274. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State0
954. I called on Prime Minister Amini today after his return from his pilgrimage to Mecca. He began the conversation by stressing the alarm and concern he had encountered on the part of King Saud, Prince Faisal, and other Saudi officials and civilians, as well as the Jordanian Chargé, [Page 675] with regard to the US policy toward the UAR. He found great bitterness toward the UAR in Jidda, and the conviction that if the US were not supporting Nasser he would collapse. The Saudis and the Jordanian Chargé found it impossible to understand why the US, which purported to be their friend, was helping the man who was seeking to destroy their governments. These officials did not share what they understood to be the US view that at least Nasser was not a Communist and that if he were to disappear there might be the danger of a Communist or extreme leftist regime in Egypt. They felt that in the event of Nasser’s collapse some other group, not Communist, would take over.
Amini said that he had endeavored to allay these fears and to persuade Saudi officials that just because the US was helping Nasser was no reason to believe it had any less regard for its friendship with Saudi Arabia. He pointed out that the question of the course and policy of the Egyptian Government had long been a complicated one and that although Iran had no cause to love Nasser, it could understand how broader considerations might make it desirable for the US to help him.
I said that I believed our policy toward the UAR was based on the estimate that this was a time of crisis in Egypt, that it might well be a unique opportunity for the West to gain a position of greater influence in Cairo, and that it would be better for the neighboring states if the UAR were to devote its energies to the domestic field. I said that we did not see how the Near East as a whole would benefit if there should be collapse and chaos in Egypt, possibly preceded by foreign adventures, and said that as far as I knew we felt far from certain that a regime which might take Nasser’s place would be a more constructive one from our point of view. After reviewing the long standing quarrel between Saud and Nasser, in which Saud was caught red-handed in a plot to break up the UAR, I asked the Prime Minister whether he would wish to see us abandon the UAR to the USSR, to which Nasser would certainly turn in greater degree in a time of crisis. I said that I assumed he would wish that the US were able to have a greater presence in Iraq through its aid facilities, and he thoroughly agreed. Dr. Amini reiterated that he knew that the question of aid to Egypt involved broad policy considerations but urged that we make a greater effort to persuade the Saudi Arabians and the Jordanians of the validity of these. He said he sensed a strong anti-American current in the Arabian Peninsula and also the feeling that the US might be gradually abandoning its interest in Saudi Arabia. He felt that the insecurity which was so apparent in the top officialdom there resulted more from the decadence of the ruling group and the enormous gap between rich and poor than it did from any immediate threat from Cairo.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/5–2362. Confidential. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and Amman.↩