Office of the Historian

265. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, May 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Iran—New Plan for U.S. Military Assistance to Iran

Through the Defense Department’s Memorandum of Conversation covering the talk between the Shah of Iran and the Secretary of Defense on April 12,1 and the Aide-Mémoire covering that conversation presented to the Shah on April 13,2 you are aware of the nature of the new five-year U.S. Plan for military assistance to smaller Iranian armed forces. Minor modifications, such as the early provision of C–47 aircraft, were made prior to the Shah’s departure from the United States.

In receiving the Aide-Mémoire, the Shah did not state specifically that he approved of the entire U.S. approach, and there were later indications that the Shah was slightly piqued because he had not participated in the formulation of the U.S. concept.

Ambassador Holmes, however, had several long conversations with the Shah in New York, and is convinced that the Shah is in essential agreement with the Plan, and will accept it. Ambassador Holmes feels that the Shah will delay in conveying a full acceptance until he utilizes the presence of a JCS planning team in Iran to make a final effort to persuade U.S. military authorities of the usefulness of certain additional items of equipment. State and Defense have agreed that for all practical purposes the Shah is reconciled to the general provisions of the U.S. Plan; he is welcoming the JCS team to Iran, and the presence of the team is an essential element of the Plan. We also appreciate that the Iranian military will continue to press for additional items not included in the Aide-Mémoire and will argue in favor of retaining substantial forces above the 150,000, as a static force for the northern borders. The success [Page 660] of the planning team and follow-up action on the part of the Shah is, therefore, an important consideration to reviewing the U.S. Plan after the planning team submits its report.

The JCS planning team, to be headed by a general officer, is to coordinate closely with CINCEUR, with Armish/MAAG in Tehran, and with the U.S. Permanent Military Deputy to CENTO. It is to report its findings by July 1, 1962. Its primary mission is fourfold:

1.
Develop a detailed early warning plan for Iran, including cost estimates, consulting with the British military authorities as to steps which the U.S. can take to assist in providing the required equipment.
2.
A study of airfield requirements in Iran, particularly the staging base in eastern Iran, with detailed costing of any additional construction required.
3.
A plan for the reorganization of the Iranian armed forces at a reduced manpower level.
4.
The resolution of the discrepancy between Iranian force goals established by CENTO and those established bilaterally between Iran and the U.S.

Under these circumstances, and pending the report of the JCS planning team, State and Defense intend to proceed on the basis that the U.S. Plan is firm.

Walter Collopy3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/5–462. Secret. Drafted by Bowling on May 2 and cleared by Tucker (DOD/ISA), Gaud (AID/NESA), W. B. Robinson (G/PM), and Cottam (NEA). A copy was sent to the Embassy in Tehran. On May 7, Komer transmitted this memorandum to Bundy under cover of a note that reads: “This is part of response to my continued pressure lest we end up giving Shah through back door a different answer than we gave him through front. Charter of JCS planning team (see p. 2) gives plenty of leeway for this, though I’m assured they’ll be well-briefed to hold fast. So far so good, but I’m keeping my fingers crossed.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 3/27/62–5/21/62)↩
  2. Document 244.↩
  3. Document 248.↩
  4. Collopy (S/S) signed for Battle above Battle’s typed signature.↩