We are at present endeavoring to persuade the UAR and Iran to cease their radio campaigns against each other, and in recent months we have encouraged the UAR to moderate its radio propaganda and have advised Jordan to avoid interference in the internal affairs of other Arab states and to devote its energy and resources to the development of Jordan.

9. Our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, doubling as Minister to Yemen, has played a useful role as intermediary between Yemen and the British authorities in Aden in achievement of a detente in that area.

10. We are at present engaged in a thorough review of our policies toward Israel with a view to determining measures we may take to alleviate Israel’s security concerns and remove some of the irritants in our relations.

II. U.S. Actions to Eliminate Barriers to Travel by American Citizens in the Near East

(A) Saudi Arabia

Since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, Saudi Arabia has customarily declined to grant entry visas to persons of Jewish faith whatever their nationality. The United States has taken every appropriate opportunity to impress on the Saudi Arabian Government our abhorrence of practices which discriminate against American citizens on grounds of religious faith.

Saudi Arabia, which considers that a state of war still exists between the Arab states and Israel, asserts its policy is prompted by security considerations and is not intended to discriminate against persons of Jewish faith but is intended to bar admittance to Zionist supporters. Saudi Arabia’s exclusionist policy is stimulated also by a strain of xenophobia which, while diluted in recent years by increasing contact with the Western world, continues to be present and tends to surround the whole process of obtaining a Saudi visa with conditions and delays.

Over a period of years we have sought mitigation and eventual reversal of the Saudi Arabian policy of excluding U.S. citizens of the Jewish faith, as well as restrictions against Jewish-owned commercial firms in the U.S. We have done so through our Ambassador in Jidda, through the Saudi Ambassador in Washington and through direct Presidential intervention with the King during the latter’s recent visit to Washington. We have repeatedly emphasized that discriminatory practices against American citizens on grounds of race, creed or color—whatever the reasons—are repugnant to the fundamental principles on which this country was founded.

We have proposed to the Saudi Arabians that as a first step they should shift their policies by certain modifications: (1) the issuance of visas to U.S. Congressmen of any faith and (2) permission for American citizens of Jewish faith to transit Dhahran airport. During the King’s visit the President suggested these modifications and reminded him that Saudi Arabia’s position on this matter is more extreme than that of any other Arab country, including the UAR, which imposes no restrictions on the entry of persons of the Jewish faith. While restating the Saudi position that only Zionists are refused entry into Saudi Arabia, the King agreed to explore the possibility of bringing Saudi policy at least into line with the more moderate visa-issuance policies of other Arab states. The King requested that upon his return to Saudi Arabia our Ambassador should deal with him directly on the matter. We so apprised our Ambassador and requested that he take every suitable opportunity to press the King further. Since the King’s return to Saudi Arabia in late March, urgent operational problems have had to take precedence in the talks our Ambassador has had with the King. In addition the decline in the King’s health plus necessary absences of our Ambassador from Saudi Arabia reduced opportunities for contacts, and for the past month the King has been away from Saudi Arabia for reasons of health.

During Assistant Secretary Talbot’s meeting in Athens in mid-June with Near Eastern Ambassadors, he discussed with them in depth the problem of discrimination and with Ambassador Hart in a private conversation he stressed the importance of this issue in the conduct of our policy. The Ambassadors in general and Ambassador Hart in particular understand fully the significance of the problem. The latter proposes to seek an early opportunity to take up the matter shortly after the King’s return, but he frankly expressed the view that, given the internal policies of the kingdom plus the current Saudi attitude toward the U.S., he could not be sanguine of early favorable action by the King. In his view, progress can come only slowly with persistent action on his part. He did point out that under the lead of the Royal Family liberalization is slowly coming in Saudi Arabia, citing the fact that Christian worship is now occurring in Dhahran and Jidda on United States-controlled premises, something that could not have occurred a few years ago. In addition, girls’ schools are now operating under the sponsorship of members of the Royal Family, equally impossible a few years ago.

We are convinced that successful amelioration of Saudi Arabia’s exclusionist policy can only come about through quiet and persuasive diplomacy and that attempts at undue pressure on our part might well inhibit prospects for making progress in this matter and even jeopardize our relations with a country whose interests and orientation coincide in many respects with our own. We have been guided accordingly in seeking to assist Congressman Halpern to obtain a visa for Saudi Arabia. Without publicity we have on his behalf approached the Saudi authorities at all levels, including the King (before his White House visit), but as yet to no avail. We have informed the Congressman of our continuing efforts and have expressed the view that, while we are vexed by the Saudi inaction, little would be gained, and perhaps much lost, by public recrimination.

(B) Syria

In 1959, while Syria was part of the United Arab Republic, the United States took advantage of the fact that it was the policy of the Egyptian region not to discriminate against travelers of Jewish faith, to urge that a similar policy be followed in Syria. Our representations were received favorably by the UAR Central Government, but implementation was not immediate because of the considerable local autonomy maintained by the Government of the Syrian Region which held that admission of persons of the Jewish faith created a security problem for Syria in view of the strong feelings of the populace concerning the Palestine problem. The American Embassy in Cairo, nevertheless, continued to pursue the matter and was greatly assisted in its endeavors by Egyptian and Syrian officials responsible for tourism who wanted to increase the income earned by the Syrian region in this field. Eventually in 1960 the UAR Foreign Office was able to give us assurances that Jewish travelers would be welcome in the Syrian region provided they arrived in organized tourist groups. Since the secession of Syria from the UAR we know of no change in this policy, nor have any complaints been brought to the Department’s attention.

(C) Jordan²

Our strenuous efforts with Jordan over many months finally resulted in late April in the removal from its visa application forms of the requirement for a baptismal certificate. However, shortly thereafter we learned that the requirement was replaced by one asking the religion of the applicant and that applications by persons of the Jewish faith were to be referred to Amman for decision. Further representations have been made to the Jordanian government and to the Jordanian Ambassador here, so far without result.

In Athens recently Assistant Secretary Talbot discussed the problem with Ambassador Macomber, who is fully conversant with its implications for U.S. policy. The Ambassador stated he had warned high Jordanian officials that following his return from the Athens conference, he intended to exert serious pressure on them to relax their discriminatory practices and to grant the Jordanian Ambassador in Washington considerable latitude in issuance of visas to American Jews. On June 26 Ambassador Macomber reported a series of conversations he has now had with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The former agreed that the Ambassador could assure the Secretary of State that within one month a way would be found to liberalize the issuance of Jordanian visas in Washington. Whether there is performance remains to be seen.

Actually, with few exceptions we have found the Jordanian government willing to waive its restrictive requirements in the case of individuals who secured the Department’s intervention. Thus, exceptions have been made to allow entry of individuals whose passports bore Israeli stamps. In other cases, Americans of Jewish faith or Americans known to be friendly to Zionist organizations were permitted to come to Jordan again after U.S. official representations.

The United States Government will continue to make all approaches it can appropriately initiate with a view to further relaxations of Jordanian restrictive practices as they relate to the travel of American citizens.

III. The Arab Boycott³

The Arab boycott stems from the Arab-Israel conflict and is designed by the Arabs to reduce the economic and hence the military potential of Israel. The causal relationship between the boycott and the Arab-Israel dispute tends to give the boycott all the emotional intensity and complexity of its underlying stimulus.

Over the years U.S. policy toward the boycott has been made clear: the United States does not recognize or condone the boycott and has consistently refused to facilitate its application. Our posts abroad are under standing instructions to reiterate this fundamental position on every appropriate occasion. For example, in July of 1961 the Department protested vigorously to the Government of Kuwait the latter’s sending to a number of American firms letters requesting compliance with boycott regulations under threat of blacklisting for noncompliance. The despatch of these letters by Kuwait now appears to have ceased. Furthermore, the Department stands ready to protest individual boycott actions which are harmful to American firms. In point of fact, however, we have received few requests for protests from firms affected by the boycott. American firms have generally wished to resolve their difficulties with Arab boycott offices in a manner which will attract the least publicity and in light of their own decision as to where their commercial interests lie. In several cases when we have offered to protest, the American firms have not taken advantage of the Department’s offer. Whereas the regulations for the boycott have been laid down by the Arab League, their application is left to the individual Arab states. Here practice varies widely and in some Arab countries the boycott has no practical effect on American firms. In others pragmatic considerations play an important part and the usual boycott procedures may be set aside in favor of the countries’ own self-interest.

Arab boycott regulations do not involve religious discrimination and thus Arab firms are neither prohibited nor do most of them refrain from doing business with Jewish-owned firms. The boycott does include a primary boycott under which all trade and financial transactions between the Arab countries and Israel are prohibited and a secondary boycott in which firms or individuals who maintain particularly close business ties with Israel or who contribute to Israel causes are blacklisted. In the latter case, these firms or individuals are denied the right to trade with the Arab countries. Mere sale of goods by a non-Arab firm to Israel is not a cause for blacklisting. The boycott also prohibits an airline or shipping line from establishing regular passenger or freight services between Israel and Arab countries. However, shipping and airlines, TWA for example, may serve both Israel and an Arab country in separate runs. With the exception of tourist ships, maritime transportation is prohibited from calling at an Israel and an Arab port on the same trip. Mere calling at an Israel port is not, however, grounds for blacklisting a vessel. Vessels carrying munitions to Israel will be blacklisted. Blacklisting does not bar ships from the Suez Canal although it does prevent vessels from receiving bunkering and other services in Suez Canal ports. (Thus no American vessel has been denied use of the Suez Canal.)

Several years ago a form used by a Saudi Arabian lawyer in connection with the registration of foreign trademarks in that country required the applicant firm to certify that it was not Jewish controlled or owned. This document has been referred to as the creed-sworn declaration. It is not clear whether this declaration followed a format laid down by the Saudi Arabian Government or whether it was merely the lawyer’s interpretation of what was required. In any event, it went beyond Arab League boycott regulations. Subsequent to 1956, when this matter came to the attention of ranking Department officers, the Department has refused to provide authentication services in connection with any declarations which gave evidence of racial or religious discrimination. As a result of this decision, a number of American firms were unable to register their trademarks in Saudi Arabia. The Department made a series of representations to the Saudi Government regarding this matter and in the latter part of 1960 the creed-sworn declaration was withdrawn from use. No other instances of Arab governments applying the boycott on racial or religious grounds have come to the Department’s attention in recent years.

There have been a few cases in which an Arab firm has unilaterally decided not to do business with Jewish-owned firms. Such decisions, however, have not appeared to be based on the policies of the Arab governments nor on the rules and regulations of the boycott.

For example, in 1961, the Department of Commerce publicized to the American business community the interest of a Jordanian firm in securing bids for processed cheese. A West Coast publishing firm telegraphed the Jordanian firm asking if it was interested in bids from three cheese manufacturers, two of whom were stated to be Jewish. The Jordanian firm asked that the non-Jewish firm submit a bid. This case was brought to the attention of the Department by the publishing house. Our Ambassador in Amman, under instructions from the Department, raised the matter with the Jordanian Prime Minister who expressed strong disapproval of the discriminatory attitude of the Jordanian firm.

Recently the Department has discussed with representatives of the Monsanto Chemical Company a threat of boycott against it in reprisal for its plan to construct through one of its subsidiaries a plant in Israel for Israeli account. The company desired that the Department take no action on its behalf, considering (a) that its interests in Israel outweigh those in the Arab world and (b) that it has certain means of continuing to do business in the Arab countries even if placed on the boycott list. In addition, in response to our approach to Minister of Economy Kaissouni regarding a warning to Hilton Hotels to stop its construction of a hotel in Israel or face loss of its contract for operation of the Nile Hilton, the Minister has assured us that no action will be taken against Hilton (the UAR values highly the tourist dollar).

Neither the Department of State nor the Department of Commerce disseminates business opportunities in the Arab states where there is evidence of discrimination on racial or religious grounds. If this element is not present, however, business opportunities in the Arab countries are publicized.

No department or agency of the United States Government has sanctioned or approved any contractual language of a discriminatory nature in ship charters nor any language barring American flag vessels touching at Israel ports from carrying gifts of American surplus agricultural commodities to Arab countries under Titles II and III of Public Law 480. In the case of Title I shipments under Public Law 480, countries making these purchases take delivery at dockside and negotiate shipping arrangements themselves directly with the private carriers. Restrictive clauses in ship charters negotiated by the United Arab Republic have included a prohibition against sailing in Israeli waters prior to discharge. UAR authorities assert this is not a boycott provision but is inserted as a precaution in view of the continuing tension in the area. The Israeli Government has included clauses in its Title I Public Law 480 cargo charter contracts which similarly forbid transporting vessels to sail in Arab waters or call at Arab ports prior to discharge.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6–3062. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Thacher and cleared by Talbot, Cleveland, and Sisco. Hewitt (L) cleared Part III. Transmitted to Bundy (NSC) on June 30 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck that reads: “The enclosed memorandum is the revision due July 1 of the preliminary report forwarded on May 29 [see footnote 2, Document 280] in response to Mr. Feldman’s request on behalf of the President for a recapitulation of United States courses of action aimed at (1) lessening tension in the Near East, (2) eliminating barriers to travel by American citizens in the area, and (3) alleviating the impact of the Arab boycott on American businessmen.”
1. Proposals for Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Document Submitted by U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, June 15, 1959; U.N. doc. A/4121 and Corr. 1.
2. Documentation relating to the question of discrimination and Jordan’s visa policy is in Department of State, Central File 885.181.
3. Documentation relating to the Arab economic boycott against Israel is ibid., 484A.8612, 486.1112, and 486.84A2.