267. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State0
232. Following text received subsequent to despatch Contel 231.1 For Talbot and Cleveland. Johnson and Moe saw Jordan ForMin Nuseibeh 3 May immediately after arrival Amman from Cairo, and again on Saturday 5 May and then had long session with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Johnson also had audience with King Saturday, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister being present. Johnson and Moe met Foreign Minister and subsequently Prime Minister with Foreign Minister again Sunday. That evening Foreign Minister gave large buffet dinner for Johnson; the Prime Minster, several other cabinet members, a number of high government officials, and leading public figures including prominent refugees were present, also several Arab Ambassadors.
After Johnson made his usual opening statement Nuseibeh began by formally reading text of Riyadh Resolution2 in fulfillment of what he described as his duty. Subsequent discussions variously described as “private”, “off the record”, “unofficial”, etc. were very frank and free-flowing ranging over the whole Palestine question, although both Ministers acknowledged that Johnson’s mission limited to paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) and that Arabs had repeatedly insisted this point. At one point Nuseibeh justified this departure from the Arab position for the record by referring to the last paragraph of the Riyadh Resolution which in substance states that question of refugees cannot be disassociated from Palestine question as whole and from relevant UN resolutions. Principal points of Jordan position were:
- (1)
- Complexities of Palestine question so inter-related that no part can be separated from rest.
- (2)
- If, as Johnson’s suggestions appeared to indicate, only a relatively small proportion of refugees would be repatriated, with rest accepting compensation, that would take [in] effect lead to liquidation of Palestine question as a whole, to Arab disadvantage.
- (3)
- If suggestion meant however that most refugees would return, this would change the nature of Israel and be step in right direction.
- (4)
- Since latter is evidently unlikely if refugee question dealt with separately, only possible answer is to grapple with Palestine problem as a whole, and Johnson’s approach is therefore unrealistic.
When Johnson expressed his surprise in view of the Arabs initiative on paragraph 11 and their reiterated insistence that he limit himself to it, both Ministers were frankly critical of Arab for proposing this approach and openly puzzled as to reasons for it. (Same attitude was expressed by many at the dinner.) Johnson pointed out possible effect of inconsistency in world opinion and UN General Assembly action. The point got across.
It is clear that both men feel that any stirrings in the Arab world are signs that 1962 may well be a “turning point” year that calls for a serious new look at Palestine question by Arabs. They urged that UN, the great powers, etc., also take new look. They do not however have yet in mind any concrete proposals or plan. They are searching for ways to overcome present weakness vis-à-vis Israel and in words of King “correct the imbalance”. All are aware of difficulties, particularly in light of frankly acknowledged conflict among Arab states. Only thing specific is that they reject Palestine entity concept or a liberation government on Algerian model.
When Johnson asked Nuseibeh what he felt refugees would choose if given the chance, Foreign Minister expressed conviction that most would elect to return. The Prime Minister however, when asked same question in Nuseibeh’s presence, was doubtful that many would so choose.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/5–862. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN.↩
- Dated May 8. (Ibid., 325.84/5–862)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 258.↩